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STANDARD OF REVIEW
In its Brief, Appellants

(hereinafter collectively

"White

Pine Ranches") claim only questions of law are on appeal, which
questions do not require deference by this Court.

White Pine

Ranches' Brief, however, continually argues the inappropriateness
of Judge Frederick's Findings of Fact.1
The trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on
appeal unless clearly erroneous.

Utah R, Civ. P. 52(a); Copper

State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appl. & Furn. Co., 770 P.2 88, 93
(Utah 1988); Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v.
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987).

A finding is

clearly erroneous only if it is without adequate evidentiary

As examples, White Pine Ranches argues the "purpose"
behind the Sharps1 right of approval of the CC&R's and
plat (Appellants' Brief, p. 6 ) ; that Heaton "claimed"
there was a modification in the parties1 agreement which
Felton's testimony "disputed" (Id., p. 8 ) ; that Sharps
never responded to White Pine Ranchesf demands to
release Lot 6 and the road (Id, p. 10); that White Pine
Ranches did not agree with the Sharps1 right of access
over the internal roadway (Id., p. 17); that it was
"painfully obvious" through the Sharps1 testimony they
never regarded the Consent to Record the CC&R's and plat
as a reconveyance (Id., p. 21, n. 11); that Sharps did
not rely in good faith on the advice of counsel (fn.,
pp. 22-25); and that the Sharps' access to the Property
was "not supported by the evidence" (Id., p. 39). These
are all arguments disputing Judge Fredericks1 Findings
of Fact. Alternatively, if only questions of law are on
appeal, the Findings of Fact are conclusive and this
Court is limited only to determining whether the Findings of Fact support the Conclusions of Law. Ebenezer
A.M.E. Zion Church v. Corporate Loan & Sec. Co. , 72
Wash. 2d. 128, 432 P.2d 291 (1967).

xi

support.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Accord

Western Capital v. Knudsvicr, 768 Pc2d

989, 991

(Utah Ct. App.

1989).
This Court must begin its analysis with the trial court's
Findings of Fact and not with White Pine Ranches' view of the way
it thinks the facts should have been found.
P.2 147, 150 (Utah 1987).

Ashton v. Ashton, 73 3

White Pine Ranches must first marshall

all evidence supporting the Findings

(which

is plentiful), and

then demonstrate that these Findings are "so lacking in support as
to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence. 1 "

In re Estate

of Bartell. 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (1989) (quoting Walker, 743
P.2d at 193).
overturning

"[AJppellants should recognize that the burden of

factual

findings

is a heavy one, reflective of the

fact we do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed fact.11
Id. at 4.
The

trial

court

found

it was

necessary

to

interpret

the

parties' Contract with reference to contemporaneous and subsequent
documents between

the parties

and between

a party

and various

third parties, by reference to subsequent dealings (course of conduct) between the parties, and with reference to contemporaneous
and subsequent events. 2

In such cases, this Court has held the

standard of review is:
... [I]f the contract is ambiguous and the trial court
makes factual findings about the intent of the parties

2

As examples, the trial court found that Exhibit 15 was
"ambiguous" (Tr. 733, R. 1645), that the proposed PUD
plat contained an internal roadway description
(cont.)

xii

based on extrinsic evidence, our review is strictly
limited.
If those findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record, they are not
clearly erroneous under Utah R*Civ«Pc 52(a) and we will
not disturb them on appeal.
Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P e 2d 1102, 1104 (Utaho Ctc App,
1988) (citations omitted).

2 (cont.):
"commonly used in plats to dedicate roads to public
use," (Ex. 39; F. 19, R. 1333, Add. B24) ; that at the
time of White Pine Ranches' development, it was "anticipated that additional developments by third parties
would occur . . . including the development of a ski
resort in White Pine Canyon."
(F. 25, R. 13 35, Add.
B26) ; that the proposed final plat included an Owner ! s
Dedication for a private road and utility easements (F.
34, R. 1337, Add. B28); that in a subsequent conversation between Felton and attorney Jon Heaton, it was
agreed that "access over the road retained if Sharp
develops undeveloped property Lots 7-12" (F. 37, R.
1338, Add. B29) ; that it was the actual practice of
White Pine Ranches to make specific requests for release
of specific PUD lots after payments were made and no
default existed (F. 47, R. 1341, Add. B32) ; that White
Pine Ranches made no claims of breach by the Sharps
until years after their own admitted breaches (F. 53, R.
1342, Add. C33; F. 71, R. 1337, Add. B38; F. 59, R.
1343-1344, B35-36); that the Sharps "perceived" their
execution of the Consent to Record constituted substantial performance to release the road (F. 60, R. 1341,
Add. B35); that most of the damages sought by White Pine
Ranches from the Sharps were the same damages it sought
in other litigation against SBSID and Summit County (F.
70, R. 1347, Add. B38) ; that the Sharps did not interfere with White Pine Ranches1 attempts to market the
Property (F. 72, R. 1347, Add. B38) ; that the Sharps
repeatedly assured White Pine Ranches they did not
intend, through foreclosure, to interfere with the lot
owners1 access rights to the road and utility easements
(F. 88, R. 1351, Add. B42) , that it was the mutual
intent of the parties the Sharps be granted use of the
road in the event of default (F. 89, R. 1351, Add. B42) ;
and that the Sharps acted in good faith and in reliance
on the advice of their counsel in refusing to reconvey
Lot 6, the road and the unplatted acreage (F. 91, R.
1351, Add. B42).
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CITATION TO THE RECORD
Citations to the record will be abbreviated as follows:
Record on Appeal
Trial Transcript
Exhibit
Findings of Fact
Conclusion of Law

"R."
"Tr."
"Ex."
"F."
"C."

Judgment

"J."

The Addendum includes relevant portions of the Record and Exhibits and shall be cited to as "Add*" with the page number
following the Record or Exhibit citation.

White Pine Ranches

attached only drafts of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and the Judgment to its Brief.

Signed copies of the Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment are attached in
Addendum B.

The Addendum has for ease of reference been numbered

consecutively and has been divided into the following four parts:
A - The Contract documents, i.e., Trust Deed, Trust Deed
Note, Earnest Money Agreement, Memorandum of Closing
Terms, the Owners Dedication of Exhibit "A" attached
to the Memorandum of Closing Terms and the Warranty
Deed.
B - The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the
Judgment.
C - Subsequent correspondence between the parties.
D - Various documents pertaining to White Pine Ranchesf
damage claims.
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JURISDICTION
Section 3 of Article 8 of the Utah Const,. Section 78-2-2(3)
of the Utah Code Ann, and Rule 3(a) of the R. Utah Ct. App. confer
jurisdiction on this Court to hear this appeal.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from a final Judgment

("Judgment") of the

Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding, dismissing
White Pine Ranches' Complaint, no cause of action, and granting
judgment

against Leon H. Saunders

("Saunders"), Robert Felton

("Felton") and Kenneth R. Norton dba Interstate Rentals, Inc.
("Norton") on a Trust Deed Note, ordering the property as security
under the Trust Deed

("the Property") be judicially foreclosed

and entering judgment for damages suffered due to a wrongful
injunction against Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company as surety
on a bond.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented by White Pine Ranches in this appeal
appear in a different order in this Brief than in White Pine
Ranches1

Brief to avoid the redundancy in White Pine Ranches1

Brief and to provide this Court with a succinct and logical
organization of the Sharps' arguments.3
3

White Pine Ranches' Brief
Point A 1, pp. 14-16
Point A 2, pp. 16-19

(cont.)
1

Sharps' Brief
Point III, pp. 26-29
Point V, pp. 31-35

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action arose when White Pine Ranches filed a Complaint
the day before a scheduled Trustee's Sale of the Property located
in White Pine Canyon, Snyderville, Utah.
1352, Add. B43).

(R. 2-89; F. 95, R.

The Complaint sought to enjoin the scheduled

Trustee's Sale, alleging, inter alia, that the Sharps had breached
the Contract between the parties 4 by failing to release Lot 6 and

3 (cont).
Point A 3(a), pp. 19-20
Point A 3(b), pp. 20-21
Point A 3(C), pp. 21-22
Point A 4(a), pp. 22-24
Point A 4(b), pp. 25-29
Point A 4(C), pp. 30-32
Point A 5, pp. 32-33
Point A 6(a)-(e), pp. 33-38
Point B 1-4, pp. 38-45
Point C 1-3, pp. 45-49
Point D,, pp. 49-50

Points I-V, pp. 20-35
Point III, pp. 26-29
Points I-V, pp. 20-35
Point VI, pp. 3 5-3 6
Point I, pp. 20-22
Point II, pp. 2 3-26
Point VI, pp. 35-38
Point VII, pp. 38-43
Point IV, pp. 29-31
Point VIII, pp. 43-49
Respondents• Brief
to Commissioner of
Financial Institutions

The Contract between the parties includes the Memorandum
of Closing Terms (hereinafter the "Memo") (Ex. 15, Add.
A9-13), a Special Warranty Deed (Ex. 17, Add. A16-17), a
Trust Deed Note (Ex. 3, Add. 5-6) together with an
Addendum to the Trust Deed Note and a Trust Deed (Ex. 2,
Add Al-4) (collectively referred to as "the Contract").
(F. 10, R. 1330, Add. B21; C. 1, R. 1355, Add. B46.)
The initial draft of a purchase agreement was prepared
by Counterclaim Defendant, Paul H. Landes, a signatory
to the final documents composing the parties 1 Contract.
(Ex. 13; Tr. 728, R. 1645).
The parties extensively
negotiated the terms of the Contract.
(Tr. 556, R.
1644) . For instance, four drafts of the Earnest Money
were discussed.
(Tr. 729-730, R. 1645).
The rule of
construction that ambiguity in a contract is construed
against its drafter is inapplicable where such contract
is the result of extensive negotiations between (cont.)
2

the roadway and 7.35 acres of the unplatted portion of the Property,

(R. 2-89).

The Complaint further alleged the Sharps had

breached the Contract by failing to pay their alleged pro rata
share of the cost of constructing certain improvements on the
Property by failing to grant an easement to the County on a 10-1/2
foot strip of land for the sole purpose of widening the County
roadway,5 and asserted causes of action for fraud,6 slander of
title,

and

failure

to

reconvey.

The trial

court granted a

temporary restraining order on September 4, 1986, enjoining the
Trustee's Sale and the matter proceeded to trial in January and
March of 1988.
The

case

arose

against

the

following

background.

The

Property was purchased with a down payment at closing and a
promise to make five annual installments payable on June 3 0 of

4 (cont.)
the parties. Centennial Enter, v. Mansfield Dev. Co. ,
568 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1977). Additionally, the rule only
functions after the court has considered all pertinent
extrinsic evidence and is still uncertain as to the
contract's interpretation.
Wilburn v. Interstate
Elec., 748 P.2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
5

The County roadway has not been widened, there are no
current plans to do so and the County has never requested an easement from the Sharps. (Ex. 107, p. 15,
Add. D99; F. 21, R. 1334, Add. B25).

6

The claimed misrepresentations were denied by summary
judgment. (R. 124-125.)

3

each subsequent year

in the amount

of $192,611.06 principal,

(Ex. 3, Add. A 6 ) . 7

together with accrued interest.

The Property

was intended to be promptly developed as a Planned Unit Development

("PUD") into twelve 4 or 5 acre lots, with an internal

roadway dedicated to public use.
A14; F. 5, R. 1329, Add. B20). 8

(Ex. 14, Add. A7-8; Ex. 39, Add.
The dedication of the roadway was

of such vital importance to the parties that an initial plat was
attached as Exhibit "A" to the Memo.

(Exhibit "A" is partially

reproduced in White Pine Ranches1 Addendum ("WPR Add."), pp. 7682) .

Paragraph 5 of the Memo further provided that "changes in

the proposed plat and the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions when prepared

shall be subject to the reasonable

approval of Seller [the Sharps].11

(Ex. 15, Add. A9) .

The Sharps

were concerned that, in the event of default, they possessed
access to the Property (Tr. 749-750, R. 1645) and Felton knew the
Sharps "wanted the right to approve them [any changes] reasonably."

(Tr. 138, R. 1642).

The Memo also provided after "the recordation of a PUD Plat
and

Declaration

of

covenants,

conditions

and

restrictions"

7

See p. 1, n. 1 of White Pine Ranches1 Brief regarding
the transfers of White Pine Ranches1 interest in the
Property among the various partners and partnerships.

8

Prior to the parties1 closing and execution of the Memo,
Summit County had refused to approve a private road
system. (F. 14, R. 1331, Add. B22).

4

("CCRs") that White Pine Ranches would be entitled to the release
of three PUD lots of its "choice together with said roadway" in
the proposed plat attached as Exhibit 'A.111
Add. A9) (emphasis added).

(Ex, 15, para 3.,

For each $140,000.00 in principal paid

thereafter and after recordation of the PUD, White Pine Ranches
"shall be entitled to the release of one
choice."
Memo

(1) lot of Buyer's

(Ex. 15, para. 1 & 2, Add. A9) (emphasis added).

further provided

the Sharps were entitled

The

to one sewer

connection and one culinary water connection in the PUD systems
"for a connection fee and service fee equal to the pro rata cost
to the purchaser of a lot."

(Ex. 15, para. 7, Add. A10-11).9

White Pine Ranches defaulted on its June 30, 198 3 payment,
which default was subsequently cured in November of 1983.

(Ex.

22; F. 27, R. 1336, Add. B27; Ex. 4, 44; F. 31, R. 1337, Add.
B28) .

In December of 1983, White Pine Ranches, with the written

consent of the Sharps, recorded a plat and the CCRs, which platted

In their Brief, White Pine Ranches failed to address the
lower court's finding that they also breached the
parties' Contract "by failing to make available sewer
and water connections at the same charge to purchasers
of a PUD lot." (F. 100, R. 1354, Add. B45) . Although
construction primarily commenced in 1983 for the sewer
and water systems, neither was completed or operational
at the time of trial, nor had the sewer construction
been approved by the Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement
District ("SBSID") . (Ex. 83, 83(a), 99-108; F. 82, R.
1349-1350, Add. B40-41).
The trial court concluded
seven years was an "unreasonable time within which to
complete the water and sewer systems." (C. 19, R. 1359,
Add. B50.)
(Tr. 366, R. 1643; F. 40, R. 1340, Add.
B31.)
5

only a portion of the Property, instead of the entire Property as
originally intended.
Add. B30).
inal

(Ex. 51, WPR Add. 91-131; F. 39-40, R. 1339,

The plat also differed from White Pine Ranches 1 orig-

intent

by

including

roadway in the PUD.

an

Owner's

Dedication

for

a

private

(Ex. 39, Add. A14; F. 19, R. 1333, Add. B24;

Ex. 1; F. 34, R. 1337, Add. B28). The Sharps were concerned about
access to the Property in the event they were required to take it
back in a foreclosure.

(Tr. 748-750, R. 1645) .

Had the entire

Property been platted as originally contemplated, access would not
have been an issue since if the Sharps took it back in a foreclosure sale, they would be owners and purchasers of PUD lots entitling them to access under the CCRs recorded. (Tr. 757-759, R.
1645).

Had the roadway remained public, their access also would

have been assured.

Accordingly, at the time the Sharps were asked

to approve the plat and the CCRs, their continued right of access
was confirmed with White Pine Ranches both orally and in writing.
(Ex. 25, 25(a), 26, 26(a), Add. C67-72; F. 35-39, R. 1338-1339,
Add. B29-30).
Pursuant to the terms of the Memo and the request of White
Pine Ranches, the Sharps directed Associated Title, the trustee
under the Trust Deed covering the Property, to release Lots 1
through 5 of White Pine Ranches Phase I.
Ex. 25, 25(a), Add. C67-68; F. 42, R.
para. 3-4, Add. A9-10).

6

(Ex. 23, Add. C65-66;

1340, Add. B31; Ex. 15,

White Pine Ranches again defaulted under the terms of the
Contract in November of 1984 by failing to pay all of the property
taxes due.

The 1984 taxes and all subsequent property taxes

remained unpaid ($20,3 68.62) through the time of trial.
49, R. 1341, Add. B32).

(F. 48-

White Pine Ranches further defaulted

under the terms of the Contract by failing to make all of the June
30, 1985 installment payment (only $59,709.47 was paid) and any
remaining

installment payment due under the Contract in 1986.

(Ex. 44; F. 50, R. 1342, Add. B33).
The Sharps recorded a Notice of Default on September 16,
1985.

(Ex. 55; F. 51, R. 1342, Add. B33) .

After White Pine

Ranches received the Notice of Default, Felton assured "every
attempt is being made to resolve the problem."

(Ex. 31, Add. C75;

F. 52, R. 1342, Add. B33). As the trial court found:

"No written

or oral claim of default on the part of the Sharps under the
Closing Documents was made by the plaintiffs [White Pine Ranches]
until February 27, 1986, subsequent to plaintiffs' own defaults."
(Ex. 35, Add. C80-81; F. 71, R. 1347, Add. B38; Tr. 200-201, R.
164 3) .

Nor did White Pine Ranches request the release of Lot 6

and the roadway until long after their own defaults under the
Contract.10
10

The district court found that "Plaintiffs1 first requests" for release of Lot 6 and the roadway were
"February 27, 1986 and May 7, 1986, respectively." (F.
59, R. 1343-1344, Add. B34-35).
Also, White Pine
Ranches did not request the release of 7.5 acres of the
unplatted property until February 27, 1986. Id. The
Contract, however, specifically provides that (cont.)
7

Judge

Frederick

held

White

Pine

Ranches

had

materially

breached the Contract and the Sharps had substantially complied
with its terms.

(C. 5-6, R. 1355-1356; Add. B46-47.)

The Judge

concluded that the material, significant and continuing breaches
of White Pine Ranches excused the Sharps from any obligation to
reconvey, and found against White Pine Ranches on all other causes
of action asserted.

(C. 4, R. 1355, Add. B46.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following facts are necessary for proper determination of
this appeal in addition to and or to rectify the statements and
omissions of facts in the Statement of the Case of the Brief of
White Pine Ranches:
1.

Exhibit "A" to the Memorandum of Closing Terms contained

a dedication commonly used to dedicate roads to public use as
follows:
Know all by these present that we the undersigned owners
of the hereindescribed tract of land having caused the
same to be subdivided into lots and streets to hereafter
be known as White Pine Ranches Subdivision, do hereby
dedicate for perpetual use of the public all parcels of
land shown on this plat as intended for public use . . .
and do further dedicate the easements as shown.
(See Ex. 39, Add. A14; Ex. 20, para. 3) (emphasis added).

10 (cont.)
only "PUD lots" are to be released. Id. As the district court found, "[a]s of these dates, plaintiffs
[White Pine Ranches] were still and are in default."
Id.
8

2.

On July 19, 1983, prior to the recordation of the final

plat of Phase I of the Property and while the June 30, 1983
payment was in default, Felton wrote a letter to attorney Jon
Heaton in which he stated that the final plat had not yet been
recorded because

fl

[a]s soon as we file the plat real estate taxes

on this property are going to go up significantly, which we would
like to avoid until we had an actual buyer for one of the lots."
(Ex. 23, Add. C65; Tr. 157-159, R. 1642; F. 28, R. 1336, Add.
B27) .
3.

On November 18, 1983, Heaton prepared a letter to the

Sharps on behalf of Saunders as an embodiment of the representations White Pine Ranches was making or willing to make to the
Sharps to secure their consent to the final plat.
164 5).

(Tr. 751, R.

The letter indicated:

At a later time in the near future Hy [Saunders] has
indicated he will seek release of Lots 1 through 5 of
the platted subdivision along with his road (White Pine
Lane)....
When those releases are made pursuant to
your [the Sharps1] instruction we will ensure that
rights are reserved in White Pine Lane for access for
the southern portions of the property purchased from you
until your Deed of Trust is fully paid.
(Ex. 25 and 25(a), Add. C67-68).
4.

On November 21, 1983, Felton wrote Heaton a reply in

which he stated "[i]t is perfectly acceptable to us [White Pine
Ranches] that he [Mr. Sharp] retain an easement over White Pine
Lane to the southern part of his property as well as to Lot 6 from
White Pine Canyon Road up to the western boundary of Lot 6."
26, Add. C69-70).
9

(Ex.

5.

Since Felton!s letter seemed to be partially contra-

dictory to the assurances and the discussions Heaton had had with
Saunders, he called Felton on November 28, 1983

(Tr. 748, R.

1645) and Heaton noted in the margin of a copy of the letter that
Felton agreed

"access over road

[White Pine Lane] retained if

Sharp develops undeveloped property Lots 7-12 White Pine Ranch."
(Ex. 26(a), Add. C71-72; F. 37, R. 1338, Add. B29) .
6.

In reliance upon and consideration of the agreement for

access, the Sharps executed the Consent to Record Phase I of
White Pine Ranches, which platted only the northern portion of the
Property.
7.

(F. 39, R. 1339, Add. B14; C. 14, R. 1350, Add. B50) .
On

January

18,

1984,

pursuant

to

the

request

of

Saunders, the Sharps directed Associated Title to release and
reconvey Lots 1 through 5.

(Ex. 23, Add. C65-66; Ex. 25, 25(a),

Add. C67-68; F. 42, R. 1340, Add. B31; Ex. 15, para. 3-4, Add. A910.)

The partial release was not prepared until January 6, 1986

and recorded on March 26, 1986.
B31).

(Ex. 45; F. 43, R. 1340, Add.

White Pine Ranches named Associated Title in the action but

chose not to serve or pursue Associated Title regarding the delay.
(F. 43, R. 1340, Add. B31).
8.

On January 17, 1984, Felton sent a letter to Heaton re-

questing Mr. Sharp to consent to a change in the development plan
stating "[w]hat we plan to do is to do a very tasteful and discrete multi-family development on the thirty (30) acres which is

10

the only way it will be economically feasible."

(Ex. 29, Add.

C73; F. 45, R. 1340-1341, Add. B31).
9.

On January 20, 1984, Felton sent a letter to Heaton

conceding that "the deeds [sic] for the roads [sic] may be difficult to do."

(Ex. 30, Add. C74; F. 44, R. 1340, Add. B31) .

The Sharps were never presented with a document in recordable form
releasing the internal road from the Trust Deed.

Felton testified

that "Associated Title probably" would be the ones to prepare that
reconveyance.
10.

(Tr. 178, R. 1642).

On February 24, 1986, Felton sent a letter to Mr. Sharp

detailing the problems with the project which caused White Pine
Ranches1 "inability to now complete the timely payments to you."
(Ex. 34, Add. C76) .

This letter concluded "we are certainly not

blaming you as being directly responsible" and asked the Sharps to
"be considerate or [sic] our problems as well as the factual
cause, whether that be intentional, malfeasance (Summit County) or
an implied or omitted condition of this development."

(Ex. 34,

Add. C79).
11.

After Felton received a notice that the Trustee's Sale

had been set again for April, Felton sent another letter to Mr.
Sharp on February 27, 1986.
1344-1345, Add. B35-36).

(Ex. 35, Add. C80; F. 59, 62, R.

This letter, for the first time, made a

claim of a breach of the Contract by the Sharps, requested conveyance of the road and approximately 7.5 acres of the unplatted
Property and demanded approximately $73,000.00 for the costs of
11

water

and

sewer hookups which

able." 1 1

Felton

claimed were

(Ex. 35, Add. C80-81; F. 59, 62, R.

"now avail-

1344-1345, Add.

B35-36).
12.
release

The
of

February 27th

Lot

6.

letter made

In a subsequent

no claim

regarding

any

letter dated May 7, 1986,

Felton requested for the first time the release of Lot 6. 12

(Ex.

37, Add. C82-83; F. 59, R. 1344, Add. B35).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although White Pine Ranches asserts a plethora
errors

committed

by

filing a complaint

the

trial

court,

once

its

of alleged

motivation

in

is revealed, this case becomes very simple.

White Pine Ranches was a partnership of desperate men who ran out
of the dollars needed to honor their obligations. 13

After years

of paying under the Contract without complaint, White Pine Ranches
As noted above, the water and sewer systems in fact were
not available at the time of trial, being neither built
or operational. (R. 1349, Add. B40-41).
White Pine Ranches claims on p. 26, n. 16 of its Brief
the fact there was no request for the release of Lot 6
is a "hypertechnicality" since only one lot was remaining in the platted portion.
However, the Sharps were
advised in the May 7, 1986 letter and Felton so
testified at trial that White Pine Ranches was "in a
position to prepare and obtain approval of that plat
[for the balance of the Property] immediately," which,
of course, would have created choices between Lot 6 and
the newly platted lots.
(F. 46, R. 1314, Add. B32; Tr.
100, R. 1642; Ex. 37, Add. C82-83; Tr. 138, 202, R.
1642, 1643.)
Felton testified "we have this construction loan that's
in default and we're desperate at this point. Make no
mistake about it.
Everybody's going bankrupt at this
point." (Tr. 309, R. 1643).

12

was forced to invent excuses for their non-performance and finally
took the startling and aggressive posture of filing a Complaint
against the Sharps, even though it admittedly had failed to pay
property taxes, installment payments and to provide to the Sharps
certain utility connections.

As the trial court found, these

excuses were never mentioned to the Sharps until immediately prior
to the filing of their Complaint in September of 1986:14
Significantly, as bearing upon the credibility of
plaintiffs1 [White Pine Ranches1] arguments is the fact
unrebutted that plaintiffs made no claims whatsoever of
breach by the Sharps until after their own admitted
breaches of the Closing Documents.
(F. 53; R. 1342, Add. B33).
White Pine Ranches made the June 30, 1982 installment payment
without

complaint.

(Cf. F.

26, R.

1335-1336, Add.

B26-27).

Although it was made late, no allegation of breach by the Sharps
accompanied the June 30, 1983 installment payment.
1643; F. 30, R. 1336, Add. B27) .

(Tr. 208, R.

On November 21, 1983, Felton

sent a letter to the Sharps stating "I would again apologize for
that late (1983) payment."

(Ex. 26, Add. C69-70) .

The June 30,

1984 payment was also made without any claims of breach.
Add. C75; F. 52, R. 1342, Add. B33). 1 5

(Ex. 31,

After failure to make the

14

White Pine Ranches1 incredible claim on p. 2 of its
Brief that "after Respondents failed to reconvey the
property, Appellants ceased making payments," is without
any citation to or support from the Record.

15

Also, on p. 2 of its Brief, White Pine Ranches1 attempts
to sympathetically exploit the amount of down and
installment payments made to the Sharps. The (cont.)
13

June 30, 1985 installment payment in full and after receipt of a
Notice of Default, Felton wrote the following to Mr. Sharp on
September 24, 1985:
I wanted to touch base with you to assure you that I am
not ignoring this problem and am very concerned since I
made my portion of the payment and am prepared to
complete the final payment next year.
In any event, I wanted to assure you that every attempt
is being made to resolve the problem and I should have a
better idea in a couple of weeks as to the ability of
the remaining interest [in White Pine Ranches] to
satisfy that obligation.
(Ex. 31; Add. C75)

(emphasis added) .

Thus, less than a year

before the commencement of this litigation, White Pine Ranches had
made no claims whatsoever of breach by the Sharps.16
The true motivation behind the filing of a Complaint was
that White Pine Ranches1 development had turned sour.

White Pine

15 (cont.)
trial court, however, entered Judgment against White
Pine Ranches in the amount of $557,642.46 for principal,
interest and late charges not made through March 22,
1988, together with a daily per diem thereafter of
$183.32 (excluding trustee's fees, court costs, attorney's fees and interest thereon). (J. 3, R. 1370, Add.
B56-63; C. 31, R. 1361-1362, Add. B52-53).
16

In F. 52, R. 1342, Add. B33, the district court also
found:
Felton, in his letter [Ex. 31] made no allegation
that the Sharps had slandered plaintiffs' [White
Pine Ranches'] title as a result of the inclusion
of Lots 1-5 in the Notice of Default [which was
recorded on September 16, 1985 as described in F.
51, R. 1342, Add. B33], nor did Felton or any
other plaintiff allege in 1984 or 1985 any breach
of the Closing Documents by the Sharps.
(Tr.
183-184, R. 1642).
14

The true motivation behind the filing of a Complaint was
that White Pine Ranches' development had turned sour.
Ranches

purchased

the

Property

from

the

Sharps

promptly develop a residential subdivision.

White Pine

intending

to

(F. 5, R. 1329, Add.

Throughout the negotiations leading up the parties1 Con-

B20) .

tracts, the Sharps declined to participate in the costs or risks
inherent in the development of raw land.

They were interested in

selling the Property as they approached retirement.

The develop-

ment soured due to a sharply declining real estate market in Park
City

and

the

extraordinary

improvement

costs

and

requirements imposed by Summit County and the SBSID.

development
(Ex. 97;

Tr. 473, R. 1644; Ex. 86, Add. D89-92; F. 69, R. 1346-1347, Add.
B37-38).
At the time White Pine Ranches purchased the Property, "it
was anticipated

that additional

developments by third parties

would occur in the White Pine Canyon vicinity, including the
development of a ski resort in White Pine Canyon and the development of adjoining parcels of land."

(Ex. 104, 105, 107 and 117;

F. 25, R. 13 35, Add. B26). Instead, development potential soured
as demonstrated

by

the testimony

of White

Pine Ranches' own

appraiser.
At the hearing in January, 1988 on the Sharps1 Petition for
Additional Security, the court below found the Property was worth
approximately
1644).

$17,500 to $20,000 per acre.

(Tr. 493-494, R.

Previously, LeRoy Pia, White Pine Ranches1 appraiser whose
15

valuations

were

exclusively

used

throughout

the

proceedings,

valued the Property on June 30, 1985 at $29,062,50 per acre.
96).

(Ex.

(The fair market value at the time of trial was found to be
[Supp. F. 2, R. 1394, Respondents1 Brief to

$20,000 per acre.

Commissioner of Financial Institutions, Add. 2]). That this case
is market motivated is again revealed in a letter authored by
Felton on January 17, 1984, in which he requested the approval by
the

Sharps

of

a

"multi-family

development"

on

the

unplatted

acreage, "which is the only way it [the development] will be
economically feasible."
Add. B31-32).

(Ex. 29, Add. C73; F. 45, R. 1340-1341,

(A multi-family concept was not adopted.)

As the market declined, White Pine Ranches1 development costs
soared, through no fault of the Sharps.

(Tr. 208, R. 1643).

On

July 26, 1984, more than one year prior to his letter of apology
for non-payment to Mr. Sharp

(Ex. 31, Add. C7 5) , Felton made

demand upon Summit County for up to $1,000,000 because of an
"unreasonable" requirement of an off-site sewer system as opposed
to the use of septic tanks, the loss of one or more sales because
of the County's refusal to plow White Pine Canyon Road and due to
"the imposition of unreasonable and extreme requirements to have
the subdivision approved."
1346, Add. B36-37).
suit

against

Summit

(Ex. 84, Add. D86-87; F. 65, R. 1345-

Soon thereafter, White Pine Ranches brought
County,

the

SBSID

and

various

officials

thereof to recover damages in the United States District Court for

16

the District of Utah ("the Federal Court litigation").

(F. 66, R.

1346, Add. B37).
In Answers to Interrogatories in the Federal Court litigation
dated December 28, 1984, White Pine Ranches stated, "Because of
the

imposition of the requirement that Plaintiffs construct an

off-site

sewer

approximately

one mile

in

length, the costs of

developing the entire project became prohibitive."
also Ex. 107, p. 7; F. 67, R. 1346, Add. B37) .

(Ex. 116; see
Subsequently in

thcit litigation, Saunders swore in an Affidavit dated March 17,
1986:
As a result of the various delays [caused by the County
and the SBSID], which are detailed below, the market for
exclusive building lots is now virtually non-existent,
costs of improvements escalated to be several times what
I had anticipated, and much of the real property in the
project is threatened by foreclosure.
(Ex. 86, para 10, Add. D90; F. 69, R. 1346-1347, Add. B37-38).
After careful review of the claims in this Federal Court litigation, Judge Frederick found "[M]ost of the damages sought to be
recovered by the plaintiffs

[White Pine Ranches] in the lawsuit

against the SBSID and Summit County are the same damages Plaintiffs sought to recover from the Sharps in the present case."

(F.

70, R. 1347, Add. B38).
Given

the

aggressive

posture

taken by White

Pine

Ranches

below, it is no wonder that it has taken a shotgun approach on
appeal. 17
17

Eleven issues are presented on appeal

in White Pine

Generally, authorities frown on alleging too many
points of error. Judge Franklin Spears of the Supreme
Court of Texas in 1985 stated:
"If you cannot win
reversal with your six best points, then the 2 0th or
3 0th will probably be unsuccessful, too."
(cont.)
17

Ranches1 Brief, pp. 2-4.

However, the actual number of issues are

greatly expanded in the body of the Brief, since there are more
than two dozen argument headings set forth in the Table of Contents.

The following summarizes the Sharps1

response to the

alleged plethora of trials court errors.
White

Pine

Ranches

materially

breached

the

Contract

by

failing to pay the entire 1984 or any of the 1985, 1986 and 1987
property taxes on the Property when due and by failing to pay the
entire 1985 or any portion of the 1986 installment payment.
100, R. 1354, Add. B45; C. 2-4, R. 1355, Add. B46) .

(F.

It was the

specific practice of White Pine Ranches to request a release of a
specific PUD lot after required payments were made and provided no
default existed.
Accordingly,

since

(F. 47, R. 1341, Add. B32; Tr. 334, R. 1643).
White

Pine Ranches1

breaches

preceded

any

request for releases, the Sharps were not obligated to release Lot
6, the roadway or the unplatted acreage.

(F. 59, R. 1343, Add.

B34; F. 100, R. 1354, C. 8, R. 1356, Add. B47). Should this Court
agree, all of the remaining issues raised by White Pine Ranches
are moot.

The Sharps committed no breach of the parties1 Contract

17 (cont.)
Spears, Presenting an Effective Appeal, 21 Trial 95(6)
(November 1985).
See also Baskin, Wasted Words or
Persuasive Prose: Connecting with the Appellate Court,
58 Fla. B. J. 69-72 (1985) (A scatter-gun approach
weakens an argument).
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and were excused by White Pine Ranches' breaches from further
performance.

(C. 5, 6 & 9, R. 1356, Add. B47).

Moreover, the Contract provisions respecting release of the
roadway were modified by the parties when it was agreed the Sharps
could retain access until the Trust Deed Note was paid in full (C.
14, R. 1358, Add. B49; see C. 9, R. 1356, Add. B47). Alternatively, the Sharps1 execution of the Consent to Record and the subsequent recordation of the final plat and the CCRs on the Property
constituted

a release of the internal roadway and was a non-

exclusive easement, equitable servitude or covenant running with
the land, allowing an owner of unplatted acreage access to the
roadway the same as a PUD lot owner.

(C. 11, R. 1357, Add. B48) .

Finally, the Sharps agreed not to and were estopped to deny the
use of the roadway for the private use of a PUD lot owner.

(C. 12

& 13, R. 1357-1358, Add. B48-49).
The district court did not err in concluding White Pine
Ranches failed to show it was entitled to relief under Utah Code
Ann. Section 57-1-3 3 since the Sharps, in fact, requested the
trustee to release Lots 1-5 of the PUD.
B51) .

(C. 24, R. 1360, Add.

Since White Pine Ranches was not entitled to a release of

Lot 6, the roadway or the unplatted acreage, there could be no
cause of action for failure to request a release.

Furthermore,

the Sharps reasonably relied upon the advice of counsel, in good
faith, which is a valid defense under the statute.
1360, Add. B51).
19

(C. 23, R.

Because White Pine Ranches breached the Contract, it is not
entitled to any damages.

Moreover, the damages sought are too

remote, speculative and conjectural.

(C. 28, R. 1361, Add. B52).

Further, White Pine Ranches has failed to establish it suffered
any actual damages.

Id.

The Sharps are entitled to recover their attorney's fees
under numerous provisions of the parties1 Contract in enforcing
the Contract, in defending and protecting their right to collect
on the Note and in prevailing on their Counterclaim.
1352-1353, Add. B43-44).

(F. 96, R.

Furthermore, White Pine Ranches failed

to challenge below the amount of or the reasonableness of the
award

of attorney's

fees sought.

(R. 1261-1273; Tr. 62, R.

1640).
ARGUMENT
Since detailed citations to the Record and Exhibits have been
set forth above in the Statement of the Case, Statement of Facts
and Summary of Argument, citations in this section will, for the
sake of brevity, generally be limited to the single principal
reference, usually found in the Findings of Fact or an Exhibit.
POINT I
WHITE PINE RANCHES IS REQUIRED TO
REQUEST LOTS TO BE RELEASED BEFORE
THE SHARPS HAVE ANY DUTY TO RECONVEY
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that the meaning
and intent of an agreement can be determined from the course of
conduct and the action and performance of the parties to the
20

agreement,

Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1975);

Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972).
The trial court concluded:

"Plaintiffs were obligated, under

the terms of the Memorandum of Closing Terms and pursuant to their
own practice, to specifically request and identify lots, including
Lot 6, for release by the Sharps."

(C. 7, R. 1356, Add. B47;

Accord, F. 47, R. 1341, Add. B32) (emphasis added).
clusion was based upon the following

This Con-

Exhibits, testimony

and

Findings by the lower court:
a)

The Memorandum of Closing Terms expressly sanctions the

release of "PUD lots of Buyer's [White Pine Ranches1] choice,11
given certain conditions discussed more fully above under the
Statement of the Case. (Ex. 15, para. 3, see Ex. 15, para. 2,
Add. A9).
b)
just

from

Felton testified:
recalling

the

"Wait a minute, wait a minute.
contract,

I'm

going

to

No,

recant that

testimony because I do believe the contract says lots of the
buyer's choice and that would require a choice."

(Tr. 334, R.

1643) .
c)

White Pine Ranches recognized the limited entitlement to

request the release of PUD lots only.
"Upon

In a letter Felton stated:

final plat approval, we will notify you to obtain the

releases for the lots and the road as per the contract."
Add. C64) (emphasis added).

21

(Ex. 21,

d)

It was the practice of White Pine Ranches to request the

release of specific PUD lots.

In a letter, White Pine Ranches

indicated in the near future it would seek the release of PUD lots
1-5.

(Ex. 25, Add. C 6 7 ) . 1 8
e)

White Pine Ranches was "land banking."

That is, White

Pine Ranches delayed recording a final plat because "[a]s soon as
we file the plat, real estate taxes are going to go up significantly, which we would like to avoid until we have an actual buyer
for one of the lots."
f)

(Ex. 23, Add. C65-66). 1 9

White Pine Ranches wanted to keep open its options as to

the unplatted acreage, requesting by letter the approval by the
Sharps of a "multi-family development."
g)

(Ex. 29, Add. C73).

White Pine Ranches indicated to the Sharps they could

plat the remaining

Property any time.

Accordingly, White Pine

Ranches "may prepare a plat of the then unplatted acreage and seek
a release of a portion of it instead of Lot 6."
Add. B35).

(F. 61, R. 1344,

Accordingly, ample evidence and authority exists to

support the trial court's conclusion that White Pine Ranches is
required to request releases before any such duty arises.

White Pine Ranches could have chosen any other combination such as PUD lots 2-6.
Approximately one-half of the
platted at the time of trial.
B54.)

22

Property had not been
(C. 34, R. 1363, Add.

POINT II
SINCE WHITE PINE RANCHES MATERIALLY
BREACHED THE CONTRACT IT WAS NOT
ENTITLED TO ANY RELEASES
If this court affirms the lower court's findings that White
Pine Ranches was required to specifically request and identify
lots, including Lot 6, for release and White Pine Ranches was in
breach of the Contract prior to any request for the release of Lot
6, the roadway and 7.5 acres of the unplatted acreage, then any
duty to reconvey is excused.
by

White

Pine

Ranches

Further, the remaining issues raised

would

be

moot

since

they

rest

upon

establishment of premises negative to a requirement of a specific
request for lots to be released and to a finding that White Pine
Ranches first breached the Contract.
The failure to pay real estate taxes is a material default
which precludes a release of lots from of a mortgage.

City Bank

Farmers Trust Co. v. Heckmann. 164 Misc. 234, 297 N.Y.S. 592, 595
(Sup. Ct. 1937); Clason's Point Land Co. v. Schwartz, 237 A.D.
741,

262

N.Y.S.

756,

760

(App.

Div.

1933).

In Markowitz v.

Republic Natfl Bank, 651 F.2d 825, 827 (2nd Cir. 1981), the court
held that because the debtor failed to pay taxes for 1972, 1973
and 1974, but in 1973, requested the release of certain lots, the
debtor was precluded from demanding release of the property so
long as he was in default.

Moreover, if a trustor (White Pine

Ranches) is in default at the time it requests reconveyance, the
beneficiary (the Sharps) is not obligated to reconvey.
23

Las Vegas

Ranch Club v. Bank of Nev. . 97 Nev. 389, 632 P.2 1146, 1147-1148
(1981); see also Sharp v. Brock, 626 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ, App.
1981) (Debtors not entitled to release where they fail to make
timely demand for release or designate specifically which land was
to be released).20
Provisions requiring payment of taxes and certain installments are material.
594-595.

City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 297 N.Y.S. at

As the court in Clason's Point Land Co., 263 N.Y.S. at

759-760, noted:
To ascertain the objects and purposes of the mortgage,
the instrument must be examined as a whole0 The mortgagee [seller] was entitled to payment and satisfaction
of the mortgage debt at a specified time and to the
preservation of the security intact until such payment
and satisfaction.
The mortgagor [buyer] was bound,
among other things, to make semiannual payments of
interest, and to pay taxes, assessments, and water
charges on the mortgaged premises. The release clause
20

The cases of Burroughs v. Garner, 43 Md. App. 302, 405
A.2d 301 at 306 (1979) and Columbia Dev. v. Watchie, 252
Or. 81, 448 Po2d 360 (1963) cited by White Pine Ranches
are distinguishable.
In Burroughs, the payments entitling the plaintiff to a release were prior to any
defaults by plaintiff and the condition requiring the
land to be platted before the buyer was entitled to
release had been waived.
In the case at hand, the
parties clearly intended the Property would be platted
before being released.
In Columbia Dev., the Oregon
court, sitting in equity, determined under the wording
of the contract and the "facts and circumstances"
surrounding execution, entitlement to release survived
default. The Court found the plaintiff was not prejudiced since there was ample security after release. In
the matter at hand, the Property clearly was not ample
security.
(Co 33, R* 1368, Add. B59; J. 4, R. 1373,
Adde B54.) Finally, in Eldridge v. Burns, 7 6 Cal. App.
3rd 396, 142 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1971), another case cited
by Plaintiffs, the court only held that the buyer was
entitled to release for entitlement accruing prior to
default.
24

is not to be viewed as independent of the mortgagor's
covenants. The various provisions of the mortgage must
be construed as dependent stipulations. The right in
the mortgagor to pay stipulated amounts for release of
parts of the mortgaged premises was a privilege of which
she might have availed herself, but apparently did not.
The payment of the interest and taxes was, on the other
hand, a definite obligation....
(citations omitted).
In a transaction where several documents are executed simultaneously and are clearly interrelated, they must be construed
together and harmonized if possible.
Bank, 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987).

Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l

It is the obligation of the court

when interpreting and construing the documents to look at them in
their entirety and in accordance with their purpose.

Big Cotton-

wood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) c
executed
should

be

In this case, the operative Contract documents were

simultaneously
construed

at

the closing

together.21

on July

In construing

16, 1981 and
the

operative

Contract documents as an integrated whole, the release provisions
in the Memo (Ex. 15, para. 1-4, Add. A9-10) must not be viewed as
being

independent of the provisions

for payment of taxes and

installments in the Trust Deed (Ex. 2, para. 5, Add. A2) and Trust
Deed Note (Ex. 3, Add. A 5 ) . 2 2

White Pine Ranches was in default

The integration provision of the Memo, para. 9, incorporates all other "closing documents executed simultaneously herewith." (Ex. 15, Add. All-12).
White Pine Ranches directly breached the Memo in failing
to make available to the Sharps within a reasonable time
sewer and water connections.
(F. 100, R. 13 54, Add.
B45) .
25

under the Contract prior to any request for the release of Lot 6,
the roadway, or the unplatted acreage23 and was not entitled to
release of Lot 6, the roadway or any unplatted acreage,. Moreover,
White Pine Ranches was not entitled to release of the unplatted
acreage

since

it had

not met

another

condition

of release,

recordation of a plat.
POINT III
PURSUANT TO A MODIFICATION OF THE CONTRACT,
THE SHARPS RELEASED THE ROADWAY
BY EXECUTING THE CONSENT TO RECORD
It is elementary that any contract may be modified by subsequent agreement provided that all the elements essential to the
White Pine Ranches seems to imply that because the
Sharps didn't assert a default with regard to the 1984
taxes, that, somehow, the failure to pay those taxes is
no longer a default. A breach is a breach, however, at
the time it occurs regardless of whether the non-breaching party seeks to enforce the agreement.
Biork v.
April Indus. . 547 P.2d 219 (Utah 1976), appeal after
remand 560 Po2d 315, cert, den. 97 S.Ct. 2634, 431 U.S.
930, 50 L«Edo2d 245 (Damages began to accrue once
defendant breached agreement.
Plaintiffs not required
to take steps to enforce agreement) ; see Ouin Blair
Enter, v. Julien Const. Co., 597 P.2d 945 (Wyo. 1979)
(Parties free to ignore provisions of contract but must
understand that they bear the consequences of such
disregard when breach becomes fact of life). Curiously,
White Pine Ranches seeks to have the argument regarding
notification both ways.
Although White Pine Ranches
asserts the Sharps should have claimed a default with
regard to the taxes, White Pine Ranches also asserts
that it had paid enough of the release price by December
23, 1983 for release of the roadway, apparently without
notification to the Sharps. (See Appellants1 Brief, p.
7) • Further, White Pine Ranches provides no answer to
the protection the Sharps insisted upon in event of
default.
If the roadway was to be automatically released from the Trust Deed, how would access rights be
preserved for the Sharps?
26

formation of a contract are observed.
Utah 2d 205, 381 Po2d 86 (1963).

See, Cheney v. Rucker, 14

A party to a written contract

may orally modify it regardless of any provision in the contract
to the contrary.

Dillman v. Massev Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d

142, 369 Po2d 296 (1962); Davis v. Pavne & Dav, Inc., 10 Utah 2d
53, 348 P.2d 337 (1960).

Here, even if the Memorandum required a

reconveyance of the roadway, the parties clearly modified the
Contract by agreeing, through the negotiations and correspondence
(including a letter (Ex. 31) signed by a general partner of White
Pine Ranches) preceding the execution of the Consent to Record,
that the Sharps would retain access in consideration of their
Consent.

Additionally, White Pine Ranches accepted the executed

Consent without requiring more and should be estopped to deny its
effect.

Brown v. Holden, 410 P. 2d 528 (Okl. 1965) (Party cannot

deny making

contract and

retain benefits

flowing

from trans-

action) .
The Sharps' execution of the Consent to Record the final plat
and the CCRs constituted a release of the internal roadway, either
in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Memo or in accordance
with

the

subsequent

modification

of the Contract.

The term

"release" has been defined as "the relinquishment, concession or
giving up of a right, claim, or privilege by the person against
whom it exists or to whom it accrues, to the person against whom
it might have been demanded."

Clearly, the Sharps conceded their

right of "reasonable approval" of any changes under para. 5 of the

27

Memo.

(Ex. 15, Add. A10) .

76 C.J.S. Release Section 1 (1976);

Coooev v. Keadv, 73 Or. 66, 144 P. 99 (1914).
The Consent to Record allowed White Pine Ranches to record
its plat and CCRs which reserved a non-exclusive easement for
utilities and vehicular and pedestrian access over the private
roadway. . . . "

(F. 39, Add. B30)

(emphasis added).

White Pine

Ranches, on page 20 of its Brief, argues in one short paragraph
that the execution of the Consent was not a "reconveyance."24
White Pine Ranches did not argue below the concept of "reconveyance" as opposed to "release" nor was Judge Frederick asked to
make such a distinction.

White Pine Ranches cannot now raise this

issue for the first time on appeal.

Valley Bank & Trust Co. v.

U.S. Life Title Ins. Co., Ill Utah Adv. Rep. 71 (1989)* 25
The CCRs to which the Sharps consented may also be construed
as

covenants

running

with

the

land

or

equitable

servitudes.

Leaver v. Grose. 563 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977) (Covenants duly executed
and recorded are enforceable by interested parties).

Covenants,

The only case cited by White Pine Ranches in that
paragraph is General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co.,
766 P.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). That case, however,
dealt with the priority of a trust deed and has nothing
to do with the issue of release or even, reconveyance.
Failure to raise the issue below is prejudicial. The
Sharps may have cured by tendering a deed of reconveyance and the court may have fashioned a grant of an
easement or some similar right in favor of the Sharps to
protect access in event of default. Moreover, the court
may have determined the parties1 intent where the words
"Deed of Reconveyance" are used in the Memo, para. 1,
and the word "release" is thereafter used in paras. 2 &
3. (Ex. 15, Add. A9).
28

by agreement, can be made to run with the landc

165 Broadway

Bldcr. Inc. v. City Investing Co,. 120 F.2d 813 (2nd Cir. 1941);
21 C.J.Se Covenants Section 62 (1978) . Any person although owning
a limited estate in property may make a valid covenant.
Section 3; CBN Corp. v. United States, 328 F<,2d 316

Id.

(Ct. CI.

1964) .
The Consent and the recordation of the plat and CCRs released the road and these documents, together with the parties1
"modification" agreement, granted access to all PUD lot owners as
well as to the Sharps until the Trust Deed was paid in full.

See

Macaw v. Gross. 452 So.2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (Partial
release to be determined from whole instrument not just particular
portions consistent with reason, probability and practical aspects
of transaction between parties).
POINT IV
SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENTS CREATED AN
EASEMENT OVER WHITE PINE LANE
IN FAVOR OF THE SHARPS
White Pine Ranches argues that the trial court's finding of
an easement in favor of the Sharps was gratuitous because it did
not plead the existence of an easement in their Answer or Counterclaim.

(WPR Brief, p. 39). It is well settled law, however, that

even if both parties litigate the issue, it will be treated in all
respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings.
v. State, 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982).
ment was fully litigated below.

J.J.N.P. Co.

Here the issue of an ease-

In fact, attorneys for White Pine

29

Ranches extensively cross-examined Heaton on that issue.

(Tr.

765-767, R. 1645).
Easements may be created by grant, express or implied, or by
prescription.
1985)c

Wright v. Horse Creek Ranches, 697 Pc2d 384 (Coloc

Additionally, easements may be created by oral grant or

estoppel.

Freiqhtwavs Terminal Co, v. Industrial & Commercial

Constr.. 381 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1963).
Here the trial

court specifically

found both parties by

mutual intent and agreement granted the Sharps a right to use the
roadway in event of default.
trial court

further

found

(F. 89, R. 1351, Add. B42) .

such agreement

was memorialized

The
by

letters between Felton and Heaton and by the recording of the
Consent to Record.

(Id). 26

Although White Pine Ranches argue

that Heaton was not authorized to make the representations to the
Sharps, Heaton testified otherwise

(Tr. 751, R. 1645) and the

court below has the discretion to believe one witness's testimony
over another.
(1963)o27

Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 381 P. 2d 78

Heaton confirmed by telephone with Felton that "access

over road [White Pine Lane] retained if Sharp develops undeveloped
property."

(F. 37, R. 1328, Add. B29).

The conversation was

26

Felton's letter of November 21, 1983 (Ex. 26, Add. C67)
indicates the parties had agreed to an easement in favor
of the Sharps: "It is perfectly acceptable to us [White
Pine Ranches] that he [Sharp] retain an easement over
White Pine Lane."

27

Throughout Appellants1 Brief, other citations to the
testimony of Felton or Saunders are set forth as though
the trial court is required to accept or believe such
testimony. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief, p. 25, n. 14.
30

memorialized by margin notes of Heaton on a copy of Felton's
November 21 letter.

(Ex. 26(a), Add. C71-72).

Moreover, Felton

was a partner in the General Partnership and, accordingly, could
bind the partnership with regard to the granting of an easement.
(C. 15, R. 1359, Add. B50) .

Utah Code Ann. Section 48-1-6; Salt

Lake City Brewing Co. v. Hawke. 24 Utah 199, 66 P. 1058 (1901).
White Pine Ranches claims that the Consent to Record does not
create an easement in favor of the Sharps.

In so arguing, how-

ever, White Pine Ranches ignores the fact that the Consent is
attached as Exhibit "A11 to the CCRs, which CCRs White Pine Ranches
executed and recorded.

(Ex. 51, WPR Add. 91-13 5) .

It also

ignores the fact that White Pine Ranches agreed to allow access.
(Fo 39, Re 1339, Add. B30). This reliance and performance by the
Sharps is sufficient to remedy any alleged defects under the
Statute of Frauds, and create an easement by estoppel, if not by
specific grant.

Lvman Grazing Ass'n v. Smith. 24 Utah 2d 443, 473

P.2d 905 (1970); Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co.. 6 Utah 2d 18,
305 P.2d 480 (1956).
POINT V
BY EXECUTING THE CONSENT TO RECORD,
THE SHARPS ARE ESTOPPED TO DENY
ACCESS TO PUD LOT OWNERS
The Sharps

are

estopped

to deny

access

roadway and utilities to PUD lot owners.

to the

internal

White Pine Ranches

claims the Sharps' foreclosure will extinguish the covenants and
easements

created

by

the

plat

31

and

CCRs,

including

the non-

exclusive easement over the roadway created in favor of the PUD
lot owners.
a)

White Pine Ranches makes this argument despite:

The provision in all Notices of Default and Notices of

Sale recorded against the Property that such Notices ares

"SUB-

JECT TO Easements, Encroachments, Restrictions, Rights-of-Way and
matters of record enforceable

in law

(sic) equity.

(F* 56, R.

1343, Add* B34).
b)

The Consent to Record grants "a non-exclusive easement

for water lines, water tank and water systems
exclusive

easement

for

utilities

access over the private roadwayo"
c)

vehicular

and

a non-

pedestrian

(Ex0 51, WPR Addc 91-131).

These same easements were reserved by White Pine Ranches

when they recorded the final plate
d)

and

[and] . . .

(Ex. 1 ) .

The plat and CCRs, with the Consent to Record attached

as an exhibit, were recorded on December 23, 1983 by White Pine
Ranchese
e)

(F. 40, R. 1339, Add. B30) .
No objection was raised by this release procedure until

after the Sharps recorded a Notice of Default on September 16,
1985.

(See generally, Ex. 57; F. 40, R. 1339, Add. B30; F. 51 &

54, R. 1342-1343, Add. B33-34).
f)

The Sharps perceived the Consent constituted substantial

performance of any obligation under the Memo to release.

(F. 60,

R. 1344, Add. B 3 5 ) . 2 8
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See Alaska Housing Auth. v. Walsh & Co., 625 P.2d 831
(Alaska 1980) (Contractor substantially performed road
construction contract where road was
substantially
serving its intended purpose).
White Pine Ranches
argues that there can be no substantial perform- (cont.)
32

g)

A provision in the Trust Deed, paragraph 9, allows the

Trustee upon request of the beneficiary (Sharps) to "(a) consent
to oo. any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any
easement.88
h)

(Ex. 2, Add. A2) .

The parties1

by mutual

intent and agreement granted

access to the Sharps in the event of default*

(F, 89, R. 1351,

Add. B42).
i)
to White

The Sharps repeated assurances, before and after trial,
Pine Ranches that they did not intend to interfere

through their foreclosure with White Pine Ranches' access and
utility easements.

(F. 88, R. 1351, Add. B42; see also, Ex. 33,

Add. D85; Tr. 22-25, 27-28 & 43, R. 164).
j)

Heaton's expert testimony at trial that recordation of

the Consent estopped the Sharps from foreclosing upon the roadway.
(Tr. 757, 765-766, R. 1645).
None of the cases cited by White Pine Ranches, however, deals
with

a

situation

as

here,

where

the

seller

(mortgagee

or

28 (cont.)
ance of a material term of a contract. Whether a term
is material, however, is a question to be determined by
the trier of fact, Matter of Bisio's Estate, 3 3 Or. App.
325, 576 P. 2d 801 (1978) (cited by White Pine Ranches)
as is the question of whether there has been substantial
performance.
American Petrofina Co. v. D & L Oil
Supply, 283 Or. 183, 583 P.2d 521 (1978). Zions Properties v. Holt. 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975), does not hold
substantial performance of material terms is legally
insufficient, as claimed by White Pine Ranches, but,
instead, deals with the issue of whether a breach is
sufficiently substantial to excuse performance by the
non-breaching party.
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beneficiary) consented to the recordation of CCRs and plat creating the easement.

One who consents to an easement is estopped to

deny its existence.

North Clear Lake Dev. Corp. v. Blackstock,

450 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App* 1970) (Successor to common grantor
who deeded lots without including easement in the legal descriptions estopped to deny the existence of an easement to which its
grantor had tacitly and specifically consented).
Similarly, in Monaco v. Bennion, 99 Idaho 529, 585 P. 2d 608
(1978), the original owners of property depicted an access road on
a plat of a subdivision of lakeshore property which was "dedicated11 as a private road.

A controversy arose as to the validity

of the "dedication" on the filed plat.

The court held "that the

legal effect of illustrating a private road on a filed plat and
"dedicating1 it is the creation of an easement in favor of the lot
purchasers."

Id. at 612. The court noted:

It is presumed that the existing private roadway added
value to all of the lots embraced in the general plan of
the plat, and that purchasers invested upon the faith of
the assurance that such access ways to the lots and the
boat launching area would not remain the totally private
property of the owner. The original owner and platter,
having "dedicated" the private roadway for the use of
lot purchasers, is estopped to deny that which he has so
plainly declared.
Id.; see also Cree Meadows, Inc. v. Palmer, 68 N.M. 479, 362 P.2d
1007 (1961) (Fee title of owner subordinate to easement granted
lot owners in plat of subdivision) ; Ute Park Summer Homes Ass'n
v. Maxwell Land Grant Co.. 77 N.M. 730, 427 P.2d 249 (1967) (Purchaser of lot acquires enforceable right that common areas be used
in manner designated).
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That the Sharps have to argue this issue is further evidence
of White Pine Ranches' straining to assert a default by the
Sharps,

In any other situation, it would be the developers who

assert the estoppel against the Sharps.

Under the common law

principles cited above and in light of the nature of the executed
Consent to Record cited above, its attachment to CCRs and plat,
all circumstances of this case, the Sharps are estopped to deny
the easement created by the Consent*
POINT VI
WHITE PINE RANCHES FAILED TO ESTABLISH
A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 57-1-33
FOR FAILURE TO REQUEST A RELEASE
The Sharps did not violate Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-3 3 by
failure to reconvey.29

This section is expressly applicable only

when a beneficiary (Sharps) "refuses to request a reconveyance ...
for a period of thirty days after written demand therefor is made
by the trustor rWhite Pines1."

The Sharps requested the Trustee,

Associated Title, to reconvey Lots 1-5 on or about January 18,
1984, two days before Felton's request,
R. 1340, Add. B31).

(Ex. 30, Add. C74; F. 42,

Because of White Pine Ranches' subsequent

breaches, the Sharps were under no obligation to reconvey the
roadway or the unplatted acreage.

Further, the trial court found

that even if there was an improper withholding by the Sharps, it
was not done in bad faith.

(F. 91, R. 1351, Add. B42) .

White

Pine Ranches conceded on p. 3 2 of its Brief that "'good faith' may
The text of this statute is set forth in WPR Add. 133.
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be a defense ... under Section 57-1-33" and the case law amply
supports such a conclusion.30

See, e.g., Shibata v. Bear River

State Bank. 115 Utah 395, 205 Po2d 251 (1949),

and the case

Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 P*2d 542 (Utah
1987) .

The trial court found the Sharps8 failure, if any, to

request any written releases of the Property was based upon their
reliance on Heaton31 and the modified agreement with White Pine
Ranches for the retention of access to the road until the trust
deed was satisfied in full.

(F. 91, R. 1351, Add. B42; C. 10, R.

1356, Add. B47).

The Sharps have never urged
reference to Section 57-1-33.

this defense

except in

The district court did not abuse its considerable
discretion in refusing to dismiss the Sharps' Counterclaim and related pleadings or in refusing to strike
attorney Heaton's testimony when the Sharps produced
certain of Heaton's documents on the last day of trial.
(See Appellants' Brief, p. 24, n. 13). Teece v. Teece,
715 P.2d 106, 109 (Utah 1986), citing Carmen v. Slavens,
546 P*2d 601 (Utah 1976). White Pine Ranches either had
these documents, they were of public record or they were
not produced due to attorney/client privilege under Rule
37(b)(2)(c), Utah R. Civ. P. (Tr. 981, R. 1647). Judge
Frederick was "not persuaded based on Heaton's testimony
that there's been any effort afoot here to try to
deprive inappropriately the Plaintiffs of their just
discovery.
The privilege could have easily been discovered by one as another party." (Tr. 955, R. 1646).
Further, White Pine Ranches did not show any prejudice
thereby.
After inquiring of Heaton concerning the
claimed failure to produce, White Pine Ranches rested
(Tre 975, R. 1647). Further, all of Heaton's documents
were tendered to the lower court under seal in the event
an in camera inspection is deemed appropriate.
(Tr.
973, R. 1347).
Any sanctions would be unwarranted
given such circumstances. Carmen, 546 P.2d 601.
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White Pine Ranches disputes the trial court's finding that
the Sharps relied on the advice of counsel, alleging Sharps'
testimony should be elevated to the status of a judicial admission.

A judicial admission requires "the statement to be a clear,

deliberate, unequivocal statement of fact, not opinion."
Xerox Corp.,

Haves v.

718 P.2d 929, 931 (Alaska 1986) (Counsel's estimate

of damages an opinion) .

If the statement is not clear, is an

inference or of uncertain memory or if a mistake is shown, a
judicial admission does not exist.

Bailey v. Mead, 260 Or. 410,

492 P.2d 798, 801 (1971); see also McCormick, Evidence Section 266
(2d edo 1972).
his

own

A "party is free to contradict and thus correct,

testimony

[or

explain

it] ; only

when

his

[or her]

testimony taken as a whole unequivocally affirms the statement [or
alleged admission] does the rule of conclusion apply."

Id.32

White Pine Ranches takes the statements claimed to be judicial admissions regarding release of the roadway and the lots out
of the context of Mr. Sharp's full testimony.

Mr. Sharp testified

Professor Wigmore notes "a party's testimony, uttered
by a layman in the stress of examination, cannot with
justice be given the conclusiveness of the traditional
judicial admission in a pleading or stipulation, deliberately drafted by counsel for the express purpose
of limiting and defining the facts in issue. Again, a
general rule of conclusiveness necessitates an elaboration of qualifications and exceptions which represent a
transfer to the appellate court of some of ... the
judge's fact finding function. These duties call for an
exercise of judgment of the judge who has heard and seen
the witness.
The supervision by appellate judges of
this trial process can best be exercised under a flexible standard, rather than a rule of conclusiveness."
Id.
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and the lower court found it was his understanding he and White
Pine Ranches had access to the road when he executed the Consent
to Record.

(Tr. 62-65, R. 1642? F, 39, 40, 42, R. 1339-1340, Add.

B30-31? F. 88 & 89, R. 1351, Add. B42).

Furthermore, Mr. Sharp

testified, and the court found, he relied on and followed Heaton's
advice concerning the releases.

(Tr. 45 & 49-50, R. 1642; F. 91,

R. 1351, Add. B42). In fact, Mrs. Sharp testified she also relied
on Heaton's advice and Heaton may even have made the decision with
regard to releasing the road.

(Tr. 444-445 & 457-458, R. 1644; F.

91, R. 1351, Add. B42).
The evidence clearly supports the trial court's finding that
the Sharps relied upon Heaton and the Sharps' testimony, taken as
a whole, should not be termed a conclusive admission.
POINT VII
WHITE PINE RANCHES IS NOT ENTITLED
TO DAMAGES OR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
FOR ALLEGED BREACH OF CONTRACT
Because the trial court did not err in determining that White
Pine Ranches breached the Contract, it is not entitled to damages,
specific performance or to have the interest tolled.33
should

this

Court

affirm the

Further,

findings of the district court

concerning liability, White Pine Ranches' damages arguments are
moot.

The court below specifically found that it was White
Pine Ranches who breached the Contract, not the Sharps.
(C. 3-5, R. 1355-1356, Add. B46-47) . Accordingly, the
trial courtfs rulings regarding White Pine Ranches1
alleged damages, therefore, even if erroneous, were
harmless and not prejudicial. Rule 5, Utah R. Evid.
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A. White Pine Ranches1 Contract Damages Claimed Are Too Speculative and It Is Not Entitled to Have the Difference Between
Contract Price and Fair Market Value of the Property.
It is well settled law in Utah that an award of damages
cannot be based on mere speculation or conjecture.

Dunn v. McKay,

Burton, McMurray & Thurman. 584 P«2d 894 (Utah 1978); Jamison v.
Utah Home Fire Ins. Co,, 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977); Robinson v.
Hreinsonr 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1965); Bunnel v. Bills, 13
Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962) .

Damages must be supported by

proof on which reasonable minds acting fairly could believe that
it was more probable than not that the damage was or will be
actually suffered.

Dunn, 584 P. 2d 894; Jamison, 559 P. 2d 958;

Robinson, 409 P.2d 121; Bunnel, 368 P.2d 597. The evidence on the
record must contain a degree of certainty which a reasonably
accurate ascertainment of Contract damages would require. Bunnel,
368 P.2d at 602.
recovery.

Further, an uncertain cause of damages precludes

Terry v. Panek, 631 P.2d 896, 897 (Utah 1981), citing

Gould v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 6 Utah 2d 187, 309 P.2d 802,
805 (1957).
In the instant case, White Pine Ranches1 alleged damages are
too speculative.

Instead, the evidence shows that White Pine

Ranches failed to show any damages directly resulting from the
Sharps1 failure to release Lot 6, the roadway and the unplatted
7.5 acres. The trial court found:
a) The Sharps had not interfered with White Pine Ranches1
attempts to sell the Property.

(F. 72, R. 1347, Add. B38; see
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also F. 73-74, R. 1347-1348, Add. B38-39; and F. 77, R. 1348, Add.
39-40).
b)

Saunders

had

told

a

prospective

purchaser

he

could

convey Lot 6 even though it had not yet been released from the
Trust Deed.

(F. 75, R. 1348, Add. B39; Tr c 284, 389, Re 1643).

c) Felton had written White Pine Ranches1 realtor, stating
"[t]he current litigation does not affect the marketability
encumber that [Subject] property."
d)

White

Pine

Ranches

or

(F. 76, R. 1348, Add. B39).

has

"not

suffered

any

damages,

special or otherwise, as a result of any act or failure to act by
the Sharps."

(F. 93, R. 1352, Add. B43).

B.
The District Court Properly Excluded White Pine Ranches1
Evidence Regarding the Interest on the Construction Loan.
The Utah Supreme Court in Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park
Citv

Corp..

592

P. 2d

620,

624

(Utah

1979) has

set

forth the

guidelines for awarding special damages:
[T]he only damages recoverable are those that could be
reasonably foreseen and anticipated by the parties at
the time the contract was entered into. Mere knowledge
of possible harm is not enough; the defendant must have
reason to foresee, as a probable result of the breach,
the damages claimed.
Furthermore, before reliance
damages may be awarded, the amount of the expenditure
must be found to have been reasonably made.
Id. (emphasis in the original) ; see also Restatement (Second) of
Contracts Section 47, comment e (1982).

In Ranch Homes, the Court

held that even though the sellers of the real property breached
the option contract, the developers could not recover damages for
managerial

"quarter-backing,"

architectural,

services or logo and brochure design because
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engineering,
such

legal

expenditures

were not reasonably foreseeable.

Id.

See also

Conner v. South-

ern Nev. Paving. 741 P.2d 800, 801 (Nev« 1987) (Interest on contractor's construction loan held not contemplated or foreseeable
at the time of agreement).
As in Ranch Homes and Conner. the Sharps did not and could
not reasonably foresee that White Pine Ranches would finance the
improvements and thereby incur interest.

(Tr. 72-73, R. 1642). 34

Instead, White Pine Ranches may have sought to raise the money
through

equity

financing35

or

may

have

chosen

to

pay cash.

Further, in both actions, White Pine Ranches admitted the construction damages were "unforeseeable," "unreasonable" and "intolerable."

(Ex. 84, Addc D86; Tr. 209-210, 212, 222-223, R.

1643; Tr. 508, 528-529, R. 1644).
C.
White Pine Ranches Is Not Entitled to Interest on Installments .
In order to be entitled to recover interest on the purchase
price paid to a seller of real property, the buyer must be deprived of the use and possession of the property.
Commercial Co. v. Spears, 641 P.2d

Dillingham

1 (Alaska 1982); see also

Bembridae v. Miller, 235 Or. 396, 385 P.2d 172, 178 (1963) (Purchaser has a right to possession and vendor a right to interest on
34

In the Federal Court litigation, White Pine Ranches
sought to recover these same damages from Summit County
and the SBSID, alleging their actions caused the losses.
(F. 70, R. 1347, Add. B38.)

35

In fact, White Pine Ranches did just this when admitting
new partners Rees and Howell. (Ex. 48, 49; Tr. 81-82,
R. 1642.)
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the unpaid purchase price.

Fruits of possession and interest

mutually exclusive, neither party has right to both).
Maleckv v. Maleckv. 148 Ariz. 121, 713 P*2d 322 (App. 1985),
cited by White Pine Ranches, is not germane to the case at hand.
In Malecky, a wife gave her husband money to purchase a home.

The

court later found the home was the ex-husband's separate property
and, since the transaction was in the nature of a loan, accordingly awarded interest thereon.

In Rose City Transit Co. v. City of

Portland. 18 Or. App. 369, 525 P.2d 1325 (1974), the court recognized that interest and possession are mutually exclusive.
In this case, White Pine Ranches has continually enjoyed the
continuous use and possession

of the Property.

There is no

element of uncompensated use by the Sharps of White Pine Ranches'
money.
D. White Pine Ranches Is Not Entitled to Specific Performance of
the Contract or to Have the Principal Interest Accruing on the
Trust Deed Note Tolled.
Because the Sharps did not breach the agreement, as discussed
above, White Pine Ranches is not entitled to specific performance.
Shepherd v. French, 612 P.2d 727 (Okl. Ct. App. 1980).

Thus,

White Pine Ranches is not entitled to have the principal and
interest on the Trust Deed Note tolled.
The cases on which White Pine Ranches relies, Pack v. Hall
Dev. Co., 667 P.2d 39 (Utah 1983); Blomouist v. Bingham, 652 P.2d
900 (Utah 1982); Amoss v. Bennion, 23 Utah 2d 40, 456 P.2d 172
(1969); and Dillingham Commercial Co., 641 P.2d 1, do not support
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a claim for tolling interest.

In Pack, the court noted that

interest will not be allowed if the seller has in some way prevented the buyer from taking possession.
In Blomquist.

the

court held where a vendor refused to

close, the buyers were relieved of interest because they were not
in "actual or beneficial possession and did not divest sellers of
actual possession,"

652 P.2d at 902,

buyer out of possession of the land.

Amoss also deals with a

456 P.2d at 174, 175. Once

a purchaser is placed in possession, however, interest under the
contract begins to accrue.
Co. is also similar.

The holding in Dillingham Commercial

641 P.2d at 10.

Unlike the above cases, White Pine Ranches here has never
been out of possession of the Property, and its marketing efforts
over the years clearly show it has enjoyed the use of the Property. (F. 72 & 77, R. 1347 & 1349, Add. B38-40).

Finally, because

White Pine Ranches breached the Contract and enjoyed the possession of the Property without interference by the Sharps, it cannot
now substantiate a claim that the trial court erred in refusing to
grant White Pine Ranches specific performance.36
POINT VIII
THE SHARPS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEY'S
FEES, WHICH FEES WERE REASONABLE
A. The Terms of the Contract Authorize the Award of Attorney's
Fees.
In Utah, where provided for by contract, the award of attorney's fees is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
36

White Pine Ranches cannot claim both specific performance and damages under the contract. The two claims
are inconsistent remedies. Cook v. Clovev Ballard Motor
Co.. 69 Utah 161, 253 P. 196 (1927).

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988)? Turtle
Mat,

v. Haggis Mat.. 645 P.2d

677 (Utah 1982).

The parties1

Contract includes numerous provisions for the award of attorneyfs
fees to the Sharps.

(F. 77, R. 1348-1349, Add. B39-40).

"Provi-

sions and written contracts providing for the payment of attorney's fees should ordinarily be honored by the courts."
Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983).

Soffe v.

White Pine Ranches was found by

the lower court to be in breach of the Trust Deed, Trust Deed Note
and Memo.

(C. 2-6, R. 1355-1356, Add. B46-47).

Three separate provisions of the Trust Deed alone provide for
the recovery of attorney's fees.
provides that the beneficiary

(Ex. 2, Add. Al-4).

Paragraph 6

(Sharps) "may commence, appear in

and defend any action ... and ... employ counsel, and pay his
reasonable fees."

Paragraph 7 then requires trustor (White Pine

Ranches) to "pay immediately"

"all sums expended hereunder by

Beneficiary," especially including sums expended in paragraph 6.
Finally, under paragraph 16, the Sharps are entitled to "foreclose
the Trust Deed [and] ... recover in such proceeding all costs and
expenses incident therein, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
The word "incident" as used in paragraph 16 means pertaining
to or involved in although not an essential part of another thing.
Amarillo Lodge No. 731 v. City of Amarillo, 473 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 488 S.W.2d 69 (Tex.
1973).

As set forth below, the Sharps' "defending" of the Com-

plaint pertains to the foreclosure of the Trust Deed.
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The Trust Deed Note provides that if it "is collected by an
attorney after default «<>. the undersigned [White Pine Ranches]
ooc agree to pay ... a reasonable attorney's fee.11

(Ex« 3, Add.

A5-6).
In Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P,2d 168 (Utah 1977), the Utah
Supreme Court denied attorney's fees to the plaintiff in defending
a counterclaim which did not relate to the collection of a note or
foreclosure of the property.

The issues in this case all relate

to the collection of the Trust Deed Note and foreclosure of the
Property.

It is White Pine Ranches who alleged the Sharps were

not entitled to foreclose by virtue of the very issues it now
claims to be unrelated to such foreclosure. See, e.g., Barker v.
Johnson, 591 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1979) (Award of attorney's fees proper
even though action instituted by buyer for specific performance
and seller asserted counterclaims of possession and quiet title);
First State Bank v. Hoehnke Nursery Co., 63 Or. App. 816, 667 P.2d
1022

(1983) (In an action to foreclose on a mortgage or trust

deed, bank's contractual right included right to collect attorney's fees in connection with actions or suits that might be
required to collect its debt in full and to realize on its security) .
Finally, under the Memo, para. 11, the defaulting party shall
pay all expenses of enforcing the same or any right arising out of
breach or default, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Add. A12) .

(Ex. 15,

The word "enforce" as used in the Memo generally

means to give effect to or compel obedience to, including to
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breach of the Contract.

See Fortier v. Donna Anna Plaza Partners,

747 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1984)-

The words "arising out of" as

used in the Memo, mean a transaction which is connected with the
subject of the action.

See County Plains Corp. v. Nosband Corp.,

234 A.D. 588, 256 N.Y.S. 10
foreclosure

action

lender to withhold

that

(App. Div. 1932)

the plaintiff

(Defenses to a

wrongfully

induced

the

final payment under the loan contract and

failed to release lots as agreed were proper subjects of a counterclaim as "arising out of" the contract).
The Utah Supreme Court has held where rights under an agreement are denied, the non-defaulting party may take legal action to
enforce the agreement and collect reasonable attorney's fees from
the defaulting party.

Trayner v. Gushing. 688 P.2d 856 (Utah

1984) (Award of attorney's fees denied to the "prevailing party"
since each party was successful on one or more points).
White Pine Ranches breached the parties' Contract, requiring
the Sharps to enforce the Contract and defend against the allegations of White Pine Ranches arising out of that breach.

Accord-

ingly the Sharps are entitled to recover their reasonable attorney 's fees.
B.

The Attorney's Fees Incurred bv the Sharps Were Reasonable.
In this matter, White Pine Ranches has repeatedly asserted

that the case was difficult and complex.
deemed the
1642).

The trial court also

case to be "somewhat complicated."

(Tr. 128, R.

The Sharps were required to defend, in a trial which

lasted nearly six days, issues dealing with breach of Contract,
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failure to release, release of a particular lot and the internal
roadway,

release

of

unplatted

acreage,

failure

to

reconvey,

slander of title, failure to convey a 10.5 strip of land to the
County for another roadway, the demand to pay a 1/6 and then 1/13
share of White Pine Ranches1 total costs for improvements on the
Property, slander of title, allegations of fraud, and claims for
(See generally White Pine Ranches1 Complaint,

unjust enrichmento
R. 2-89).

In the process, numerous witnesses were called to

testify at trial and over 125 exhibits were introduced.

Further,

counsel for the Sharps was required to file, brief and argue
numerous motions and engage in the extensive discovery.
generally R.

128-1628). Given this background,

(See

it is obvious

Sharps8 counsel performed substantial legal services which were
needed to prosecute their counterclaim and defend against White
Pine Ranches' Complaint and the trial court so found.
1354, Add. B45)
1985)).

(F. 99, R.

(see Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P. 2 622 (Utah

Under the case law cited below, the trial court's finding

should be sustained.
The amount involved in this controversy greatly exceeded onehalf million dollars and the Sharps clearly prevailed
issues asserted.

on all

Here, the trial court, without objection from

White Pine Ranches, directed Mr. Winder to proceed by filing an
Affidavit.

"It is this Court's view that Mr. Winder should submit

an affidavit in support of his claim for attorney's fees on behalf
of the Defendants [Sharps]."

(Tr. 9, R. 1651).

The testimony of

a prevailing party's attorney as to the reasonableness of attor47

ney's fees is sufficient evidence*
989. 37

The

court accepted

Dixie State Bank, 7 64 P*2d. at

the unrebutted

Affidavits

of Mr.

Winder, with itemized billing statements and a signed fee agreement letter attached thereto.
56, Ro

1640? R. 1285-1320)e

(Cfe F. 97, R. 1353, Add* B44,° Tr,
Such an unrebutted affidavit is

competent evidence for an award of attorney's fees.

Freed Finance

Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.. 537 P. 2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1975) (Attorney^

fees cannot be awarded without a stipulation, unrebutted

affidavit or evidence).
Finally, White Pine Ranches1 claim that post judgment attorney's fees and fees incurred on appeal are not recoverable is not
the law in Utah.

In Bates v. Bates. 560 P.2d 706 (Utah 1977),

attorneyfs fees for pursuing an appeal were awarded and Rule 4506(3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration specifically
recognizes the award of post judgment attorney's fees in default
judgments0
The reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the
case and the fee customarily charged in the community
for similar services can be gauged from reviewing the
redacted statements of attorney's fees attached to
Plaintiffs' Third Supplemental Response to Defendants1
First Set of Interrogatories dated February 27, 1988.
(R. 1305-1320).
White Pine Ranches' counsel, Mr.
Anderson, bills his time at $160.00 per hour, Mr.
Watkins' time at $135.00 per hour, and Mr. Gaylord's
time at $60.00 per hour; higher fees than are reflected
in the Affidavits of Attorney's Fees submitted by the
Defendants. Further, Hansen & Anderson charged higher
fees than Winder & Haslam for the opposite side of the
same case. For example, Hansen & Anderson's statement
for November 16 through December 12, 1987 was
$14,786.75. In comparison, Winder & Haslam's statement
for both November ($2,401.00) and December ($10,992.00),
was less.
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In summary, the Contract documents in this case should be
treated

as an integrated whole

(see Point II, supra) and the

attorney's fees provisions in each should be applicable to the
breach of any.

The issues litigated in this matter were clearly

related to the rights of the Sharps to foreclose and to collect
after White Pine Ranches defaults.
recognized

the

White Pine Ranches itself

Sharps' foreclosure

activities

in

obtaining a

temporary restraining order to restrain the Trustee's Sale of the
Property

in September

of

1986.

The

factors

for determining

reasonableness have been met in this case and the unrebutted
Affidavit of Mr* Winder is competent evidence from which the Court
can determine

an award

of attorney's

fees.

The Sharps are,

therefore, entitled to their attorney's fees in accordance with
the terms of their Contract.
CONCLUSION
As noted in the Summary of Argument, this case is really very
simple.

The trial court found White Pine Ranches breached mater-

ial terms of the Contract by, inter alia, failing to pay taxes and
annual principal installments.

When White Pine Ranches requested

certain releases for the first time, it was already in default and
the Sharps' performance was excused.

Under the numerous attor-

ney's fees provisions in the Contract documents, the Sharps are
entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees.

Thus, the Sharps

respectfully request this Court to affirm the Judgment entered by
Judge Frederick.
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DATED this 27th day of September, 1989,
WINDER & HASLAM
Attorneys for Defendants/
Respondents Sharps

Donald J. Windfer

& ^)rmaJ)^^^>u^^
Tamara K.Prince
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct copies of
the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF TO SAUNDERS, ET AL. to be mailed,
postage prepaid, on this 27th day of September, 1989, to the
following:
Robert M. Anderson
Glen D. Watkins
Mark R. Gaylord
Sixth Floor
Valley Tower Building
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
John B. Anderson
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
623 East 100 South
P. Oo Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah

84147

Stanford B. Owen
Patrick L. Anderson
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

~TX^(&Q./X/^&,_

Tab A
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TRUST DEED
With Assignment of Rente
THIS TRUST DEED, made thia _ 2 Q t h _ day of
between _PMTT, H.,.T*Nnra, KEESTJEEUSai0.,lFmj\.

I^TTV»

, 19Q1_

SAIINDgBS,

l!I|KS!^J?a^
whose address is

, as TRUSTOR,

itJSfi&anc^la^^^^
(Start M * m— Ur>

^SOCpTEP ii TTrLE COMPANY

JOIjN Cy,o SHARP and GEBAIDB1E Y. SHARP

(CUT)

(SUU)

§ M

M

TRUSTEED and

BENEFICIARY,

WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST,

f
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in .Sumrifr
County, State of Utah:
SEE EXHIBIT "A* ATERCHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE INC0RPQRA3ED HEREIN.

Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof,
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the nght, power and authonty hereinafter given to and conferred upon
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $...963,.055*30
, made by
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest aa therein
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as
hereafter may lie made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory
note or notes reciting tliat they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with mterest
thereon as herein provided.
•NOTE: Trusts* must be a member of the Utah Slate Bar; a bank, buOdlnf and loan association or savtnea
ami loan association authorized to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in
Utah; or a Utie insurance* or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah.
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TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED, TRUSTOR AGREES:
1. T o keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or demolish any building tfureon, to
complete or restore promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed,
damaged or destroyed thereon; to comply with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting suid property; not
to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer o r permit any act upon said property in violation of law; to
do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be reasonably necessary, the specific
enumerations herein not excluding the general; and. if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof is being obtained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property. Trustor further agrees:
(a) T o commence construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable diligence to completion
in accordance with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and
(b)

T o allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all times during construction.

Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Brneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accipt as true and conclusive all facts and state*
ments therein, and to act thereon hereunder.
2. T o provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on
the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said property. Such insurance shall be carried
in companies approved by Beneficiary with loss payable clauses in favor of and in form acceptable to Beneficiary
In e w n t of loss, Trustor shall give immediate notice lo Beneficiary, who may make proof of loss, and each insurance
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment for suth loss directly to Beneficiary
instead of to Trustor and Beneficiary jointly, and the iniurance procveds, o'r any part thereof, may be applied
by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair of
the property damaged.
3. T o deliver to. pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full,
such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of title or policies of title insurance and
any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto,
4. T o appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to
also appear in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee.
5. T o pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property, including
all assessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or
used in connection with said property; to pay. when due, all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest,
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs,
fees, and expenses of this Trust.
6. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may
deem necessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said
property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees.
7. T o pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee,
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured hereby.
I T IS MUTUALLY AGREED T H A T :
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement
or condemnation procee ling, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner, Beneficiary shall be
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option
to commence, appear in and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights
of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property,
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may, after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees,
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require.
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and pre*
sentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby,
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any m a p o r plat of said property; (b) join in granting any easement or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed
or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part of said property. T h e grantee in
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of any
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph.
10. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property
located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, Trustor shall have the right to collect ail such rents, issues, royalties,
and profits earned prior to default as they become d u e and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid,
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from t i m e to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same.
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall l>e, or be construed to
be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option.
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in
person, by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of
Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's teea, upon any indebtedness
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary m a y determine.
12.
profits,
damage
default

T h e entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collecton of such rents, issues, and
or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or
of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any
or notice of default hereunder or invalidate a n y act done pursuant to such notice.

13. T h e failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other
or subsequent d e f a u l t

f\
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14. T i m e is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due
and payaBIt* at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee
to execute a written notice of default and of election t o cause said property to IK- sold to salLfy the obligations
hereof ami Tniatri.* shall file such notice for record i n each county * hi rein said property or some part or

default, and notice of default and notice of safe having been given as then required by law, Trustee, without demand
jn Trustor, shall sell sari prop' ' on the date and at the time and place desig '->d in suul notice of sale, either as
a whole or in separate parcel*,
n such order as it may determine (but subje
any statutory right of Trustor to
direct the order in which *uc« .operty, if consisting of several known lots
parrels, shall l>e sold), at public
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United Stutes at the time of
sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to
time until it shall be completed and, in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the Bale; provided, if the sale is postponed
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given m the
same manner as the original notice of sale Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveytng said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the
Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps
on Trustee's Deed;
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10r/r per annum from date
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any. to the person or persons
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place.
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to. declare all sums
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law
and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedfor the foreclosure of mortgages on reial property
.
hereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be
ing all costs and expenses incident thereto,
fixed by the court
17. Beneficiary may appoint • successor trustee at any time by filing for reco* 1 in the office of the County
Recorder of each county in which said property or tome part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From
the tune the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee Each such substitution shall be executed and
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
18 This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees,
devisees, admtnstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured
hereby In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculme gender includes the feminine and/or
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public
record as provided by law Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless
brought by Trustee.
20. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah
21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth.
Signature of Trustor

si^iz
(If Trustor an
STATE OF UTAH*
COUNTY OF & J p
On the
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b.trr.

day of . . . . . . S ^ C ^

, A.D. w S L , personally

appeared before me ...PiUJL.H«..Ii^ES^.Brar7r^
,
the signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that ..they, executed the

A LQ&SASL xJF^.y^i.
My Commission Expires: 5 ' ^ ' o 5

^^

Notary Public residing at:
Ai /
( /^
—{—

(If Trustor a Corporation)
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On the .

Lk?..r:.... day o f . — X . h * ? ^

appeared before me

L.D.
, A.I

KEWNETO..R...HHfcN.
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i/.. personally

, who being by me duly sworn,

says that he is the
President
of ...Interst3te.aental3 f ...Inc r r
..,
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution
of its board of directors) and said KEtt^H..R...NQRraN.
to me that said corporation executed the same.
[ \r\

.LH*&£*:.Public
My Commission Expires:

^v

Notify PL
hJ
|~ _, L ,

acknowledged

EXHIBIT "A"

Beginning at a point South 89° 43' 36 w West along the North
line of Lot 8, 175.42 feet from the corner of Lots 1 and 8* a
brass cap set by the Uc S« General Land Office, said brass cap
also being South 00° 19• 46" West along section line 1336.14
feet from the Northeast corner of Section 1, Township 2 South,
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian? and running thence
South 89° 438 36" West along the North line of Lots 7 and 8
2948.98 feet to the Northwest corner of Lot 7; thence South
00° 13e 29" East along the West line of Lot 7, 1312.84 feet to
the Southwest corner of Lot 7; thence North 89* 47* 41" East
along the South line of Lot 7, 832.67 feet? thence North 61°
008 00" East 195tSo90 feet? thence North 47° 331 15" East
462.75 feet? thence North 42° 44' 40" East 85.63 feet to the
point of beginning.
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments, Restrictions, Rights-of-Way
and matters of record enforceable in law or equity.

TRUST DEED NOTE
DO NOT QCSTXOY THIS NOTfc Vfimm aoaej. ata^a**, »ita Ynatf Dooei
to Tnaatoo for eonnflmiia, boforo w i n I I I H I wtf W r W i

Jim

FOE VALUl I £ C S V E D , ta« aadonipod, Joiariy aod «venily,

30

_ 19.11.

p«f to tfco order o/

JCHN C. SHARP,and GZ3AIDPJE Y. SHARP^

v r r e wfawnycn c - v - ^ - v g r r -yrrttswn *»TTT>/ g r y r a^m mnnn
together »tta ioicrcat froa dait a* q e n u oi
3"«EL7E..
aao laooaid arioape*. u*d pnoopei aod iourm payable a* follow*:

r^V

io< (J...3J&2,055.2.0...).

p«* c a t ( L 2 - ^ )

ADOSMXM A3TAC23 HEE5ZO AND BY THIS HkssJkXOL

per u u u a 00

MACE A PART K S 3 S T .

Each paymeor laail ba applied fine oj accrued taarac aad tao beiaact to dio raduoioa of* phoapai. Aoy
aaca aooaiLsexK aoc paid* whoa duo ihaii bow iatsroai daereoitor u the n u ^/ e i q h r g g a
-~

oaac <_IJL£%) por aaaua uoui poaU and shall ba subject to a late payment charge of 4%
of such overdue payment.
II de/auk acorn ia dao paymeatt ad mid inafilTmann oi phaopai uxd inures* or toy part thereof, or ia
dat performance 0/ aay agraexneor mnr lined ia sho Txuac Deed aocuriag dm 001c, cat holder hereof, at iu
opooa and without oocics or ^—»-***, not' dodaro the ootiro phndpai bmiaoct aod accruod iotcrcai duo aod

U dua aoe* ia cailootd by a* artoroey t i t s default ia ch« payment 0/ phncipai or interest, either %ith
or without auc, tat undersigned, jointly aod acvcnlly, agrao to pay ail caau aod expert*** of collection iiuiuding
o raa*oa*bic aatoroey'i foe.
The OMOi, aurruca. gujjraatori aod codonera hereof aevenily w»»\»* prnenuncat for payment, demand
aad aoar* oi diabooor aod aoopavcocot 0/ chu ante, aod cooacne to any aod ail otcnuona of u s e , near*ait,
waiver* or aoouicuiooa chat ma* be granted by the bolder hereof with ropoct to the payment or other proviaioaa of «V^ ante, aod to the reicavae of aoy accuriry, or any pan thereof, with or without lubanranon.
Tail

x«4 by a Truat Deed oi rroo data herewith.
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.

^
-tfi^

^

Ate no

^

? DVINOANTS
IXHIilT

rmnc:
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AECBGM to Trmt Deed Note dated June 30, 1981, axaeutad by PAUL H. LUGES,
JCBEKT FELTCN, LBCM H. SMKOS^ 2HE3S3AIS KE2OTLS, 22C«» a* ttuster i a favor
of 32ft C. SAB? and G5ULDXNE X- S»RP, aa B m f i d a r y .
lo

S * entire principal balance of 963,055/5b together with accrued interett
at the rata of tvelva percent (12%) pt£ annua ahall be paid aa follows*
*,

Q* or before June 30, 1582, a principal payment of $192,611.06, or
acre together with accrued Interest on the entire unpaid principal
balance ahall be due and payable in f u l l .
B« On or before June 30, 1583, a principal payment of 5192,611.06, or
mare together with accrued interest on the entire unpaid principal
balance shall be due and payable in f u l l .
C Ch or before June 30, 1984, a principal payment of $152,611.06, or
acre together with accrued interest on the entire unpaid principal
balance shall be due and payable in f u l l .
Do Cn or before June 30, 1985, a principal payment of $192,611.06, or
more together with accrued interest on the entire unpaid principal
balance shall be due and payable in f u l l .
E. Ch cr before June 30. 1986, a principal payment of $192,611.06, or
more together with accrued interest on the entire «r-aid principal
balance shall be due and payable in f u l l .
2«. trustor shall have the right to prepay up to 501 of the ; rincipal secured
hereunder in any one calendar year but in the event of v:y prepayment a
charge in the amount of $10,000.00 ahall be aateasad f~r each calendar
year reduced firm the payment schedule by prepayment.
3c Kenneth R. Norton, President of Interstate Rentals, Inc., individually
and personally dots hereby guarantee the performance of Interstate
Centals, Inc.
EXZ5D this

day of June 1981.

S^'jCKN C. SKn3?,t Beneficiary

M

_

AGZSALDI^ *. SKAS?, Beneficiary

rfV/lllt

\«.

L V

*»»'

-*—
Leon II. S a u n d e r s , tlobcrt Vol ton.
* •• I » '•
> " • >*• j i»- '/»' K c n n e r h B.. 2Jor.toa_& P n u L J l — L n n d e s .
u„br •.,— .it ,*, .. ..,«•., - n o ,», .„. u u ^ i O O O ^ g ^ . , ^Twenty-Five Thousand and no/100
o ^
M* IH« i«« <w
check to b e immediately negotiated Co S e l l e r
,
__
i.. * .« ,J <Mif «. .1* ^ . w o< tt» p«or,.., ..«w.«j .• _See^t,tachegLpJ.^t locating appr^xjmALeJjoundariea o f
p r o p e r t y . P r o p e r t y consists o f 7 0 a c r e s , m o r e o r l e s s , a s generally outlined p p the atta
Exhibit "A". N o w a t e r rights_are transferred b y S e l l e r h e r e u n d e r .
Propert;y_j«_aQld__t0£*
w i t h access from the County^road_but subject to e a s e m e n t s , e n c r o a c h m e n t s f r e s t r i c t i o n s .
J i & h c s - o f - w a y and matters of recorjd.or e n f o r c e a b l e in l a w o r equity.
..... . _ «.
— «. . r.ir
Summit
W *_Utflh
(tmmf
The Ml««««f r o t . * * ! r« n**'*f •'••II •!•»• t» n.nid*u *• r*'* at ••»«• r*«v*"r r«i»«naa«J
None
Lfcy_pfix_troaa_acrBou
TU M I ^ * » ......
ui < i , ^ i*L
Q J X Lr -. >T I j- y• enn
t , y - s l x . EfrQusanoLt
anatl !«• f»»yaM* aa f uki » M
I —ir-di ~ .
-iiyHh.rrntcaanii
anatl U f.»yaM> aa
fc»»«^.f_x.?
-i2P.:J~rr?i
~ r
Q - • n H n r r n t c a # n « i die a f a r v d o o n V d < t y « H m e t * W - K K J I « bcrtbv K a f t w l r d f t t f * T y«w
liminary plan,
$495,000 „ j,hv,„ ^ j„j M ,,„.,(MUia
M k n . L.kiti, -. i,i .• _
. , -u.
~u
. . > ,.,
?nl the balancc^in.
equal annual installments oc principal and interest, the first such payment being due out
after cloiing. "Closing^sRall "Be immeTiaTeiy'llpo'n recording of Buyer1 s^PUD. Bu7er to pTc
as_rapid_ly as possible to recording. In all events, closing shall be no later than 6/30/
AM additional ^consideration from Purchaser, to Seller, _nt closing, Purchascr_nJ\nll sell. t<
Seller at_a cost to Seller of $100,000 cash, 50 acre/feet of irrigation water rights froi
Weber River Decree Auards^A\l_ (Priority__1860)Land_4J6 (Priority 1861). 5uyer, at his opt
at any time, may pay amounts"in"exce*?s of payments upon the unpaid balance, but no more than
50% of total principal shall be paid by Buyer in any one
p
calendar year without Seller's advance written approval.
tlTe"d'nte of% T o s T * "" %~p"d*~uonm
«4>

M a i i f l i t h t i i T i y i i fiirt

w u

|

pv

hate p»»»<? «•» l » IIKIIMJT I tn «k» n t a * nKr I p i f i M M i and iHall b c t i n »• «** J a i * of puawaaion - h * * dial! K« on

cne once or c , f o s i ^ . a „,
,J {iitifHitt
end f i | v - i » « ol inturaiuc t l i t l l U tiorn by ih« »*{U$ until d*l» <•< I M N H H I U I at mb»ck «••»« p i " i * f t » i t i c i i t i t u inauf«n«« i n « f « u «ml 01U1 *«p«A»r« oi i K t ptoo«r<»
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J M J !••« u< f••*•#*••« n
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The contract to Seller o r the note secured by deed o f trust prepared by Seller, a s S e l l e r raa
e l e c t , shall* provide for Into payment penalty and shall p r o v i d e Purchaser with n r e l e a s e o f
lot for every p r i n c i p a l payment of 1 3 0 % of initial p e r lot p r i n c i p a l balance of the o b l i p n t i
The down payment n h n l l roleirio thrro four-ncrc to fivc-ncro lota and the property required I
the approved roadway. Unless Seller a g r e e s , n o r e l e a s e o f a n y property is required u n t i l tl
completion of the transfer of o w n e r s h i p of the w a t e r rights and the final recording o f the
Plat. P u r c h a s e r ' s d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n s p r e s e n t l y a n t i c i p a t e 12 to 15 four-acre to f i v e - a c r e lc
and such plans shall b e subject to the r e a s o n a b l e a p p r o v a l o f Seller. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g anytl
to the contrary contained within the language o f this Earnest Money A g r e e m e n t , the p a r t i e s
agree that Seller is n o t w i l l i n g to sell the P r o p e r t y u n l e s s from the date o f e x e c u t i o n h e n
to closing, a l l e f f o r t s fail to find suitable like p r o p e r t y o r p r o p e r t i e s qualifying f o r a
tax-deferred e x c h a n g e under the a p p l i c a b l e p r o v i s i o n s of the Internal Revenue Code for pure!
by Purchaser and e x c h a n g e w i t h S e l l e r . F a i l i n g to find suitable like exchange p r o p e r t y o r
properties by such t i m e . Seller is w i l l i n g to ncll the P r o p e r t y but under n o other c i r c u m stances. P u r c h a s e r is w i l l i n g to e x e r c i s e best e f f o r t s to consummate a n e x c h a n g e . Purchase
and Seller covenant that each w i l l e x e r c i s e i t s b e s t e f f o r t s from and after the time of
signing of this A g r e e m e n t to seek out suitable e x c h a n g e p r o p e r t y o r p r o p e r t i e s q u a l i f y i n g
for a tax-deferred e x c h a n g e of the P r o p e r t y . Each p a r t y c o v e n a n t s and w a r r a n t s that it w i l
immediately notify t h e o t h e r should such p r o p e r t y o r p r o p e r t i e s so q u a l i f y i n g b e found. T h
d e c i s i o n regarding t h e s u i t a b i l i t y o f the p r o p e r t y for e x c h a n g e and ownership by S e l l e r s h a
rest w i t h Seller. T h e p a r t i e s a c k n o w l e d g e that the p r o v i s i o n s herein regarding the sale of
the subject Property shall apply if a n d only i f , d e s p i t e the best e f f o r t s of the p a r t i e s
h e r e t o , their a g e n t s a n d other p a r t i e s i n Che real p r o p e r t y b u s i n e s s , suitable like p r o p e r t
for exchange is not o b t a i n e d , b y c l o s i n g . ^ A t a time d e s i r e d b y Seller, P u r c h a s e r shall a l l
Seller to hook into the culinary w a t e r system and sewer s y s t e m developed b y Purchaser o n th
subject Property at the same p e r - h o o k - u p price charged by P u r c h a s e r to the buyers of lots
developed o n the nub)cct P r o p e r t y . P u r c h a n c r a n d a l l o f them (through K e n Norton o r o t h e r w i s e ) shall exercise best e f f o r t s to transfer to S e l l e r u s the water rights (or wltii S e l l e r
approval in lieu of t h e w a t e r r i g h t s ) alluded t o a b o v e t h e irrigation w a t e r a v a i l a b l e t o Pv
chaser o r p e r s o n s in concert w i t h P u r c h a s e r that i s m o s t u s e f u l to Seller's adjacent p r o p e r
No woik shall be allowed on the property until c l o s i n g . U n t i l closing, no publicity o r r e l
of information r e g a r d i n g this sale s h a l l be m a d e by a n y p u r t y except a 3 necessary to perfor
actions required h e r e u n d e r . If Buyer pays the note o r coiilfrnct through
;II .muxoved
.muxpvec p r e p a y m e n t
irs, Buyer shall p a y a s a d d i t i o n a l s u m s a
ch; irge 6 t $ ^ 0 , 0 0 D f o r each
' y e a r s Jtlwit payment is m a d e .
,. - - .
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EXHIBIT "A
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KS?40RAHDUM OF CLOSING TSRH3

MEMORANDUM OF CLOSING T5RHS dated June 30, 1381,
executed by JOHN C. SHARP and GERALDIHZ x. SHARP (hereinafter •Seller') , and ROBERT FELTON, L20H H. SAUNDERS, KTHNETH
R. NORTON, and PAUL H. LANDES (hereinafter collectively

•Buyer*K
This Memorandum Lm e x e c u t e d for the express purpose
i

of d e s c r i b i n g those^matters agreed upon by the p a r t i e s hereto
which s u r v i v e the c l o s i n g of the t r a n s a c t i o n .
1.

I t i s a u t u a l l y agreed and understood that a f t e r

r e c o r d a t i o n of the PUD P l a t and the D e c l a r a t i o n of Covenants,
Conditions and R e s t r i c t i o n s , and upon r e c e i p t of each
$140,000.00 i n p r i n c i p a l (but n o t i n c l u d i n g the e a r n e s t money
and down payment money), S e l l e r s h a l l e x e c u t e and d e l i v e r t o
Buyer a P a r t i a l Deed of Reconveyance f o r one (1) PUD l o t *
2.

Upon the payment of t h e r e l e a s e p r i c e , feuyer s h a l l

be e n t i t l e d t o the r e l e a s e of one (1) l o t of Buyer's choice upon
r e c e i p t of t h e payment or a t any time
3.

thereafter*

Zt i s agreed t h a t , a t the time of e x e c u t i o n of

t h i s Memorandum, Buyer has paid t o S e l l e r the sua of $620,000.00
which w i l l r e l e a s e from the Deed of Trust three (2) PUD l o t s .
Upon the r e c o r d a t i o n of the PUD P l a t and Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions and R e s t r i c t i o n s w i t h t h e Susstit County Recorder,
Buyer s h a l l be e n t i t l e d to the r e l e a s e from the Deed of Trust of
three (3) PUD l o t s of Buyer's c h o i c e t o g e t h e r with the s a i d r o a d way.

I

f DEFENDANTS
1
EXHIilT

4*

In the event Buyer should pay to Seller any prinei-

pal sun in excess of the agreed upon release price, said sua
shall be applied toward the next release price, i.e., should Buyer
sake a principal payment of $160,000.00, the sua of $20,000•00
($110,000.00 less $140,000.00) shall be applied toward the next
release price which shall require an additional principal payment
Of $120,000.00 ($20,000,00 plus $120,000.00 equals

$140,000*00)

to release the next lot.
5«

The proposed plat is attached hereto as Exhibit

•&• and by this reference incorporated herein*. Seller hereby
acknowledges and agrees to execute as a lienholder the original
plat prior to recordation.

Changes in the proposed plat

and the

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions when prepared shall be subject to the reasonable approval of Seller.
6.

Seller agrees to grant to Summit County the ten

and one-half (10-1/2) foot strip of land outlined in red on
Exhibit *Xme

Said conveyance shall be for the sole purpose of

widening the County roadway.

If possible, sue*, grant shall be

in the form of an easement. The County indicates that it is
possible that the County road as it exists is not where it is
platted.

If such proves to be a fact. Seller agrees that upon

proper vacation, quit claim and abandonment of the platted road
by the County, Seller shall grant to the County (by way of
easement if possible) the County road as it exists as it is
shown on Exhibit
7.

mm

\ .

Buyer agrees to provide Seller wit.*, one (1) sewer

connection and one (1) culinary water connection into Buyer's
systems at such time as each is available, and Seller shall pay
a connection fee and service fee equal to the pro rata cost to

the purchaser of a lot in Buyer's proposed PUD plus any charges
of Suanit Water Distributing Company.

The sewer and water

connection granted above can be ummd by Seller in nev
construction it

allowed on the 8.5 acre parcel or for connec-

tion to the existing residence of'seller.

Should Seller require

another water and/or sewer connection, upon payment of 'the same
charge set forth in the prior sentence, if well and sewer line
c«pacity i% available in Buyer's systems, and if Buyer shall
convey to Seller whatever water rights the Board of Health
would require for one (1) culinary connection (not to exceed
one acre/foot) and the location of the residences to be located
on the retained approximately 8.5 acre portion of Seller's
property shall be subject to the reasonable approval of Leon H.
Saunders and the residences to be constructed on the said 8.5
acre parcel shall be subject to the same restrictions as Buyer's
residences are subject to under the Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions of White Pine Ranch PUD, Buyer shall grant to
Seller another one (1) culinary connection and one (1) sewer
connection*

If Seller does not request the second culinary

water connection and/or sewer connection. Seller is not
subject to the conditions set forth in the immediately
preceding sentence.

The location through Buyer's property

of the sewer line and culinary water line shall be designated
by Buyer and Buyer will make such designation to the closest
reasonable connection point to Seller's property*
8.

Buyer and«Seller agree that nonm of them have en-

gaged a Real Estate Broker, Agent or Finder for the purposes of
effecting this transaction and no commission, fee or other compensation shall be due and owing to any such Broker, Agent or
Finder as a result of this closing*
9.

This Memorandum and the closing documents executed

simultaneously herewith contain all the understandings, warranties.

-3-

representations and agreements among thai parties and the I I M
a n entered i n t o after each party ham personally and fully i n vestigated a l l facta and circumstances concerning the traa*ac~
t i m e r e f l e c t e d by and con temp La ted herein and none of the
pmrtimm mrm relying upon any statements or representations not
embodied herein.
10*

Time i s of the essence of this Memorandum and

i t may not be o r a l l y changed, modified or terminated except in
writing signed by the party against whoa the sane i s sought to
be enforced•

The terms of t h i s Memorandum shall apply to and

bind the h e i r s 9 executors, administrators, successors and
assign* of the respective parties hereto.
11.

In tfw event of breach or default of any obliga-

tion under t h i s Memorandum, the defaulting party shall pay a l l
expenses

of enforcing the **cie or any right arising out of breach

"or default thereof, including reasonable attorneys' f e e s , whether
incurred with or without s u i t And both before and after judgment.
12.

All warranties, covenants, obligations and agree-

ments contained herein shall survive the closing of t h i s transaction and any and a l l documents and instruments delivered in
connection herewith and shall remain binding upon the parties
hereto.

DATED this \L>

day of

ZTy^N

, 1981.

I

S?*^ xft^-<>

C. SHARP

^Cl^^t^ ^4L*
_______
Bursa:

&LS
LECN H . SAUHDZXS
-4-

J„

a/^Cd^^
sA.^*^?

BOTZRJ
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OWNER'S

DEDICATION

KNOW ALL BY TriEBE PRESENT THAT WE THE UNDERSIGNED OWNERS
OF THE 'r-REiN DESCRIBED TRACT OF LAND HAVING CAUSED ~Tr.E SAME TO
BE SUBDIVIDED INTO LOTS AND STREETS TO HEREAFTER BE .KNOWN AS
WHITE PINE RANCHES SUBDIVISION, CO HEREBY DEDICATE FOR PERPETUAL
USE OF THE PUBLIC ALL PARCELS OF LAND SHOWN ON THIS PLAT AS I N TENDED FOR PUBLIC USE, AND DO WARRANT, DEFEND, AND SAVE THE CTY
HARMLESS AGAINST ANY EASEMENTS OR OTHER INCUMBRANCES ON THE D E DICATED STREETS WHICH WILL INTERFERE WITH THE CTY S USE, OPERATION,
AND MAINTENANCE OF THE STREETS AND DO FURTHER DEDICATE THE EASEMENTS AS SHOWN.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE UNTO SET MY HAND THIS
DAY OF

LEO', n

, A. D. 1981.

SAUNDERS, XI

INDIVIDUAL

{ DIFENDANTS
IXHIBIT
S\,~\J

M

?orded ac Request of...
ar™

• M, Fee Paid $. Dcp. I5»vilt_

by-

Mail tax notice to_Bober£~Eel£oa_

~ Page

Ref.:

. Addresf„fM_Exc#ange.£iacj2L
Salt Lake City, Utah

841U

WARRANTY DEED
(Special)
JOHN C. SHARP and GERALDINE Y. SHARP, h i s wife, as tenants in common (the
said John C. Sharp owning an undivided two-thirds (2/3) i n t e r e s t therein grantor
and the said Geraldine ¥. Sliarp owning an undivided one-third (1/3) interest
therein) of Salt Lake City, Utah
hereby
CONVEY

AND WARRANT

against all claiming by, through or under said grantors

to

PAUL H. LANDES, ROBERT FELTOM, LEON H. SAUNDERS and INTERSTATE RENTALS,
XNCo, a Nevada Corporation, each as t o an undivided 25% i n t e r e s t as
tenants in common and not as joint tenants
grantee

of

S a l t Lake City, Utah

forthejumof

Ten Dollars and other good and valuable consideration
the fojlowing described tract

of land in

DOLLARS,

Summit

County,

State of Utah:
SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE
INCORPORATED HEREIN.

mown

WITNESS, the hand
July

of said grantor

, this
. A. D. 19 81

Signed in the Presence of

GERALDINE T . SHAk
STATE OF UTAH,
County o£-.Salt Lake •
On t W C / . ^ t h - - *
-lay of
personajl'y.ap^a^ before me
JQm

July
c<

SHApp

, A. D. 1*81
.^a GERALDINE Y. SHARP

the signers" ' of the wiilnn instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that

the y executed the

*• ./\.

S~?£.
J,Jj.^c^_^fck^Js»«te
£
My commmton « P , r « . . _ J L " J J L i S

«

,

I

Hoticf Public.

. .. R«.ding i«.5L«A? . i . t - & _ L ^ . I . T C J _ .

EXHIBIT "A*

Beginning at a point South 89* 43* 36* West along the North
line of Lot 8, 175*42 feet from the corner of Lots 1 and 8* a
brass cap set by the Uc S. General Land Office, said brass cap
also being South 00° 19* 46* West along section line 1336d4
feet front the Northeast corner of Section 1? Township 2 South,
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian? and rurning thence
South 89* 43* 36* West along the North line of Lo- 7 and 8
2948.98 feet to the Northwest corner of Lot 1? tb
*e South
QQ° 13' 29* East along the West line of Lot 7, 1. c 84 feet to
the Southwest corner of Lot 7? thence North 89* »
41* East
along the South line of Lot 7, 8 32.67 feet? thencj North 61*
00 s 00* East 1956.90 feet; thence North 4T 33* 15* East
462.75 feet; thence North 42° 44* 40" East 85„63 feet to the
point of beginning.
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachme cs, Restrictions, Rights-of-Way
and matters of record enforceable in law or equity.
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SaHUkc C:.L::;:y Utah

Donald J. Winder, Esq. (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq. (#4022)
Tamara K. Prince, Esq. (#5224)
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Or 2 fc 1388
;;

. st. Court

Csp^ty Clerk

Attorneys for Defendants Sharps

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE RANCHES,
a Utah general partnership;
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a
Utah general partnership,
Plaintiffs,
FINDINGS OF FACT
vs.
AND
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah
corporation,
Defendants.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. C87-1621
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP,
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT FELTON; LEON H.
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; KENNETH R. NORTON dba
INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC.,

00132G
0017

and PAUL H. LANDES, individually; WHITE PINE RANCHES,
a Utah general partnership,
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES,
a Utah general partnership,

:
:
%
:
;
9

Counterclaim-Defendants..

This

cause

came

on for

trial

before

the Honorable

J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29,
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the defendants John C. and Geraldine Y* Sharp

(hereinafter the

"Sharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A* F,
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enterprises,

Leon H.

Saunders

(hereinafter

"Saunders"),

Robert

Felton (hereinafter "Felton"), J. Richard Rees and Saunders
Land Investment Corporation appearing by counsel Robert M.
Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord.

Counterclaim

defendant Kenneth R. Norton ("Norton") appeared through his
counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim
defendant Norton.
in this action.

Defendant Associated Title was never served
Counterclaim defendant Paul H. Landes (here-

inafter "Landes") was never served in this action.
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, having reviewed and received exhibits, having heard the arguments
of counsel, having received stipulations of counsel, having
reviewed memoranda presented by counsel, having presented its
oral ruling on the issues involved in the case on March 30,

_2_

0G1327

1988, having heard and ruled upon the Plaintiffs1 Objections
to Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Plaintiffs' Proposed Alternate and Additional Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and upon Plaintiffs1 Objection
to Affidavit in Support of Request for Attorneys' Fees (ineluding a similar motion filed by Norton) on September 16,
1988, and for good cause appearing, hereby makes and enters
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1*

On or about December

9, 1980, Leon H. Saunders,

Robert Felton, Norton and Paul H. Landes entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (hereinafter "Earnest
Money") with the Sharps for the purchase of certain real property located in White Pine Canyon, Snyderville, Summit County,
State of Utah (hereinafter "the Subject Property").

(Exhibit

14).
2.

Plaintiffs' "development plans presently anticipated

12 to 15 four-acre to five-acre lots" and the Earnest Money
provided

"such

plans

shall

be

subject

to

the

reasonable

approval of Seller [the Sharps]."
3.

The Earnest Money also provided, inter alia:
At a time desired by Seller, Purchaser
shall allow Seller to hook into the
culinary water system and sewer system
developed by Purchaser on the subject
Property at the same per-hook-up price
charged by Purchaser to the buyers of
lots developed on the subject Property.

4.
fore

The plaintiffs acted upon the understanding that be-

Summit

County

would

approve

any planned

_3_

development,

001323
nrw Q

they, as the developer, must provide to Summit County for
approval an environmental impact statement, a plat map and, if
a planned residential development, a declaration of protective
covenants.

The Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District

("SBSID") required all sewer design improvements be approved
and construction must receive final approval .
5.

Plaintiffs wanted to promptly develop the Subject

Property and anticipated the approval process would be completed by June, 1981.
60

Prior to closing the transaction which was the sub-

ject of the Earnest Money, a Shared Water System Cost Estimate
was prepared for Saunders by J. J. Johnson & Associates, engineers in Park City.

The Estimate proposed two alternatives

wherein 15 units at Saunders Ranch (subsequently White Pine
Ranches), known herein as the "Subject Property", develop a
water system sufficient for its needs and the needs of various
adjacent properties in order to provide users of the water
system an economy of scale resulting in lower water system
costs to each user.

(Exhibit 105).

Although considered by

him, Saunders never adopted any of these proposals.
7.

In April, 1981, an Environmental

Impact Statement

(hereinafter "EIS") was prepared by J. J. Johnson for Saunders
Land Investment Corporation concerning development of the Subject Property and was delivered to the Sharps prior to closing *

(Exhibit 67) „
8.

The EIS provided the "sewer system will be connected

to the Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District and a line
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extension agreement with the Sewer Improvement District will
be signed." The EIS also provided two alternative water storage systems for the development on the Subject Property which
would be available to other proposed developments, including
Ranch Place and Landmark Plaza, as well.

The EIS further pro-

vided that the internal traffic circulation

in the subject

project would be via private road.
9.

In April 1981, Felton, Norton, Saunders and Landes

operated

under

the

assumed

name

of

White

Pine

Ranches.

(Plaintiffs1 Complaint, 5151 and 5 ) .

ID.

Thereafter, on or about

July

16, 1981, the parties

closed the sale of the Subject Property through the execution
of a Memorandum of Closing Terms

(Exhibit 15) executed by

Saunders, Felton, Norton, Landes and the Sharps; a Special
Warranty Deed (Exhibit 17) executed by the Sharps and conveying

the title

to the Subject

Property

to

Landes, Felton,

Saunders and Interstate Rentals, Inc.; a Trust Deed Note executed

by

Rentals,

Felton, Saunders, Landes, Norton
Inc. by its president, Norton,

and

Interstate

in the

amount of

$963,055.30, together with an addendum to the Trust Deed Note
(Exhibit 3) outlining the schedule of payments, and a Trust

Si

s

^ g

5

Deed

covering

the

Subject

Property

executed

by

Saunders,

Landes, Felton and Interstate Rentals, Inc. by its president,
Norton, and securing the Trust Deed Note (Exhibit 2) (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Closing Documents").
11.

A

partnership

agreement

establishing

White Pine

Ranches was executed September 25, 1982 with Felton, Saunders,

•5-
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Dan Hunter and J. Richard Rees as general partners.
49).

(Exhibit

Saunders Land Investment Corporation subsequently as-

sumed and bought out the interest of Dan Hunter in the White
Pine Ranches partnership.
12.

On June 30, 1982 White Pine Ranches and Howells In-

vestment executed a Partnership Agreement of White Pine Enterprises for the purposes of "investing in, managing, leasing,
developing,

subdividing

and

selling

unimproved

real estate

(Exhibit 48) described on Exhibit fAf attached" thereto, which
unimproved real estate was the approximately 27 southern acres
of the Subject Property that was never platted.
13*

Both partnerships, White Pine Ranches and White Pine

Enterprises, are general partnerships.
14.

Preliminary plats (Exhibits 18 and 19) of the Sub-

ject Property were prepared by J. Jo Johnson & Associates for
the development prior to closing, but were modified by plaintiffs because the County Commission was opposed to the private
road concept.
not

approved

(Exhibit 109).
prior

to closing

These preliminary plats were
because the County Attorney

would not approve a private road system (Exhibit 114), A new
plat was prepared for White Pine Ranches, a Planned Unit Development

("PUD") and attached as Exhibit "A" to the Memo-

randum of Closing Terms.

This Exhibit "A" to the Memorandum

of Closing Terms platted all of the Subject Property and was
initialed by all the parties thereto except Felton. (Exhibit
20).
15. Paragraph 1 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms (Exhibit 15) provided as follows:

_6_
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1.
It is mutually agreed and
understood that after recordation of
the PUD Plat and the Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions,
and upon receipt of each $140,000.00 in
principal
(but
not
including
the
earnest money and down payment money),
Seller shall execute and deliver to
Buyer a Partial Deed of Reconveyance
for one (1) PUD lot. (Emphasis added.)
16. Paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided as follows:
2.
Upon the payment of the
release price, Buyer shall be entitled
to the release of one (1) lot of Buyer's choice upon receipt of the payment
or at any time thereafter.
(Emphasis
added.)
17. Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided as follows:
3. It is agreed that, at the time
of execution of this Memorandum, Buyer
has
paid
to
Seller
the
sum
of
$620,000.00 which will release from the
Deed of Trust three (3) PUD lots. Upon
the recordation of the PUD Plat and
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions
and Restrictions with the Summit County
Recorder, Buyer shall be entitled to
the release from the Deed of Trust of
three (3) PUD lots of Buyerf s choice
together with the said roadway.
(Emphasis added.)

ii
S3
3§

18. Paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-

s

vided as follows:
5. The proposed plat is attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference incorporated herein.
Seller

0G1322
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hereby acknowledges and agrees to execute as a lienholder the original plat
prior to recordation. Changes in the
proposed plat and the Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions
when prepared shall be subject to the
reasonable approval of Seller.
(Emphasis added.)
19. The proposed plat, Exhibit "A" attached to the Memorandum of Closing Terms included a boundary description describing all of the Subject Property and an Ownerfs Dedication.

The Owner's Dedication is a standard printed form used

by J.J. Johnson, parallels dedications used in the city limits
of Park City and is commonly used in plats to dedicate roads
to public use, not as a dedication for a private road as originally contemplated in the EIS.

The Owner's Dedication pro-

vides in pertinent part as follows:
Know all by these present that we the
undersigned owners of the herein described tract of land, having caused
the same to be subdivided into lots
and streets to hereafter be known as
White Pine Ranches Subdivision, do
hereby dedicate for perpetual use of
the public all parcels of land shown
on this plat as intended for public
use, and do warrant, defend, and save
the city harmless against any easements or other encumbrances on the
dedicated streets which will interfere
with the city's use, operation, and
maintenance of the streets and do further dedicate the easements as shown.
(Emphasis added.)
(Exhibit 20).
20. Paragraph 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided in part as follows:
6. Seller agrees to grant to Summit County the ten and one-half (10-

-8-
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1/2) foot strip of land outlined in
red on Exhibit "A".
Said conveyance
shall be for the sole purpose of
widening the County roadway. If possible, such grant shall be in the form
of an easement. The County indicates
that it is possible that the County
road as it exists is not where it is
platted.
21. The County roadway has not been widened, there are no
current plans to do so, and Summit County has never requested
such an easement from plaintiffs or the Sharps.

(See Exhibit

107, p. 15; Exhibit 87, p. 8; and Exhibit 34).
22. Paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided in pertinent part as follows:
7. Buyer agrees to provide Seller
with one (1) sewer connection and one
(1) culinary water connection into Buyer's systems at such time as each is
available, and Seller shall pay a connection fee and service fee equal to
the pro rata cost to the purchaser of a
lot in Buyer's proposed PUD plus m any
charges of Summit Water Distributing
Company.
The sewer and water connection granted above can be used by Seller in new construction if allowed on
the 8.5 acre parcel or for connection
to the existing residence of Seller....
(Emphasis added.)
23. Subsequent to closing, attorney Jon Heaton represented Saunders in continuing plaintiffs' attempts, begun prior to

*3
2 O

IS

*2 *

closing, to obtain County approval of a private road for the

I

development.

(Exhibit 127).

24. Before signing

the Closing Documents, on June 16,

1981 and subsequently on November 1, 1983, Plaintiff White
> cu = »o o 3» o
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Pine Ranches entered into sewer extension agreements with the
SBSID to install a sewer trunk line up White Pine Canyon pursuant to which agreements White Pine Ranches would

receive

reimbursement for their construction costs of the sewer line
to the development from connection fees charged to third parties connecting to that line:
Said third parties will be allowed to
connect to such lines only upon payment
to the District of the applicable number of connection fees.
The District
shall retain $100 plus the actual costs
of construction and inspection from
each such connection fee and pay the
balance of each such connection fee to
Applicant [White Pine Ranches].
(Exhibits 80 115(c) and 81 I5C).
25. At the time plaintiffs were trying to obtain County
approval of the development and agreeing to run the sewer line
to Subject Property, it was anticipated that additional developments by third parties would occur in the White Pine Canyon
vicinity, including the development of a ski resort in White
Pine Canyon and the development of adjoining parcels of land,
all of which future developments would hook into the sewer
trunk line plaintiffs were to construct, allowing plaintiffs
the opportunity to recoup expenditures for the sewer system
through the connection fees paid pursuant to the provisions of
the line extension agreements •

(Exhibits 104, 105, 107 and

117).
26. On June 30, 1982, White Pine Ranches paid the Sharps
the installment payment of $308,177.69, by check (Exhibit 44)
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enclosed with a cover letter from Felton stating:

"Upon final

plat approval, we will notify you to obtain the releases for
the lots and the road as per the contract."
27. On June

28, 1983

and

June

(Exhibit 21).

30, 1983, Felton and

Saunders Land Investment Corporation paid to the Sharps the
sum of $178,165.23 by two checks in the amount of $71,266.09
and $106,899.14 respectively.

(Exhibit 44).

portion of the June 30, 1983

installment payment

plaintiffs,

a

check

from

Dan

Hunter

in

The remaining

the

due from
amount

of

$106,849.14 was returned for insufficient funds, resulting in
a default in the June 30, 19823 installment payment.

(Exhibit

22).
28. On or about July 19, 1983, while the June 30, 1983
payment was in default and prior to the recordation of a final
plat on the Subject Property, Felton wrote a letter to attorney Jon Heaton, inquiring about obtaining a release from the
Sharps of the road and five lots.

The letter further ex-

plained that a final plat had not been recorded because "[a]s
soon as we file the plat real estate taxes are going to go up
significantly, which we would like to avoid until we have an
actual buyer for one of the lots." (Exhibit 23).
29. On or about September 23, 1983, a Notice of Default
was filed pursuant to the Trust Deed on the Subject Property
for the default in the June 30, 1983 payment.

(Exhibit 24.)

30. Plaintiffs made no claim during 1983 that the Sharps
had breached the Closing Documents.

00133<3
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31. On or about November 14 f 1983, the June 30, 1983 default under the Trust Deed was cured with a payment in the sum
of $118,397.39 from Saunders Land Investment Corporation (Exhibits 4 and 44).
32. On or about November 18, 1983, attorney Jon Heaton
sent a letter to the Sharps enclosing for their approval a
proposed

final plat, which was

later

recorded with Summit

County (hereinafter the proposed "final plat"), and a Declaration of Protective Covenants (hereinafter "CCRs"), which Declaration was prepared

on behalf

of Saunders by Heaton and

which contained covenants, conditions and restrictions for use
of respecting a portion of the Subject Property by lot owners.
(Exhibit 25).
33. The proposed final plat enclosed with the November 18,
1983 letter did not plat the entire approximately 60 acre parcel as originally contemplated in the Earnest Money and the
Memorandum of Closing Terms, but platted

only the northern

portion of the Subject Property into six PUD lots, leaving the
southern portion (approximately 27 acres) of the Subject Property unplatted (hereinafter the "unplatted acreage").

(Exhib-

it 1 ) .
34. The proposed final plat included an Owner's Dedication for a private road in the PUD and delineated the existence and location of the private road and certain utility
easements, including easements for water lines, water tank and
water systems.

(Exhibit 1 ) .

0G13C
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35. The November 18, 1983 letter from attorney Jon Heaton
to the Sharps

further

provided

in pertinent part that;

At a later time in the near future, Hy
[Saunders] has indicated he will seek
release of Lots 1 through 5 of the
platted subdivision along with his road
(White Pine Lane)....
We will handle
that matter when it is presented....
When those releases are made, pursuant
to your instruction we will insure that
rights are reserved in White Pine Lane
for access for the southern portions of
the property purchased from you until
your Deed of Trust is fully paid. (Emphasis added.)
(Exhibit 25 and 25a).
36. On or about November 21, 1983, Felton mailed a letter
to Jon Heaton regarding the November 18, 1983 letter to John
Sharp,

The letter provided in pertinent part:

"it is per-

fectly acceptable to us that he [Mr. Sharp] retain an easement
over White Pine Lane to the southern part of his property as
well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road up to the western
boundary of Lot 6."

(Exhibit 26).

37. On or about November 28, 1983, Felton had a telephone
conversation with attorney Heaton memorialized

by notes of

attorney Heaton in the margin of Feltonfs November 21, 1983
letter

2
O
P

(Exhibit 26).

Felton agreed that "access over road

[Whits Pine Lane] retained if Sharp develops undeveloped prop-

I

erty Lots 7-12 White Pine Ranch."

(Exhibit 26a).

= <* £

38. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps authorized

BSMii

the recording of a Cancellation of Notice of Default relating
to ths June 30, 1983 payment (Exhibit 27).

-13/r\r%r>o

39. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps, in consideration of the agreement of plaintiffs to allow them access
over the private roadway

(White Pine Lane) in the event of

foreclosure, and pursuant to their right of approval under
paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms, also executed
a Consent to Record Phase I of White Pine Ranches, which Consent after setting forth the metes and bounds description of
Phase I of White Pine Ranches granted:
[A] non-exclusive easement for water
lines, water tank and water systems
over, under and across the property,
shown here near the southwest corner of
the subject property, and specifically
described in the Declaration of Protective Covenants and reserving unto
the owners, for granting to the owners
of adjacent or nearby property, a
non-exclusive easement for utilities
and vehicular and pedestrian access
over the private roadway shown on the
plat and from the well sites as developed. (Emphasis added.)
(Exhibit

51) .

As

additional consideration

for

signing the

Consent to Record, the Sharps permitted the platting of only a
portion of the Subject Property.
40. The proposed final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I
sent to the Sharps for approval on November 18, 1983 was recorded on December 23, 1983 in the office of the Summit County
Recorder following the execution of the Consent to Record by
the Sharps*

(Exhibit 1 ) . The CCRs were also recorded in the

office of the Summit County Recorder on December 23, 1983 and
the Consent to Record was attached

as an exhibit thereto.

(Exhibit 51).

-14-
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41. After recordation of the final plat, the CCRs and the
Consent to Record, plaintiffs proceeded with construction of
the improvements on the Subject Property.

However, instead of

adopting any of the alternatives described in Finding No. 6,
supra, plaintiffs constructed a small, private water system
for this development.
42. On or about January 18, 1984, the Sharps executed a
direction to the Trustee under the Deed of Trust to release
from the Deed of Trust Lots 1 through 5 of White Pine Ranches
(Exhibit 28).
43. The Partial Reconveyance of Lots 1 through 5 directed
and authorized by the Sharps, was not prepared by Associated
Title, the trustee under the Trust Deed, until January 7, 1986
and was recorded March 26, 1986 (Exhibit 45). No explanation
of the delay in preparing the Partial Reconveyance was provided at trial.

Plaintiffs, although naming Associated Title as

a defendant in this action, chose not to serve or pursue and
question Associated Title for such delay.

No other request

for reconveyance was authorized by the Sharps.
44. On or about January 20, 1984, Felton sent a letter to
attorney Heaton expressing astonishment that the deeds to Lots
1 through 5 had not been received but stating, "I realize that
the deeds for the road may be difficult to do."

(Exhibit 30).

45. On or about January 17, 1984, Felton sent a letter to
attorney Heaton requesting the approval by the Sharps of a
"multi-family development" on the unplatted acreage, "which is

0G13^J
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the only way it [the development] will be economically feasible*w

(Exhibit 29). A multi-family concept was never adopt-

ed.
46. Felton testified at trial and affirmed on May 7, 1986
in a letter sent to the Sharps that the plaintiffs "were in a
position to prepare and obtain approval of that plat [for the
unplatted acreage] immediately."

(Trial Transcript, p. 110,

hereinafter "R." 110 and Exhibit 37).
47. It was the actual practice of plaintiffs and a requirement of paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms to
make specific requests for the release of specific PUD lots
from the Sharps after required payments were made and provided
no defaults existed under the Closing Documents,

(R* 334).

48. Property taxes on the unreleased property (Lot 6 and
the unplatted acreage) became delinquent pursuant to law on
November 30, 1984 when plaintiffs failed to pay all of the
1984 property taxes due on the Subject Property

(Stipulation

of counsel at Trial) in violation of paragraphs 5 and 14 of
the Trust Deed, which provided in paragraph 5 that the Trustor
[plaintiffs] agrees "to pay at least 10 days before delinquency

all

taxes

and

assessments

affecting

said

property...."

(Exhibit 2 ) .
49. Except for $1,515.24 in property taxes paid on the
unplatted

acreage in 1984, no taxes have been paid on the

unreleased Subject Property (Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage)
subsequent to November 30, 1984, and including 1985, 1986 and
1987 (Stipulation of counsel at Trial), and plaintiffs, there-
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fore, remained in default under the provisions of paragraphs 5
and 14 of the Trust Deed.
50. Plaintiffs paid the 1984 installment payment.

However,

on or about June 27, 1985, the Sharps received only a portion
of the June 30, 1985 installment payment in the form of a
check from Felton in the amount of $59,709.47 (Exhibit 44).
51. As a result of plaintiffs' defaults, a Notice of
Default was recorded on September 16, 1985 covering the Subject Property as described in the Trust Deed, which description included Lots 1-5.
52.

On

or

about

(Exhibit 55).
September

24,

1985, Felton

sent a

letter to Mr. Sharp acknowledging receipt of the September
1985 Notice of Default and assuring him "every attempt is being made to resolve the problem...."

(Exhibit 31).

Felton,

in his letter made no allegation that the Sharps had slandered
plaintiffs' title as a result of the inclusion of Lots 1-5 in
the Notice of Default nor did Felton or any other plaintiff
allege in 1984 or 1985 any breach of Closing Documents by the
Sharps.
53. Significantly, as bearing upon the credibility of
plaintiffs' arguments is the fact unrebutted that plaintiffs

< 2

3

made no claims whatsoever of breach by the Sharps until after
their own admitted breaches of the Closing Documents.

a 2 asgg
f« CM i< <*

(Ex-

hibit 31).
54. On or about January 10, 1986, Felton wrote a letter

> °-§J«O^Q

to Blake G. Heiner of Associated Title Company, the Trustee
under the Trust Deed, informing him that the Notice of Default
-17-
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(Exhibit 55) and Amended Notice of Sale (Exhibit 56) covering
the Subject Property included Lots 1 through 5 which were to
have been released, pursuant to the Sharps' direction.

(Ex-

hibit 57) .
55. In response to Felton's letter (Exhibit 57), Blake
Heiner for Associated Title Company prepared and recorded an
Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale against the Subject Property,
excluding Lots 1 through 5.

(Exhibit 58).

Other Notices

filed subsequently against the Subject Property also excluded
Lots 1 through 5.
56.

All

of

(Exhibits 3 and 36).
the Notices

of

Default

and

Notices of

Trustee's Sale recorded against the Subject Property specifically provided that such Notices are:
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments,
Restrictions, Rights-of-Way and matters
of record enforceable in law (sic)
equity.
(Exhibits 5, 36, 55, 56, and 58).
57. No payment at all was made when the final installment under the Closing Documents was due on June 30, 1986.
58. The balance owing to the Sharps under the Trust Deed
Note

through

March

22,

1988

is

$557,642.46,

including

$371,739.35 principal; $23,113.33 interest at 12%; $147,920.21
default interest at 18%; and $14,869.52 late payment charges
of 4% on each overdue payment.
diem rate of $183.32.

Interest is accruing at a per

(Exhibit 122).

59 a Plaintiffs made no written or oral request for the
release of the roadway or Lot 6 prior to their default in
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November 1984, when the 1984 property taxes became delinquent,
and prior to their default in failing to make the entire 1985
installment payment when due.

Plaintiffs' first requests were

made for such releases on February 27, 1986 and May 7, 1986,
respectively.

(Exhibits 35 and 37). Also for the first time

in the letter dated February 27, 1986, plaintiffs requested a
release from the Sharps for 7.5 acres of the unplatted acreage, despite the provision in paragraphs 1-3 of the Memorandum
of Closing Terms for the release by the Sharps of "PUD lots"
only.

As of these dates, plaintiffs were still and are in of

default for the 1984 and 1985 property taxes and the payment a
portion of the 1985 payment and the full 1986 payment required
under the Addendum to the Trust Deed Note.
60. The Sharps perceived that the execution by them of
the Consent to Record constituted substantial performance of
any obligation to release the roadway pursuant to paragraphs 3
and 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms.
61. As plaintiff Felton testified, "the contract [Memorandum of Closing Terms] says lots of buyer's choice and that
would

require

a choice."

After

the release of Lots 1-5,

plaintiffs may have chosen to prepare a plat of the then unplatted acreage and seek a release of a portion of it instead
of Lot 6.
62. Also in the letter of February 27, 1986, Felton demanded

from

$73,000.00

the

Sharps

as their

for

the

first

time

approximately

"cost of the sewer and water hook-ups

which are now available."

(Exhibit 35).
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costs had been made of the Sharps prior to that time nor had
plaintiffs provided an accounting of such costs.

Before

trial, plaintiffs claimed exorbitant expenses of $1,638,753.61
for the complete costs for the construction of the improvements on and to the Subject Property (Exhibit 32a).
63. At trial, plaintiffs claimed costs for the construction

of

improvements

on and

to

the Subject

Property of

$1,063,348.10, (Exhibit 60) and plaintiffs modified their demand from the Sharps for water and sewer connection fees to
$43,706.00.

(Exhibit 66).

64. Prior to actual construction of the sewer system,
Saunders told the Summit County Planning Commission

in a

meeting on December 14, 1982 that they "would really like to
have the septic tank system used because of the high cost of
the sewer line but in the long run it may be the best way to
go."

(Exhibit 79). On or about September 16, 1983, Felton

wrote Summit County challenging the requirement "to install a
sewer line up the County road from Highway U-224 to the
Project, a distance of about one and one-half (1-1/2) miles."
(Exhibit 79). Felton concluded the letter by declaring:
2

°S
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"In

the event we are required to install the sewer line, we will
test the validity of that requirement in court."
65. Plaintiffs made formal demand upon Summit County on
or about July 26, 1984 for, inter alia, the following damages;

S s 5

I 5£
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The sum of $117,297.15 being the
costs of off-site sewer which we
were, under protest, required to
install to service the subdivision.
***
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[W]e [plaintiffs] have lost one sale or
more sales and anticipate the damages,
loss of profit and interest at between
$250,000 and $500,000.
***

[D]amages for the loss of sale, reduction
in business and damages suffered in reduction to profit
(Exhibit 84).
66. Soon thereafter plaintiffs brought suit in the United
States District Court, District of Utah, Civil No. C84-2090W,
against Summit County, the SBSID and various officials thereof
to recover their claimed damages.
67. In answer to interrogatories dated December 28, 1984
in the Federal Court litigation, plaintiffs stated:
Because of the imposition of the requirement that Plaintiffs construct an
off-site sewer approximately one mile in
length, the costs of developing the
entire project became prohibitive.
(Exhibit 116; see also, Exhibit 107, p. 7 ) .
68. In further interrogatory answers on March 31, 1986,
Saunders declared:
At the present time I have recently found
out that the right-of-way servicing my
property has been forfeited by Summit
County contrary to law.
This will not
allow my development to proceed, will not
allow me to recover costs for the capital
improvement and significantly diminishes
the value of the property.
(Exhibit 107, p. 15).
69. In Saunders1 Federal Court affidavit dated March 17,
1986, he also swore:
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10.
As a result of the various
delays [caused by the County and the
SBSID], which are detailed below, the
market for exclusive building lots is now
virtually non-existent, cost of improvements escalated to be several times what
I had anticipated, and much of the real
property in the project is threatened by
foreclosure.
(Exhibit 86, p. 3 ) .
70. Most of the damages sought to be recovered by the
plaintiffs in the lawsuit against the SBSID and Summit County
are the same damages plaintiffs sought to recover from the
Sharps in the present case.

(Ro 252 and 263? cf„ Exhibits 60

with 86; see also Exhibits 87, 88, 107, 116 and Plaintiffs'
Verified Complaint herein).
71. No written or oral claim of default on the part of
the Sharps under the Closing Documents was made by the plaintiffs until February 27, 1986, subsequent to plaintiffs1 own
defaults in failing to pay the 1984 and 1985 property taxes
and failing to pay the full 1985 payment required under the
Addendum to the Trust Deed Note.
72.

The

Sharps

did

not

interfere

with

plaintiffs'

attempts to market or sell the Subject Property.
73. Plaintiffs received only one invitation for an offer
to purchase Lot 1 or Lot 6, which invitation was not consummated due to the failure of conditions imposed by the one,
B. F. Sammons, and the failure of such conditions were unrelated to any actions or statements of the Sharps.
88).

(Exhibit

74. One of the conditions of purchase by Sammons was an
independent appraisal supporting a $220,000 proposed sales
price' (Exhibit 88).

The plaintiffs provided Sammons with a

letter appraisal, dated August 8, 1986, which had been prepared by LeRoy Pia.

(Exhibit 9a).

This appraisal stated that

Lots 1 and 6 had a fair market value of $220,000.

On or

about November 11, 1986, while Sammons and Saunders were still
negotiating, a letter appraisal was obtained by Steve Clyde,
attorney for the plaintiffs from the same appraiser, valuing
the lots at an average of only $190,000.00 (Exhibit 9). The
November 11, 1986 appraisal was not shown to Sammons.

(R.

283-4).
75. Saunders had given Sammons "the impression" that
plaintiffs could convey Lot 6 to him even though it had not
been released from the Trust Deed,

(R. 389; see also R. 284).

76. On or about March 24, 1987, Felton, pursuant to the
request of the real estate agent, Steve Clegg, employed by
plaintiffs to list Lots 1, 2 and 5, wrote a letter to Clegg
for dissemination to other Park City real estate agents, which
letter stated

M

[t]he current litigation does not affect the

marketability or encumber that [SubjectJ property."

(Exhibit

89.)
77. After the commencement of this action, the Sharps
took all reasonable steps to facilitate the sale and marketing
of the Subject Property as evidenced by a letter dated September 30, 1986, to plaintiffs' prior attorney, Steven Clyde, who
was notified by Donald J. Winder, the Sharps1 attorney, that

(j013
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the Sharps would take all steps reasonable to effect a sale of
Lot 6 or the unplatted acreage (Exhibit 33), and the Sharps1
Motion to Appoint a Receiver for the Subject Property in this
proceeding dated May 14, 1987.
78. There have been no arms length sales to purchasers of
PUD lots at the Subject Property wherein sewer and water connection and service fees have been assessed . The only conveyance of a PUD lot has been to Felton, a member of the partnerships,,

At trial, plaintiffs testified that they intended, at

all times, to include the cost of the sewer and water connection and service fees within the sales price of lots.

(R*

310-312).
79. Mr. Sammons was not to be charged any sum above and
beyond a $220,000 land price for sewer or water connection
fees.

(R. 285).
80. Felton testified that a purchaser of one of the PUD

lots listed with real estate agent Clegg would only be charged
"over and above ... the purchase price" "the hook-up fee to be
charged by Snyderville Basin for sewer."

(R. 310).

81. If plaintiffs sold a lot to Sammons at $220,000, they
would not have been "compensated for those [sewer and water]

z
o

6

I

3

2

& £

improvement costs...." At a $220,000 sales price it's "impossible" to recover the costs of sewer and water improvements to

8

the Subject Property.

"You have to take a loss."

(R. 311-

312).
< en »-«
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82. The sewer system, as of the date of trial, is not
completed

or

operational, nor
-24-
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has

its

construction

been

OG13C'4

approved by the SBSID.

(Exhibits 83, 83a and 99 through 103).

The culinary water system as of the date of trial is also not
operational.

Under paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing

Terms, the Sharps do not have to pay connection fees for these
systems until they are "available."
83.

The sewer

system

(Exhibit 15).

constructed

by plaintiffs

has a

capacity to handle between 2,000 and 3,800 connections.

(Ex-

hibit 86) .
84. Under the line extension agreements with the SBSID, a
connection fee "at the rate in effect at the time of connection" shall be determined by the SBSID for the system on the
Subject

Property

(Exhibit

it 80, paragraph 4(d)).

81,

paragraph

4D;

see

Exhib-

The "connection fee shall be paid by

the property owner" before issuance of a building permit, to
the

Application

(the plaintiffs

herein),

except

that

the

SBSID, shall be entitled to "the first $100 of the connection
fee."
85.
Money
with

The parties

concerning
the

intended

the language

in the Earnest

"same per-hook-up price" to be synonymous

language contained

in paragraph

7, Memorandum

of

Closing Terms, regarding "pro rata cost" to a PUD lot purchaser.
86. Average and reasonable connection fees for culinary
water and sewer systems in the Park City and Snyderville Basin
area are $2,000.00 each.

(See Testimony of John C. Brown and

Rex Ausburn, cf« Exhibit 86, p. 6)*
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87 . The Sharps intended and wanted to be charged only
what purchasers of a PUD lot would be charged as fees to connect to the culinary water and sewer systems on the Subject
Property, and the plaintiffs should have understood that this
was the intent of paragraph 7, Memorandum of Closing Terms.
88. The Sharps repeatedly assured plaintiffs that they
did not intend, through their foreclosure, to interfere with
access rights over the private roadway or to the utility easements shown on the Consent to Record which the Sharps signed*
(R. 64; Exhibits 33 and 51; cf. Exhibits 25, 25a, 26 and 26a) .
89. Correspondingly, it was both the mutual intent and
agreement of the parties that the Sharps be granted use of the
roadway in event of default (Exhibits 25, 25a, 26 and 26a),
which agreement was later memorialized and recorded in the
Consent to Record.

(Exhibit 51).

90. The inclusion of Lots 1 through 5 in the September
1985 Notice of Default (Exhibit 55) and December 1985 Amended
Notice of Trusteefs Sale (Exhibit 56) was inadvertent, unintentional and without malice.
91. In refusing to reconvey Lot 6, the road, the unplatted acreage, the Sharps acted in good faith and relied on the
advice of attorney Jon Heaton*
92.

The

Sharps

have been charged

trustees1

fees by

Associated Title in their efforts to foreclose the Subject
Property in the amount of $1,803.80 (Exhibit 42).

001351

93. Plaintiffs have not suffered any damages, special or
otherwise, as a result of any act or failure to act by the
Sharps.
94. Paragraph 13 of the Trust Deed provides that failure
to promptly enforce any right thereunder does "not constitute
a waiver of any other right or subsequent default."

(Exhibit

2).
95. On September 4, 1986, the day before the scheduled
Trustee's Sale, plaintiffs filed a Complaint commencing this
action and obtained the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order

(TRO) from

Judge Judith M. Billings to restrain the

Sharps from conducting the Trustee's Sale of the Subject Property.

The TRO required a bond in the amount of $2,400.

In a

hearing held on January 4, 1988, this Court required that the
bond be increased to $50,000 "to protect the Sharps for the
payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered if the Sharps are found to have been wrongfully enjoined
or restrained...."
96. The Trust Deed Note provided that if it "is collected
by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or
interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned
agree to pay ... a reasonable attorney's fee."
Paragraph

16

of

the

Trust

Deed

provided:

...

(Exhibit 3 ) * ,
"Upon

the

occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary [the Sharps]
shall have the option to ... foreclose the Trust Deed ... and
Beneficiary

shall

be entitled

to recover

... a reasonable

oGias'J;
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attorney's fee

"

(Exhibit 2; see also 5111 thereof) .

Fur-

ther, paragraph 6 of the Trust Deed provided that Beneficiary
(the Sharps) may "commence, appear in and defend any action or
proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the
rights of [sic] powers of Beneficiary . .. and in exercising
any such powers ... employ counsel, and pay his reasonable
fees."

Additionally, paragraph 7 of the Trust Deed requires

Trustor to "pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with interest from
date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per
annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured
hereby,"

Paragraph 11 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-

vided that "the defaulting party shall pay all expenses of
enforcing the same or any right arising out of breach or default thereof, including reasonable attorneys1 fees, whether
incurred with or without suit and both before and after judgment."

(Exhibit 15).

97. Legal services have been rendered to the Sharps by
the law firm of Winder & Haslam in the nature of time expended
by individual members, through August 31, 1988, in the amount
of $144,469.75.
98. The foregoing amount does not include any services
performed on or after August 31, 1988, including those services of Winder & Haslam necessary for finalizing the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and preparing for, responding to and arguing any post trial motions.

The legal

fees for such matters may be supplemented later.
-28-
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99. The services rendered by the law firm of Winder &
Haslam, excluding legal research related to attorney's malpractice , were reasonably necessary for the development of the
case and protection of the rights of the Sharps; and the rates
charged are reasonable and are in accordance with those rates
generally charged by attorneys in this area for similar services.
100. Plaintiffs breached the Memorandum of Closing Terms
by, inter alia, failing to make the payments intended thereby
to the Sharps and by failing to make available sewer and water
connections at the same charge to purchasers of a PUD lot.
101. Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Memorandum of Closing
Terms, all "agreements contained

[t]herein shall survive the

closing of this transaction...."

(Exhibit 15).

102. The Sharps1 defense of plaintiffs1 Complaint was an
action purporting to affect the security under the Trust Deed I
and the rights and powers of the Sharps; related to collecting
the Promissory Note after default; related to foreclosing the i
Trust Deed; and related to enforcing the Memorandum of Closing
Terms and rights arising out of a breach or default thereof.
103. After closing the sale on the Subject Property, on or
about July 16, 1981, attorney Heaton represented White Pine
Ranches relating to the development of the Subject Property
(R. 789) until the filing by Associated Title of a Notice of
Default on or about September 16, 1985.

(R. 836; Exhibit 55).

Attorney Heaton did not represent the Sharps between the closing of the sale and the filing of the first Notice of Default
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on or about September 23, 1983.

(R. 791; Exhibit 24) . For a

period of time after the filing of the first Notice of Default
on or about September 23, 1983, and

after the filing of the

Notice of Default on September 16, 1985 (R» 793), attorney
Heaton did represent the Sharps 0
104. The Sharps have incurred costs of court in this action.
Having made the above Findings of Fact, the Court herewith makes and enters the following;
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Closing

Documents, which term is defined in

Finding No. 10 above, are the operative documents relating to
the parties1 closing of the sale of the Subject Property by
the Sharps to the plaintiffs, and this transaction constitutes
the Contract between the parties (hereinafter the "Contract")»
2. Plaintiffs, by their failure to pay the 1984, 1985,
1986 and 1987 property taxes on Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage on November 30 of each respective year, are thereby in
breach of the Trust Deed.
3. Plaintiffs' failure to pay the entire June 30, 1985
installment payment and the 30, 1986 final installment payment
required pursuant to paragraph ID and IE of the Addendum to
the Trust Deed Note constitutes a breach of the Trust Deed
Note, Trust Deed and Memorandum of Closing Terms.
, «N S W fM
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4. Plaintiffs' breaches were material, significant and
continuing

and were uncured when plaintiffs releases were

*

first requested by plaintiffs for the roadway and Lot 6 on
February 27, 1986 and again on May 7, 1986.

0046
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5. The breaches by plaintiffs of the Contract occurred
prior in time to any alleged breaches by the Sharps, and this
Court specifically holds there were no material or significant
breaches on the part of the Sharps of their obligations under
the parties' Contract.
6. The Sharps have substantially complied with all of
their obligations under the terms of the parties1 Contract.
7. Plaintiffs were obligated, under the terms of the
Memorandum of Closing Terms and pursuant to their own practice, to specifically request and identify lots, including Lot
6, for release by the Sharps.
8.

Because

the

plaintiffs1

material

and

continuing

breaches of the parties' Contract preceded timely plaintiffs'
requests for reconveyance of Lot 6, the roadway and the unplatted acreage, defendants were not obligated to reconvey Lot
6, the roadway and the unplatted acreage.
9. The Sharps were justified in and were excused from
performance under the Contract to reconvey Lot 6, the roadway
or the unplatted acreage shown on the final plat of to the
plaintiffs because the plaintiffs were in breach of the parties1 Contract at the time such reconveyances were requested.

z
o
p

10. Alternatively, the Sharps1 execution of the Consent
X
3
ert

C

to Record the final plat of and the CCRs constituted a release
of the roadway shown on such plat in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms.

£° < S
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11. The execution of the Consent to Record by the Sharps
and the subsequent recordation of the final plat and the CCRs
created a non-exclusive appurtenant easements to run with the
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and
benefit of the unplatted acreage and the owners and purchasers
thereof (including the Sharps), and their invitees, guests,
heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and for access
to and the right to use as a means for ingress and egress for
vehicular and pedestrian access over, under and across the
private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the recorded final
plat, and a non-exclusive appurtenant easement to run with the
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and
benefit of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the owners and purchasers thereof

(including the Sharps) and their heirs and

successors in interest for water lines, water tank and water
systems over, under and across the Subject Property near the
southwest corner of the unplatted acreage as shown on the
final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I.
12. The Sharps are estopped to deny the dedication of
White Pine Lane, pursuant to the final recorded plat, for the
private use of the parcel owners, their invitees and guests,
subject to the CCRs and the non-exclusive appurtenant easement
for the use and benefit of the unplatted acreage described in
Conclusion No* 11 above.

Further, the Sharps are estopped to
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deny the non-exclusive utility easement also described in Conclusion No. 11 above.
13. The Sharps', by the execution of the Consent to Record, are estopped to deny the operative and legal effect of
the recordation of the final plat and CCRs and the rights and
obligations of the owners of PUD lots as set forth in the recorded final plat and CCRs for White Pine Ranches Phase I.
The final recorded plat and CCRs and the non-exclusive easements set forth in Conclusion No. 11 above shall remain in
full force and effect, and not be affected by the foreclosure
ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff's Sale, or a subsequent redemption of the subject premises, other than a complete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs herein coupled with
plaintiffs1

declaration

for

the extinguishment

of

the non-

exclusive easement in favor of the unplatted acreage,
14. Owners and purchasers of the unplatted acreage (including the Sharps), and their successors in interest are entitled to use of the private roadway

(White Pine Lane) for

access to the unplatted acreage of the Subject Property as set
forth in the legal description attached hereto as Exhibit "A"
and

incorporated

by

reference

herein, as a

result

of

the

mutual intent and agreements between the parties to grant to
the Sharps the use of the roadway, which agreement was memorialized by the letters of Heaton and Felton and evidenced by
the part performance and

reliance of the Sharps on such let-

ters and agreements in executing the Consent to Record.
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15. General partners in a partnership are bound by the
actions of other partners taken on behalf of the partnership
and by the actions of the partnership itself*
16. The language in paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of
Closing Terms "pro rata cost to the purchaser" is ambiguousf
necessitating the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret the
same.
17*

The extrinsic evidence presented at trial demon-

strated that the parties intended to allow the Sharps, at
their request, one connection each to both the culinary water
and sewer systems when and if such systems are available and
operational.
18. The construction costs of the culinary water and
sewer systems claimed by the plaintiffs are not reasonable, in
violation of the reasonable value rule.
19. Seven years is an unreasonable time within which to
complete the culinary water and sewer systems and require the
Sharps to mandatorily hook into these systems, which systems
still are not yet operational.

The Sharps are not obligated,

but have the option, to hook into the culinary water and sewer
systems should such systems become operational.
20. It is an unreasonable interpretation of the language
"pro rata costs" in the Memorandum of Closing Terms and the
earlier language in the Earnest Money delineating "the same
per-hook-up price" to require the Sharps to pay 1/13 of the
exorbitant construction costs for culinary water and sewer
hook-ups.

Such an interpretation would recast the Sharps as
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developers rather than the mere sellers of Subject Property
that they were and intended to be in this transaction.
21. A reasonable fee to be paid by the Sharps to the
plaintiffs for a connection to the culinary water and sewer
systems is $2,000.00 each.
22. The inclusion of Lots 1-5 in the initial Notice of
Default

(Exhibit 55) and Notice of Trustee's Sale

(Exhibit

56) on behalf of the Sharps was inadvertent, unintentional and
without malice.
23. There was no improper holding by the Sharps of any
requested

reconveyance, but even if there were, it was not

done in bad faith.

The Sharps acted in reliance on the advice

of their counsel, and did so in good faith.
24. Alternatively, the Sharps did not improperly withhold
reconveyances and plaintiffs have failed to establish a cause
of

action

for

failure

to

reconvey

under

U.C.A.

§57-1-33 <.

U.C.A. §57-1-33 is applicable only when a beneficiary refuses
to request a reconveyance within 30 days after written demand
therefor

is made by the Trustor.

The Sharps requested the

Trustee to reconvey Lots 1-5 on or about January 18, 1984, and
because of plaintiffs1 subsequent breaches were under no obligation to reconvey the remainder of the Subject Property.
25. As a result of plaintiffs' breaches of the Contract,
the Sharps were entitled to record all of the Notices of Default and Notices of Sale described in the Findings against
the Subject Property.
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26. The Sharps acted in good faith and not maliciously in
having recorded the Notices of Default and the Notices of Sale
and in refusing to reconvey Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage.
27. The plaintiffs have not established a cause of action
for slander of title against the Sharps.

The Sharps did not

act maliciously or cause any special damages to the plaintiffs.
28. All of the damages, including, without limitation,
those under U.C.A. §57-1-33, claimed by the plaintiffs are too
remote, conjectural and speculative.

The plaintiffs have

failed to establish they have suffered actual damages resulting from any alleged breach by the Sharps, and this Court concludes no such breach by the Sharps occurred.
29. The attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps in this
matter through August 31, 1988 in the amount of $144,469.75
are
same.

reasonable and the Sharps are entitled to an award of the
Further, the Sharps are entitled to supplement and aug-

ment this amount by affidavit for their reasonable attorney's
fees incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of the
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any posttrial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution or
otherwise, and, if necessary, after prevailing on any appeal.
30o The Sharps are entitled to their costs of court in
the amount as assessed or taxed pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54 and to
post-judgment interest as provided by law.
31. By virtue of the significant and material breaches of
the Contract by the plaintiffs, the Sharps are entitled to
-36-

judgment against Saunders, Felton, Interstate Rentals, Inc.
and Norton, jointly and severally, in the following amounts:
a.

i.
ii.

iii.

Principals

$

371,739.35

March 22, 1988:

$

171,033.54

Late payment charge:

$

14,869.57

TOTAL:

$

557,642.46

Interest through

together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of
$183.32 from and after March 22, 1988.
b.

i.
ii.
iii.

Trustee's fees:

$

1,803.80

Court Costs:

$

2,881.04

$

144,088.75

Attorneys1 fees through
August 31, 1988:

together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per
annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until
paid by plaintiffs.
c.

Delinquent property taxes:

$

20,368.62

together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as
provided by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and
post-judgment interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum.
32. As a result of the significant and material breaches
of the Contract by the plaintiffs, the Temporary Restraining
Order entered in the above captioned matter by the Honorable
Judith M. Billings on September 4, 1986 was wrongfully issued
and the Sharps are entitled to have it lifted and dissolved.

33. The Sharps are entitled to be paid the bond posted by
plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in September, 1986 in
the amount of $2,400 and to be paid from the security posted
by Tracy Collins Bank in the amount of $28,570.63 for their
interest, attorney's fees and other damages incurred as a result of the issuance of the wrongful Temporary

Restraining

Order, and for which amounts the Sharps are not secured by the
fair market value of the Subject Property*
34o The Sharps are entitled to have Lot 6 as described in
the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the
unplatted property more particularly described on Exhibit "A"
attached hereto or such portions thereof as may be sufficient
to pay the amounts found to be due and owing under the Judgment,

together

with

interest

as set forth

hereinabove and

accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, sold at public
auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, in the
manner prescribed by law for such sales; that said Sheriff, if
and when the subject premises are sold by him, out of the proceeds of such sale shall retain first his costs, disbursements
and commission, and then pay to the Sharps, or to their attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs of this action, then said
sums for the Sharps' attorney's fees, and the amount owing to
the Sharps for principal, interest, costs and expenses of sale
and maintenance, taxes, assessments and/or insurance premiums,
together with accrued

interest thereon, or so much of said

sums as said proceeds will pay, and that the surplus, if any,
shall be accounted for and paid over to the Clerk of this
-38-
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Court subject to this Court's further order.
35. All persons having an interest in the subject premises shall have the right, updn producing satisfactory proof of
interest, to redeem the same within the time provided by law
for such redemption; that from and after the expiration of the
period of redemption as provided by law, that the plaintiffs
above named, and each of them, and all persons claiming by,
through or under them, or any of them, shall be forever barred
and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and estate in and
to the subject premises, and that from and after the delivery
of

the

Sheriff's

Deed

to

the

subject

premises

that

the

grantees named therein be given possession thereof.
36. If a deficiency results after due and proper application of the proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are
entitled to be awarded a personal judgment against Saunders,
Felton, Norton and Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them,
jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency.
37. The Sharps are entitled to have the right, at their
request, to one connection to both plaintiffs' culinary water
and sewer systems on White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connection fee of $2,000 each.

38
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38. The Sharps are entitled to have the Complaint of the
plaintiffs dismissed, no cause of action.

DATED this _fyy€ay

COOUN

of

WT

m,

1988.

TTEST
ON KINDLEY
Cterk
By

Dept-^y Gicrk
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Donald J. Winder, Esq. (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq. (#4022)
Tamara K. Prince, Esq. (#5224)
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

2 C 1338
C:sr'- Z-i D:sl Court
Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendants Sharps

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE RANCHES, a
Utah general partnerhip;
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a
Utah general partnership,

^ R .
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Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT

vs.
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah
corporation,

Civil No. C87-1621
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP,

z
o

Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,

2
8

vs.

5

<
O
0

UJ
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ROBERT FELTON, LEON H.
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; KENNETH R. NORTON dba

INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC.,
and PAUL H. LANDES, individually; WHITE PINE RANCHES,
a Utah general partnership,
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES,
a Utah general partnership,
Counterclaim-Defendants,

This

cause

came

on

for

trial

before

the

Honorable

J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29,
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the defendants

John C.

and Geraldine

Y. Sharp

(hereinafter

the

"Sharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A. F.
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enterprises,
Felton
Land

Leon H.

Saunders

(hereinafter

"Saunders"),

Robert

(hereinafter "Felton"), J. Richard Rees and Saunders

Investment Corporation

appearing by counsel Robert M.

Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord.
defendant Kenneth R. Norton

Counterclaim

("Norton") appeared through his

counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim
defendant Norton.
in this action.

Defendant Associated Title was never served
Counterclaim defendant Paul H„ Landes (here-

inafter "Landes") was never served in this action*
Having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law,
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs1

Complaint be dismissed, no cause of

action*
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

Saunders, Felton, Interstate Rentals, Inc. and Norton are indebted, jointly and severally, to the Sharps in the following
amounts :
ao

i.
ii.

iii.

Principal:

$

371,739*35

March 22, 1988:

$

171,033.54

Late payment charge:

$

14,869*57

TOTAL:

$

557,642*46

Interest through

together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of
$183.32 from and after March 22, 1988.
b.

i.
ii.
iii.

Trustee's fees:

$

1,803.80

Court Costs:

$

2,881.04

$

144,088.75

Attorneys' fees through
August 31, 1988:

together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per
annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until
paid by plaintiffs.
c.

Delinquent property taxes:

$

20,368.62

together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as
provided by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and
post-judgment

interest thereon at the rate of 12% per

annum*

3_
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this
Judgment shall be supplemented and augmented in the amount of
the Sharps' reasonable attorney's fees as established by affidavit and as incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any
post-trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution
or otherwise, and after prevailing in any appeal.
IT

IS FURTHER

Temporary

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

Restraining

Order

entered

that the

in the above captioned

matter by the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4,
1986 was wrongfully issued and it is hereby lifted and dissolved.

The Sharps are hereby awarded judgment against the

bond posted by plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in September, 1986 in the amount of $2,400.00 and against the security posted by Tracy Collins Bank with the Clerk of this Court
in the amount of $28,570.63, and for which amounts the plaintiffs are not secured by the fair market value of the subject
premises.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Lot 6 as
described

in the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches

Phase I and the unplatted property more particularly described
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto or such portions thereof as may
be sufficient to pay the amounts found to be due and owing
under this Judgment, together with interest as set forth hereinabove and accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, be
sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State
of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law for such sales; that

said Sheriff, if and when the subject premises are sold by
him, out of the proceeds of such sale shall retain first his
costs,

disbursements

and

commission,

and

then

pay

to

the

Sharps, or to their attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs
of this action, then said sums for the Sharps1

attorneys'

fees, and the amount owing to the Sharps for principal, interest, costs and expenses of sale and maintenance, taxes,
assessments and/or insurance premiums, together with accrued
interest thereon, or so much of said sums as said proceeds
will pay, and that the surplus, if any, shall be accounted for
and paid over

to the Clerk of this Court subject to this

Court's further orders
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all persons having an interest in the subject premises shall have the
right, upon producing satisfactory proof of interest, to redeem the same within the time provided by law for such redemption; that from and after the expiration of the period of redemption as provided by law, that the plaintiffs above named,
and each of them, and all persons claiming by, through or under them, or any of them, shall be forever barred and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and estate in and to the
subject premises, and that from and after the delivery of the
Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises that the grantees named
therein be given possession thereof0

I

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that if a
deficiency results after due and proper

-5~

application of the

ooiaq

proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are hereby awarded
a

personal

judgment

against

Saunders, Felton, Norton

and

Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency.
IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the

Sharps shall have the right, at their request, to one connection to both plaintiffs1 culinary water and sewer systems on
White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connection fee of $2,000
each.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a nonexclusive appurtenant easement shall run with the land, as a
covenant running with the land or as an equitable servitude,
as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and benefit of
the unplatted acreage described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto
and incorporated herein by reference and the owners and purchasers thereof

(including the Sharps) and their invitees,

guests, heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and
for access to and the right to use as a means for ingress and
egress for vehicular and pedestrian access over, under and
across the private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the recorded final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I, recorded with
the Summit County Recorder; and a non-exclusive appurtenant
easement to run with the land, as a covenant running with the
land or as an equitable servitude, as the case may be, in
favor of and for the use and benefit of White Pine Ranches

-6-
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I

Phase I and the owners and purchasers thereof (including the
Sharps) and their heirs and successors in interest for water
lines, water tank and water systems over, under and across the
subject premises near the southwest corner of the unplatted
acreage as also shown on the final recorded plat of White Pine
Ranches Phase I.
IT

IS FURTHER

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the

final plat and Declaration of Protective Covenants recorded
for White Pine Ranches Phase I with the Summit County Recorder's Office and the non-exclusive easements set forth above
shall remain in full force and effect, and not be affected by
the foreclosure ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff's
Sale,

or

a subsequent

redemption of the subject premises,

other than a complete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs
herein

coupled

with

plaintiffs'

declaration

for

the

ex-

tinguishment of the non-exclusive easement in favor of the
unplatted acreage.

00li|

Beginning a t a point South 89 degrees 43 , 36".West along t h e
North l i n e of Lot 8, 175.42 f e e t from the corner of Lots 1
and 8, a brass cap s e t by the U.S. General Land Office, s a i d
b r a s s cap a l s o being South 00 degrees 19'4 6" West along
s e c t i o n l i n e 1336,14 f e e t from the Northeast, corner of
S e c t i o n 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; and running thence South 89 degrees 43*36"
West along the North l i n e of Lot 7 and 8 2948.98 f e e t l t o w t h e
Northwest corner of Lot 7; thence South 00 degrees 1 3 2 9
E a s t along the West l i n e of Lot 7, 1312.84 f e e t to the •
Southwest-corner of Lot 7; thence North 89 degrees 47 f 41 r t
E a s t along the South l i n e of Lot 7, 832.67 f e e t ; thence
North 61 degrees 00'00" East 1956.90 f e e t ; thence Ncrth 47
d e !g r e, ef s 33'IS" East 462.75 f e e t ; thence North- 42 degrees
4 4 4 0 East 85.63 f e e t to the point of beginning.
LESS and excepting White Pine Ranches, Phase I , a Planned Besidential
Development/ according to the official plat thereof on file and of
record i n the Summit County Eecorder's Office, State of Utah.
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SPEOALE & FSLTON
lx.
220 CaortSnmd Row** C««w
Su
324 South Saw Sw«t
SjJtUk«CSty.Ua»> 8*111

801 389-9216

June 30, 1932

Mr. John Sharp

Dear Mr. Sharp:

1982, f c r the
he r s t a l payment
p r i n c i p a l anc

Purchase of the .Property i n V ; n ; l s 2 > 6 l l . 0 6
c f S203.177.5S i s w m p o M d o . ^ ^
apprcval
we
s
S i l 5 . 5 6 6 . 6 4 i - ^ ; f ;* V ^ h e r e l e a s e s f o r the l o t s anc
w i l l n o t i f y ycu t o o b t a i n die
t h e read as c e r t h e conwract.
Very t r u l :

Robert Feito:
Rr/tp
tijclusui'c

UwOffioM
SPEC1ALE & FELTON
Suits 220 Coofdlntfrd Rnandaj C*nt»r
324. South Ststs Stmt
Salt Lak* Oty,Utih 84111-2303

801 359-9218

July 19 f 1983
John Keaton
Attorney At Law
424 East 500 South No. 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
He: Sharp Property
Dear John,
I was writing this letter to inquire about obtaining the
release from Mr. and Mrs. Sharp for the road and five lots.
Under the MEMORANDUM OF CLOSING TERM we are entitled to three
lot plus one for the payment of each 3140.000.00 in principal.
The principal has been reduced by over 3380,000.00 and under the
terms of our agreement we would be entitled to the roadway and
the five lots.
At the present time the plat has not been filed and that
is why I am making this request. As soon as we file the plat
real estate taxes on this property are going to go up significantly, which we would like to avoid until we have an actual
buyer ready for one of the lots. At the same time, we are
anxious to obtain an improvement loan and having title to the
prescribed acreage would greatly assist us in that.
We redesigned the subdivision a little bit so that it will
be in tv.o pnases. The first phase constitutes exactly five lots
and I am enclosing a copy of the plat for your perusal. It is
this property plus the road which we would like to have deeded
to the partnership. I think this substantially complies with
our agreement and I would appreciate it if you would talk to Mr.
Sharp about it«
Also, you might tell Jack that I have put a horrendous
amount of work dueling with Dr. Osguthorpe to guarantee the
public nature of this road without any cost to him. At the present time we have obtained Summary Judgment that the road is a
public road three rods wide. It is anticipated that this mat-

ter will be appealed since Dr. Osguthorpe is as mad as a wet hen.
Please let me know if this is alright and I will send the deeds
over for your clients' signature.

Very Trul^uYours,

ROBERT FELTON

RF/lm
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Mr. John Sharp
5068 Hollacay* Boulevard
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Re:

White Pine Ranch Property

Dear Jack:
Enclosed please find., the Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions and the subdivision plat that Ey Saunders proposes
to record with your approval. The subdivision plat subdivides
only a portion of the property he purchased from you,
specifically tne northern portions of the property, 3y Ey's
signature, which 1 " will obtain to this letter prior to
releasing your consent to the recordation of the subdivision
plat, he agrees that you continue to have your right of
approval with * regard to how the southern portion of the
property is platted. Your signature on the enclosed consent
document only acknowledges your approval of his recording the
plat and the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, copy here
enclosed. At a later time in the near future Ey has indicated
he will seek release of Lots 1 through 5 of the platted
subdivision along with his road (white Pine Lane) and the ten
and one-half foot strip to the County Road Commission. We will
handle that matter when it is presented. For your information,
I have reviewed the payments under the Note and find that he is
entitled to tnc^e releases.
When those releases are jnace,
pursuant to your instruction we will insure th£~ righ-s are
reservec in White. Pine Lane rcr access for the southern
portions cf_ the property purchased from you until your Deed of
Trust is fuiiv caid. Please call me with anv Questions vcu may
have.

*3incerely/f\ .

JCTTC.

rCH:se

TN

v

aeaclin
-cc^^v^di

l « 0 0 RA«« AVENUE
R. O. BOX 30
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November 18/ 1983
OF COUNSEL
MAX K. MAWOUM
LYLS M. \WARO

j A M C S A. BOEVERS
THOMAS J . E P 8 I N
RONAL3 E . N E M R . N G
JEFFREY R. ORtJT,
ROSAUE E. WALKER
j FREDERIC v C R C S ^ J R .
OAVIO * • BROAOBEN,

Fir. John Sharp
5068 Holladay Boulevard
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84117
White Pine Ranch Property
Re:
Dear Jack:
Enclosed please find the Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions and the subdivision plat that Hy Saunders proposes
to record with your approval. The subdivision plat subdivides
only a portion of the property he purchased from you,
specifically the northern portions of the property. Bv Hv's
t
signature, which I will ofrfain tQ ^ ^
l^<-^ pr"nr
"°
-n£.
releasing your consent iofrftere<
*.U i
agrees that
i^f^Your signature on the enclosed consent
property only acknowledges your approval of his recording the
document the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, copy here
plat and
At a later time in the near future Hy has indicated
Lots 1 through 5 of the platted
enclosed.
he will seek release of road (White Pine Lane) and the ten
subdivision along with his the County Road Commission. We will
and one-half foot strip to is presented. For your information,
handle that matter when it x»
^
fcuLC^^uw—
I have reviewed the payments under the Note and find that he is
entitled to those i nreleases.
When
releases are made,
s t r u c t i o n we
w i lthose
l
.pursuant to your :k_„?ine~
^ e ^ n r H nLane
n we ror
will insure taac rich_^s_ are
^z
y n n r r n a s e o , iroin
fullv paid. Please call me with any questions vou
Sincerely,

Jon Co Heaton
Approvec:
JCH:pe
Encl.
13983
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Law OfRcas

SPECIALS & FELTON
Suit* 220 Coordinated Financial Canter
324 South Stats StrMt
Ssit Lafca Cty, Utah 347 71-2303
801 359-9216

November 21, 1983

Jon Heaton
Attorney at Law
424 East 5th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

White Pine Ranch Property

Dear Jon:
Hy gave me your November 18, 1983 letter to Mr. John Sharp•
almost total agreement with that letter except for one item*,

We are in

Tour letter states something regarding the reservation of an easement
along White Pine Lane to be retained by Mr. Sharp for access. This was not
parr of the agreement and is not acceptable since it would mean rewriting our
Covenants at this late date. With the release of Lots 1 - 5 , Mr. Sharp only
needs access to Lot 6 on the north half of the property. It is perfectly
acceptable to us that he retain an easement over White Pine Lane to the
southern part of his property as well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road
up to the western boundary of Lot 6. Actually, Mr. Sharp has no need for the
reservation of any easement since all of the property which will not be
released may be accessed from White Pine Canyon Road. Nevertheless, we think
it is fair that an easement be retained as far as the western boundary of Lot
6,
You should be infomed that we have spent almost two years "fussing11 with
the County for approval of this project and any future delays are
intolerable.
While I realize that we were late on a portion of the payment
because Mr. Hunter did not contribute his partnership share, that problem has
been rectified, including all penalty sums which were due. Tor that delay I
can only apologize, but I must inform you that any delays in formalizing the
items referred to in your letter and this letter will result in losing the
construction financing on this project* That, as you may know, could be very
expensive.
In any event, Mr, Sharp has required that we live up to the * exact terms
of our agreement * Z car. only insist that he now live up to the exact :ems as
written. There is nc erevision for the reservation of an unnecessary easement

across our road which would result in rewriting the covenants on the property,
place an unreasonable burden upon the property to be conveyed, and very
possibly cause us to lose our construction financing.
In summary, I would just like to confirm our position that all rights of
approval which Mr. and Mrs. Sharp retain pursuant to our original purchase
contract certainly continue as to the southern portion of the property. I
would again apologize for the late payment, but I certainly think we paid for
it in full. The easement which Mr. Sharp retains should be limited to the
property which is not deeded pursuant to the terms of the contract and we are
certainly in agreement with that as described in this letter.
Please have your client sign his consent to the recordation immediately
since time is very crucial to our construction financing.

Verj. truly yours,

Robert Felton

RF/tp
cc: Hy Saunders
1899 Long View Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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SPECIALE & FELTON
Suita 220 Cocrcfln*t*xdfinancialCantac
324 South Stitm Street
Salt Late Oty, Utah 84111-2303
801 359-9216

November 21, 1983

Jon Heaton
Attorney at Law
424 East 5th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE: White Pine Ranch Property
Dear Jon:
Hy gave me your November 18, 1983 letter to Mr* John Sharp*
almost total agreement with that letter except for one item*

We are in

Tour letter states something regarding the reservation of an easement
along White Pine Lane to be retained by Hr. Sharp for access* This was not
part of the agreement and is not acceptable since it would mean rewriting our
Covenants at this late date* With the release of Lots 1 - 5 , Mr. Sharp only
^ - O ^ . ^ needs access to Lot 6 on the north half of the property* It is perfectly
t£ ^^
acceptable to us that he retain an easement over White Pine Lane to the
southern part of his property as well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road
' * "• ^\ up to the western boundary of Lot 6. Actually, Mr. Sharp has no need for the
reservation of any easement since all of the property which will not be
tf*
released may be accessed from White Pine Canyon Road. Nevertheless, we think
it is fair that an easement be retained as far as the western boundary of Lot
" - >. 's;
6.
\

^

^

You should be informed that we have spent almost two years "fussing11 with
the County for approval of this project and any future delays are
intolerable. While I realize that we were late on a portion of the payment
because Mr. Hunter did not contribute his partnership share, that problem has
been rectified, including all penalty sums which were due. For that delay I
can o n
^ 7 apologize, but I must inform you that any delays in formalizing the
items referred to in your letter and this letter will result in losing the
financing on this project. That, as you may know, could be very
j construction
expensive.
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In any event, Mr. Sharp has required that we live up to the exact terms
of our agreement. I can only insist that he now live up to the exact terms as
written. There is no provision for the reservation of an unnecessary easement

across our road which would result in rewriting the covenants on the property,
place an unreasonable burden upon the property to be conveyed, and very
possibly cause us to lose our construction financing.
In summary, I would just like to confirm our position that all rights of
approval which Mr. and Mrs. Sharp retain pursuant to our original purchase
contract certainly continue as to the southern portion of the property. I
would again apologize for the late payment, but I certainly think we paid for
it in full. The easement which Mr. Sharp retains should be limited to the
property which is not deeded pursuant to the terms of the contract and we are
certainly in agreement with that as described in this letter.
Please have your client sign his consent to the recordation immediately
since time is very crucial to our construction financing.

V e r ^ truly yours,

Robert Felton

RF/tp
cc: Hy Saunders
1899 Long View Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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Liw OfficM

SPEC1ALE & FELTON
Suiti 220 Coordinated Financial Cantar
324 South Ststt Stnaat
S«ft Uka Ory. Utah S4111-2303
801 359-9216

January 17, 1984

John Heat on
424 East 500 South
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

White Pine Ranches

Dear John:
Because of t h e time, expense, and requirements which Summit
County has imposed upon u s , i t appears t h a t i t w i l l he
i m p r a c t i c a l to develop t h e twelve (12) l o t s at White Pine as
s i n g l e family r e s i d e n t i a l . I t is our i n t e n t to develop t a s t e f u l ,
multi-family developments on t h e t h i r t y (30) acres which have not
been platted*
Would you p l e a s e r e a u e s t Mr. Sharp for h i s consent as t o
I c e r t a i n l y d o n ' t have any
t h i s change in our o r i g i n a l p l a n .
problem if he r e t a i n s some s o r t of review so he p r o t e c t s p r o p e r t y
and the development is not too obnoxious. What we plan t o do i s
t o do a very t a s t e f u l and d i s c r e t e m u l t i - f a m i l y development on
t h e t h i r t y (30) acres which is t h e only way i t w i l l be
economically f e a s i b l e .
I would a p p r e c i a t e i t i f you would ask
Mr. Sharp to send us h i s consent for t h i s change in concept.
Verv t r u l y yours,

Robert Felton

RF/tp

DEFENDANTS
EXHIBIT
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SPEC1ALE & FELTON
Suiti 220 Coordinated Financial Camar
324 South Stat* Street
Sart Lik* Cry, Utah 34111-2303
801 359-3216

January 20, 1984

John Heat on
424 East 5 t h South
No. 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

Deeds to Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5

Dear John:
Ky t a l k e d t o me on January 20, 1984, and to my astonishment,
t o l d me t h a t we have not received t h e deed on our l o t s from Mr.
Sharp. Would you p l e a s e c a l l me and confirm or explain what t h e
situation i s .
I r e a l i z e t h a t t h e deeds for t h e roads may be d i f f i c u l t t o
do, but I am a t a complete loss as t o why t h e other deed h a s n ' t
been r e c e i v e d .
Very t r u l y yours,

r-

Pobert Feltoti

I

!

DEFENDANTS
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SPEC1ALE 81 FSLTON
5 Trad Cantor. Suits 585
Salt Lata Gty, Utah 84180
(801)359-9216

September 2 £ , 1985
Mr- John Sharo
10 Vest 300 South
Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 8M.01
SZ:

White Pine Ranches

Dear Mr. Sharp:
I received a Notice of Default regarding Ey's inability to
pay his share of the June 30th payment to you.
I wanted to touch base with you to assure you that I am not
ignoring this problem and am very concerned since I have made my
portion of the payment and am prepared to complete the final
payment next yearIn any event, I wanted to assure you that every attempt is
being made to resolve the problem and I should have a better idea
in a couple of weeks as to the ability of the remaining interest
to satisfy that obligation.
When I have a better feel for what can be done I will give
you a call and I would like to sit down and discuss it with you.
Vezpy truly yours

Robert Felton

RF/to
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Law Offices

SPEC1ALE & FELTON
5 Triad Canter, Suits 585
Salt Lain City. Utah 84180
(801)359-9216

February 2 4 ,
Mr. J o h n Sharp
3 0 0 0 Connor
S a l t Lake C i t y ,
Dear

Utah

1986

84103

Jack;

I will try and explain to you the difficulties we have
encountered regarding White Pine Canyon Road which has been one
of the fundamental problems in the delay of our .project and is
one of the causes of our inability to now complete the timely
payments to you.
When the property was purchased from you it was understood
that there was a 49.5 foot right-of-way from the State KTghvay up
to the property. We operated on that assumption when we
purchased the property.
In any event, as a condition of the approval of our
development, Summit County imposed a requirement that we widen
the County road in accordance with County standards to 24 foot
driveable surface. After having us agree to that condition the
County, and especially Mr. Strebel, informed us that D.A.
Osguthorpe contested the existence of a County road and the
width. The County was and continues to be unwilling to go to bat
for us or pursue any legal remedies at all in regards to this
road and, therefore, we were given the ultimatum that if we
wanted to develop this property it was our problem to deal with
Dr. Osguthorpe.
As a result we were forced to file a lawsuit against
Osguthorpe which finally ended up in a Summary Judgment
proceeding in the summer of 1983, almost two years later. The
District Court Judge stated that where Osguthorpe has property
just below you the County road was 49.5 feet wide.
Because of the financial constraints that this delay had
placed upon us, in conjunction with other problems, we had no
choice but to go ahead aad perform the required task, even though
that case has now been appealed to the Supreme Court and should
it be overruled we would be out of business.
DEFENDANTS
EXHIBIT
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I think you have to understand that at no time had anyone,
yourself or the County, ever come to our assistance to help
Vccomplish or solve this problem and the result is still up in
the air almost five years after we started.
There is another part of this dilemma which has further
confused this issue. The County has used a tax-exempt
description of a road three rods wide originating out of the
Condas litigation in 1928 and 1980. Those cases described White
Pine Canyon Road above us as a road three rods wide which appears
to go right through the middle of your house.
If you will look on the attached map you will see a red line
which goes through the middle of your property. That is. the
described White Pine Canyon Road as set forth in the County's
tax-exempt description. The existing road is marked by the black
line .
If these problems are not enough, there has been a further
complication. In 1956 Jim Ivers and his wife deeded the County a
three road right-of-way to try and clear up any discrepancy in
White Pine Canyon Road where it abutted their property. However/
because of a mistake by the surveyor, the road that was described
does not conform exactly to that on the ground. If you will
refer to the attached plat you will see the blue line which
describes the description in the 1956 deeds. You will see that a
majority of the description exists next to the long right-of-way
coming off the State highway but at the bend appears to veer off
the traveled surface somewhat. Also, the description does not
join about half way up the straight-of-way. This problem, in and
of itself, would not have bean crucial except for a secret
arrangement which the County entered into with the Estate of Jim
Ivers commencing in 1981 and culminating in 1983.
You should keep in mind that during the period of 1981 to
1983 we are actively involved in litigating the existence and
width of a portion of White Pine Canyon Road with Dr. Osguthorpe
on behalf of the County.
In any event, in early 1981, Stan Strebel acting on behalf
of the County enters into secret negotiations with the attorney
for Jim Tver Sr.'s Estate to change the deeded right-of-way»
In
1981 the Estate of Jim Ivers and Jim Ivers delivered deeds to Mr.
Strebel for property in White Pine Canyon Road which all lays
within the fence line but is not even close to the 49*5 width of
the right-of-way. In fact, the map which shows the property
which Ivers has given back to the County by these deeds in 1981
shows that the property is only 11 feet wide on one end of the
road instead of 3 rods°
The County, at no point, ever tells us or anyone else about
this transaction to swap deeds with the Ivers. In any event, Mr.
Strebel keeps the deeds in his office for two years while we are
involved in trying to litigate this issue with Osguthorpe.

0077

On March 22, 1983 the Summit County Commission, once again
without notice to anyone, authorizes the deeds to be recorded. I
am enclosing a copy of the minutes of that day as well as a copy
of the survey which describes the property which has now been
deeded from Ivers to the County. In exchange for this the County
deeded back the entire three rod right-of-way from 1956. This
amounted to an exchange of over four acres for just over one acre
of property by the County.
Last summer Jim Ivers threatened to sue us for trespassing
because he asserts that the road is only 24 feet wide and to
support that kind of a surface our pushing road base beyond the
24 feet was a trespass.
To keep you fully informed, I should note that in the 1956
deeds from Ivers to the County there was a reversionary clause
that stated if the County didn't use the road or maintain it, it
would revert back to Ivers. There was no time limit on that and
you can clearly see that a majority of the description did lie in
the maintained County road portion.
One now has to ask the question as to where everyone sits
and as to the road issue alone what has been the problem. If you
were to look at the map it appears that there is now a road from
the highway up through Ivers' which varies from 11 to 37 feet
wide. The County has given up a 49.5 foot right-of-way without
notice to anyone, there is a case pending in the Utah Supreme
Court which may completely shut down our project if it is lost
because the road is not as represented, and there is a described,
tax-exempt road which may go right through the middle of your
hous e.
I have tried to be as detailed in describing the problem of
this road as I can, and I would be happy to get together with you
or Jon and tell you in more detail, but the bottom line is that
this road mess has been a contributing factor to the delay in
this project and my personal opinion is that we have been hung
out to dry by everyone.
While it is unnecessary for me to go into the legal
ramifications of this mess, I think the ethical considerations
are certainly obvious.
One thing I should mention is that, against our wishes, the
County made us install a sewer line up this Canyon which services
your property as well as our. This line will service between
2,000 and 4,000 hook-ups and we had to put it in for our six
units.
The transaction I have described with the Ivers family has
probably narrowed the road to a degree that we will not be able
to recover sums on hook-up fees, nor will this Canyon be able to
be developed now to the capacity of the sewer because the roads
would have to be 44 feet wide and the County has given away its
right-of-way.

I understand that you may question your responsibility in
this action and we are certainly not blaming you as being
directly responsible, but it was represented to Hy prior to
buying this property that there wasTa "49".5""foot roa*d right-of-way
up the Canyon which apparently does not exist and that fact has
been one of the substantial causes of our problems in this
development.
I hope this letter is informative and you can be considerate
or our problems as well as the factual cause, whether that be
intentional, malfeasance (Summit County) or an implied or omitted
condition of this development.
I look forward to working with you in the future, and if you
have been out of town I would urge you to give a Hy a call since
he is anxious to get in touch with you and see what can be worked
out •
Very /truly yoyts?,

Robert Felton
RF/tp
Enclosure
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Law Offices

SPECIALE & FELTON
5 Triad Canter, Suita 585
Salt Lake Cry. Utah 84180
(801)359-9216

February

M r . John Sharp
3000 Connor Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
RE:

27, 1986

84108
Notice

of Default

and

Contract

Dear Jack:
I received notice that the Trustee's Sale has again been
scheduled for A p r i l .
Since it appears inevitable that we will
have to litigate the contractual rights of the parties I wanted
to make sure that our position was clear to you.
The first problem that I need to address is that if we
institute litigation, which now seems inevitable either in the
form of a lawsuit or a bankruptcy, I will be requesting Prince,
Yeates to withdraw as counsel.
The reason for this is that
Howell Investment Company is a partner in the remaining 30 acres
and Jon Heaton also represents the H o w e l l s .
Because of this
conflict of interest I would appreciate knowing the name of your
new attorney and maybe we can get some of the preliminary matters
worked out should court action be necessary.
The other items which present a problem are, besides the
road problem which I have addressed in a separate letter, the
fact that you have not deeded us the property to which we were
entitled and, also, under the terms of the contract you owe us
approximately $ 73 , 000 . 00• for the cost of water and sewer hook-ups
which are now available.
Under the terms of the contract we have paid for
approximately 7.5 acres of property located in the unrecorded
area.
In addition, in the event you did not pay us the sums due
for the water and sewer, which we are hereby requesting, and thus
that sum / approximately $73,000.00,13 applied to the amounts
alreaay paid, you would be required to deed us 10 acres of
property.
Before I get an exact survey of the property I would
appreciate it if you would let me know which of the two
alternatives you would like to pursue.

I
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Enclosed with this letter is a breakdownof the costs for
the water and sewer line dated November 18, 1985. In addition to
those sums, additional sums for drilling the well in the amount
of $85,000.00 to $100,000.00 was expended and engineering costs
in the sum of approximately $75,000.00. The total cost for
engineering of this project comes to approximately $168,000.00.
The last item which concerns me is your apparent failure to
deed the road located in White Pine Ranches Phase I which was
suppose to have been done approximately three years ago.
As you can tell, there are substantial terms of the contract
which were caused by you and have existed for some years and I
wanted to give you notice of these defects so that there is no
allegation that you didn't know about them.
We would be happjr to provTd^^-accounting information and
survey information if you will put in writing that you
acknowledge liability, but I don't want to >pend a lot of time
and money if you do not plan to comply.
Also, since the described County road apparently goes
through your living room and is not located whede it is
designated, I would appreciate it if you would comply with the
contract and deed the road to the County in conformance with the
contract.
I would be happy to discuss this matter with you or your new
attorney at any time, but I would appreciate a written response
as to your intentions.
Very pruly

y / /

I

Robert Felton
RF/tp
cc: Jon Heaton
Hy Saunders
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Lew Offices

SPECIALE & FELTON
5 Triad Center. Suite 585
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
(801)359-9216

May 7 ,

1986

John and Geraldine Sharp
3000 Conner
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
RE:
Dear Mr-

White Pine

Ranches

Sharp:

1 have not heard from you or your new attorney as to my
February 24, 1986 letter.
I would like to reiterate the position
set forth in that letter, as well as alert you to a couple of
other problems which have arisen.
The first problem is that your failure to deed us the road
and lot 6 as provided for in the contract are about to impair a
sale of that lot and I would again request that you immediately
deed us the road and the lot as provided forThose items were
to have been conveyed to us some years ago.
The last item which I wish to clear up is any dispute about
the fact that you will not deed us any property for which we have
paid on the left side of our road because it is not platted.
We are in a position to prepare and obtain approval of that
plat immediately.
If you will acquiesce, in writing, that you
intend to comply with those terms of the contract, we will
immediately perform that act.
I find it quite disturbing that we have received no response
from you whatsoever, in spite of the fact that Hy has requested
your input.
It is my understanding that M r . Heaton was
instructed not to respond.
While you may know that Hy has his own difficulty which
distrubed me from my position as a member of the partnership and
a purchaser of the property, I am equally upset by your disregard
of the contract term and your apparent unwillingness to attempt
to resolve this matter.

1
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It appears to me that unless the parties sit down, recognize
the problems and responsibilities which both sides of this matter
bear, that some judge or jury is going to be making a decision on
this case and that title to the property is going to be clouded
for years*
I would urge you to get in contact with Hy to see if the
differences in this matter cannot be resolved, but maybe this is
just one of those cases where we f re going to have to let someone
else make the decisions for us*

Robert Felton

RF/tp
cc: Hy Saunders

0083

Law Office*

SPECIALE

&

FELTON

6 TRIAD CENTER. SUITE 8 8 8
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 4 1 8 0
801~889-93S6

March 24,. 1987
S t e v e Clegg
P .0 . Box 4365
Park C i t y , Utah 84060
RE;

White Pine

Dear S t e v e :
You asked me to w r i t e you a l e t t e r regarding some confusion
as t o the l i t i g a t i o n as i t r e l a t e s to the three l o t s you have
l i s t e d i n White Pine Ranches*
The c u r r e n t l i t i g a t i o n does not a f f e c t the m a r k e t a b i l i t y or
encumber t h a t p r o p e r t y . I t i s e s s e n t i a l l y an a c t i o n for a refund
and damages as a r e s u l t of the e x t r a o r d i n a r y delays but the
s e r v i c e s and water are done and guaranteed to those l o t s .
The s t a t u s of the water i s t h a t the water system i s
c o m p l e t e l y done and water r i g h t s have been transferred to the
w e l l and* w i l l be a v a i l a b l e for those three l o t s .
The sewer system i s completed and the only charge w i l l be
the hook-up f e e a s s e s s e d by S n y d e r v i l l e Basin Sewer Improvement
District.
The sewer l i n e i s completed a l l the way through the
development to the highway. The e l e c t r i c i t y w i l l be i n s t a l l e d as
soon as anyone wants to build t h e r e .
None of the pending l i t i g a t i o n a f f e c t s the three l o t s you
have l i s t e d and the water and sewer are complete and ready to g o .

Robert F e l t o a

RF/tp
} DEFENDANTS
I
EXHIBIT

w
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ATTORNEYS
AT
LAW

WINDER&HASIAM

DONALDJ. WINDER

bUlTE 4004
175 WEST 200 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101
(801) 322-2222

September 30, 19 86

Mr. Steven E. Clyde
Attorney at Law
CLYDE & PRATT
American Towers, Suite 200
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

Sharp adv. White Pine Ranches

Dear Steve:
My clients wish to make their position abundantly clear regarding any potential sale of Lot 6 or of any of the unplatted acreage. My clients will not hinder or in any way prevent a sale of such property, upon reasonable terms. If
they prevail in the litigation or otherwise and obtain a
return of the property, such a sale could only be of benefit to them.
Accordingly, should Bob Sammons want to close on a purchase
of Lot 6 or should you receive any other serious offer,
please let me know immediately. We will make every effort
to promptly take all steps reasonable under the circumstances
to work with your clients concerning a sale of Lot 6 or the
unplatted acreage.
Sincerely yours,

DNALD J. WINDER
DJW/cas
cc:

John t .

and Geraldine Y. Sharp
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SPEOALE & FRTON
Suits 220 CFS RnancW Cirnr
324 South S m StrMC
Sail Ufc* Oty,Ut*j S*111-2301
(801) 36&-t21*

J u l y 26, 1984

Summit County
Governoring Board
of Summit County Commissioners
Gentlemen:
The following claim is submitted for your consideration by
White Pine Ranches, a Utah partnership. The submission of this
claim should not be construed to imply that claimant believes it
is necessary or required since the causes of action giving rise
to our claim do not, in our opinion, require this notice.
In any event, the claimant, by and through its partner and
attorney, Robert Felton, submit the following claim:
1. The sum of $117,297.15 being the costs of the off-site
sewer which we were, under protest, required to install to
service the subdivision. This sum is arrived at due to our
engineers estimate as to the cost and is supported by the
attached letter. The basis for this claim is fundamentally
described in my September 16* 1J98J* letter to the Board of
Commissioners, a'copy of which is attacned to this claim.
Further, the basis for tnis cxaim violates OMT rights W
guaranteed under the laws of the State of Utah as well as the
Constitution of Utah and the Constitution of the United States.
While there are numerous cases supporting our position as will
become apparent in the event litigation is necessary the
fundamental basis is found is a statement by the Utah Supreme
Court in that a municipal fee "related to services lifce water and
sewer must not require a newly developed property to bear more
than their equitable share of the capital share of costs in
relationship to benefits conferred*. Banberrv Development v«
South Jordan, Utah, 631 P2d 899 (1981). The Banberry decision
sets forth seven
factors in determining the reasonableness of the
imposition of capital construction on newly developed property
and at the requirement of the off-site sewer, in light of the
fact tha£ the Utah State Health Department was in a position to
approve the use of septic tanks which were authorized by State
law and by ordinances of the County renders this requirement
ur.reascr.ab le.

r\'\^n

Damages to be determined f*r j the
plow the White Pine Canyon Road
It is anticipated that becaua
or more sales and anticipate the damages, .lossif^lprofitiM^S^
interest at between $250,000 and $500,000.
— - The discriminatory application of zoning lavs *with the
specific intent to extract unreasonable demands from claimant mm
veil as damage or prevent claimant's project from being
accomplished. Claimant shall assert claims against the County
and its employees pursuant to Section 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 et seq.
for vhich no claim need be filed vith this County Commission.
Further, claimant shall allege damages for the loss of sale,
reduction in business, and damages suffered in reduction to
profit, incidental damages, loss of reputation, or otherwise
because of the malicious and conserted misapplication and
discrimination applied to claimant. Said acts on behalf of the
County and its officers and agents acting in their official
capacity or otherwise include, but are not limited to: (1) the
imposition of unreasonable and extreme requirements to have the
subdivision approved including litigating unnecessary claims;
(2) discriminatory application of the lavs and ordinances of the
State of Utah that other land owners were allowed to subdivide
and develop property with no requirement as to improvements of
access or municipal services or compliance with County or State
law; (3) refusal to provide services, including snow plowing
based upon discriminatory application and thereby depriving
claimants of access to their property.
Claimants assert that the damages and liability created by
this continuing cause of action, to the best of claimant's
ability, will be between $300,000.00 and $1,000,000.00.
The foregoing claims may be in part or wholly asserted
against Stan Strebel as an employee and against Synderville Basin
Sewer Improvement District in that Utah case lav specifies that
such special service district is a branch of county government.
The foregoing claims are hereby submitted for your
consideration.

STATE OF UTAH
C0UHTY OF SALT LAKE

81139
)

;U3SC2:BED and SWCRN to before ae, a notarv sublie, on this,

0'JS7

th« /

July, 1984.
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My Commission Expires:
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Robert Felton, 1056
George H. Speciale, 3053
5 Triad Center
Suite 585
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Phone:
(801) 359-9216
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT

DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL

COURT

DIVISION

* * * * * * * * *
WHITE PINE RANCHES, a
partne rship,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
LEON H. SAUNDERS

V8 .

Civil No.

SUMMIT COUNTY, RON PERRY,
CLIFF BLONQUIST, and GERALD
YOUNG, as Commissioners of
Summit County, STAN STREBEL,
individually and as Planning
Director of Summit County,
SNYDERVILLE BASIN SEWER
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, and
JOHN DOES I through X,

C84-2090W

Defendants.

* * * * * * * * *

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

I,

Leon

Ho

)

ss

Saunders,

being

first

duly

sworn,

depose

state;

R0266

and

7.

Based

specializing

upon

approval

would

be had i n

of

White

of

The

range

state

December,
for

June,

1981,

for

for

White

principally

Pine

s u c h l o t s was e x t r e m e l y

active.

From D e c e m b e r ,
continual

through delays i n
the

Planning

satisfied
10.
below,

I

had

project

is

11.
reduce
acre
rather

delay

Commission

market

of

of

threatened

and

in

to

to

submitted,

two months

either

and which

lot

in

the

Subdivision

is

cut

of C a l i f o r n i a ,

end

of

to

1981,

the

forward

process,

the

and

the

present,

with

have

I

the

hrve

project
cauied

been a v o i d e d

and

or

building

lots

escalated

much

of

which

the

is

are
now

detailed
virtually

to be s e v e r a l

real

property

times
in

the

foreclosure.

the
the

delays,

various
project

seek
to

to

delays,

it

from t w e l v e

utilize

septic

the Snyderville

became
(12)
tank

necessary

to s i x

(6)

sewage

B a s i n Sewer

-

3

to

five-

disposal

Improvement

Dis t r i c t •

-

B026S
0030

in

marV.et

most of w h i c h were
might

various

improvements

by

than c o n n e c t i n g

building

Ranches

the

going

exclusive

anticipated,

t h e s c o p e of
lots,

as

that

time.

for

cost

Owing

developer

I anticipated

allowing

continuing

the a p p r o v a l

As a r e s u l t

non-existent,
what

1980,

at an e a r l i e r

the

estate

Subdivision,

from t h e S t a t e
through

encountered

real

exclusive

continuing

9.

by

Ranches

market

projected

1980,

a

circumstances.

relevant

buyers,

as

i n Summit C o u n t y ,

Pine

or a b o u t

way f o r u n f o r e s e e n

price

experience

in developments

final

8.

my

landowner's accountant

that he has not been In the State of Utah

since 1985 and has no plans to come back to Utah.

Apparently I

will be unable to get his approval.
38.

Plaintiff

has

incurred

costs

for the subdivision as

f©Hows:
Construction Financing

$650,000.00

additional Engineering and Architectural Fees

$57,000.00

Water to Service Project Purchased
from Outside Source

$80,000.00

Well Drilling

$65,000,00

Morley Construction Company for Additional
Road Construction and Snovplowing

$38,602.26

Harper Excavating for Excavation and Road Base

$11,641.00

Armco Steel for Conduits for Road

$4,470.25

Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District
for Engineering Fees (we still owe over $5,000)

$2,090.17

Bruce Ericksen for Tree Removal

$350.00

Steve Clyde for Legal Work for Transfer
of Water Rights

$4,227.01

Roger Dean for Gravel for Well

$794.33

Bryce Montgomery for Hydrogeologlc Service

$75.00

Rhodes Brothers to Test Pump of Well

$6,935.00

C. & R. Sales for Additional Construction

$1,949.45

The

total

for

these

"municipal

type

services"

is

approximately $923,130.00, or $153,855.75 per lot,
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DATED this

/ 7 — - day of March, 1986.

Leon H« S a u n d e r s
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

QM±Htkn^

ss

I, the undersigned, do hereby represent that I am the signer
of

the foregoing

instrument

and

that

all information

contained

therein is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

s^Cc^i
Leon H. Saunde rs

(IJU^

A

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

SUBSCRIBED

)

ss

and SWORN

H. Saunders on this, the

to' before me, a notary public, by Leon
/ / day of March, 1986.
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Robert Feltou 1056
George H. Speciale, 3053
5 Triad Center
Suite 585
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Phoue: 1801) 359-9216
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
* * * * * * * * *

WHITE PINE RANCHES, a
partnership,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
DAMAGES AND FOR DECLARATORY
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

vs .

Civil No.

SUMMIT COUNTY, RON PERRY,
CLIFF BLONQUIST, and GERALD
YOUNG, as Commissioners of
Summit County, STAN STREBEL,
individually and as Planning
Director of Summit county,
SNYDERVILLE BASIN SEWER
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, and
JOHN DOES I through X,

C84-2090W

Defendants.
* * * * * * * * *
Plaintiff complains of Defendants and alleges;

I.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
lc

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U*S.C»

§1337 of the

First and Thiru Causes of Action of this Complaint which arise
under "Sections 4 and 16 of the CLayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 915 and
27, to enjoin the activities of Defendants hereinafter recited
and to recover treble damages and the costs of suit, including
reasonable attorney's fees, for injuries sustained by Plaintiff
by reason of Defendants' violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U*S.C. 3^1 and 2.

B02S4

XVIIIJURY DEMAND
61.

Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Plaintiff demands a jury trial-

XIX.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendants and each
of them,
1.

Declariug that the conduct of the Defendants, and each

of them, is unlawful,
2o

For general damages in an amount to be determined caused

by Derendants' imposition of unlawful restrictions and conditions
arising from Defendants' violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, the Utah Anti-Trust Act, 42 U . S . C

1983, and the

Constitution of the State of Utah,
3.

Plaintiff is entitled to damages for the reduction in

value of their property caused by Defendants, loss of the
property, reasonable cost of work performed, additional costs
incurred as a result of the actions of the Defendants in a sura
not less than Six Million Dollars
4.

($6,000,000.00),

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendan:,

Snydervilie Basin Sewer Improvement District for the value of tie
benefit conferred upon them by the improvements unlawfully
required to be installed by Plaintiff in an amount not less thai
Seven Million Dollars ($7,000,000.00) representing the capital ;o
be received by the Defendants from hook-up fees to the sewer
installed by the Plaintiff,

B0302
0094
-

1 Q

-

5.

tor

punitive

general damages

damages

awarded

in an amount

Plaintiff

treble

or as otherwise

the amount

of

deemed

approp riate;
6.

For attorneys' fees

and costs pursuant

to Section

4 of

the Claycon Act, Utah Code Ann. §76-10-919, and 42 U.S.C. §1988,
7.

For injunctive

relief

For such other

and

to the extent

justified

by

the

proof,
8.
just

further

relief

as the Court

deems

in the premises.
DATED

this

///

day

of March,

19S6o

SPECIALE

Ro/bert

& FELTON

Felton
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Robert Felton, 1056
George H. Speciale. 3053
5 Triad Center
Suite 585
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Phone,
(801) 359-9216
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
* * * * * * * * *

WHITE PINE RANCHES
partnership

a
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORIES
AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS BY DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff
vs -

Civil No.

SUMMIT COUNTY, RON PERRY,
CLIFF BLONQUIST, and GERALD
YOUNG, as Commissioners of
Summit County, STAN STREBEL
individually and as Planning
Director of Summit County,
SNYDERVILLE BASIN SEWER
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT and
JOHN DOES I through X,

C84-2090W

Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * *
I,

Hy

Saunders,

answer

Defendants'

Interrogatories

and

Request for Production of Documents as follows.
INTERROGATORY NO. 1.
plaintiff's
White

ownership

Pine

Canyon,

Please identify the nature and extent of

interest

Summit

in

County,

the real property
State

located

of Utah, which

in

is the

subject matter of the plaintiff's claims in this action
ANSWER*
approximately
Contract.
is

Plaintiff

the

real

property

in

1981 pursuant to the terms ofa Uniform Real Estate

The entire parcel of property which is being purchased

approximately

contract

purchased

from

sixty

Jack

and

(60)

acres

Geraldine

and

Sharpo

was

purchased

The

portion

( DEFENDANTS 1
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I Ar7

I

under
of

the

J 0571

include
forced

Plaintiff's
to

litigate

property
the

in

the district

necessity

of

this

and Plaintiff was

maintenance

District Court of Salt'Lake County, State of Utah.
Court

thereafter

ordered

Summit

County

to

in

the

The District
provide

said

maintenance which they have failed and refused to do.
Also see my deposition taken March 6, 1986.
INTERROGATORY
contained

in

identify

all

paragraph

9.
25

or

respect

worksheets,

other

identified

With

to

of the plaintiff's

documents

corresondence
expenditures

NO.

written
therein,

set

allegations

Complaint,

compilations

memoranda
and

the

which

forth

please

of

data,

support

the

method

and

the

manner by which the figure of One Million Dollars in damages was
computed, including the identification of any and all worksheets,
compilations

of

data,

correspondence

or other written memoranda

or documents used in computing that figure.
ANSWER.
damages.

The

Amended

It is anticipated

Complaint

sets

forth

different

that the damages will be as follows

and the supporting documents are being produced for counsel.
(a)

Loss of the

property at 1981 appraised value 5.4

million dollars,
(b)
There

is no

fees,

nor

Legal fees for litigation
debt

did

he

from

the Partnership

keep

time,

but

it

required by the County*
to Mr.- Felton
is

for these

anticipated

that

a

reasonable fee for all three cases would be around $30,000.00,
(c)
(d)

Engineering costs $158,000 00,
Improvements

$650,000.00

plus accrued

March, 1986 in the approximate sum of $19,000 00.

interest*to

This interest

accrues at the approximate rate of $6,600.00 per month
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(e)
Snyderville

Benefit
Basin

of

Sewer

the

bargain

Improvement

as

to

District

the
for

Defendant
the

amount

realized by the sewer line under the illegal contract in the sum
of $7,000,000,00 to $12,000,000o00,
(f)

Cost of the well which is being lost

approximately

$100,000 .00,
(g)

See my Affidavit attached hereto as to summary and

additional costs and damages,
(h)

These only reflect actual damages, not punitive or

special damages»
The

loan

documents

are

the

there

documents.

In

event

foreclosure,

compensation

as

being

provided

is

to the

any

in

property

value

of

that

separate

left

after

property

as

proven at trial will be deducted from the alleged damages.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10.

Describe with particularity those facts

upon which you rely in support of the contention in paragraph 27
of the Complaint

that the acts of defendants constitute illegal

and anticompetitive activities as alleged therein,ANSWER.
Interrgatory

Please refer to my deposition and to the Answer to
No.

8.

It

is my understanding

that

there

is an

exemption in the Utah Anti-Trust Act for authorized action, but
the actions

complained

beyond

authority

the

of were without sanction of law and were
of

Mr.

Strebel

and

Summit

County.

The

result w.as to frustrate or prevent Plaintiff's development to the
benefit of other developers* to illegally restrain Plaintiff from
providing
Plaintiff's

OJSS

its

own

sewage

development

so

removal
the

service

project

- 14 -

would

and
be

to

frustrate

lost,

thereby

J 0584

insuring

greater

District

to f u l l y

of

Plaintiff.

disposal

development
capitalize

It

is

also

and

more

proceeds

to

the

Sewer

on the c a p i t a l improvements required
my understanding

that

in Utah sewage

or sewer systems are not governmental type jobs but are

"private n•
INTERROGATORY

NO- 1 1 .

State

with

particularity

those

facts

upon w h i c h y o u b a s e y o u r c l a i m i n P a r a g r a p h s 36 t h r o u g h 46 of t h e
Fifth
of

Cause
the

of A c t i o n

Defendant

Plaintiff's

amply

civil

Please

Interrogatory
In

herein

federal

ANSWER;

Summit

and A s s o c i a t e s .

the

right-of-way
County

will

improvement

my

the actions

deprivation

deposition

and

by

and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s

the

minutes

Planning

present

time

servicing

I

have

my p r o p e r t y

law.

This

not

allow

me t o

will

significantly

A 60 f o o t

by

County.

me t-o i m p r o v e

right-of-way
Summit
capital

the

of

the

Answer

to

s e t forth

are

Summit

County

and J . J . J o h n s o n

I have been d e p r i v e d

to

and

of

Commission

o f l a w and c o n t r a r y

property.
Summi-t

see

In addition,

contrary

proceed,

a

that

rights

County

due p r o c e s s

At

constitute

the facts

demonstrated

without

Complaint

No. 8 h e r e i n .

addition,

Commission,

from

of P l a i n t i f f ' s

of my p r o p e r t y

to law.

recently

found- out

has b e e n

forfeited

not allow

recover

for

the

the

by Summit

my d e v e l o p m e n t

costs

diminishes

that

the

to

capital

value

of

the

has been taken as a requirement

County
plants

has taken
which

large

sums

of money

are not located

on my

property.

T ncrocr

LeRoy Pia, 4444 South 700 East, No. 204, Salt Lake City,
Utah.

Mr.

Pia

is

an

appraiser

appraisal on the property.

who

is

currently

doing

an

No report has yet been received, but

when it is, it will be produced for the DefendantsJohn Haycock, 50 West 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Mr.

Maycock has been contacted regarding being available as an expert
witness to testify as to the transactions between the Ivers, the
road, and the legality or authority of the requirements imposed
upon Plaintiff.

At the present time he has not been retained

but has expressed his willingness to testify.

His testimony will

be requested in the same general areas as that of Mr. Anderson.
DATED this [j f—

day of March, 1986.

Leon K. Saunders
STATE OF UTAH )
:

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
I,

Leon

foregoing
information

H.

)

Saunders,

instrument
and

SS*

is

do
true

hereby
to

the

declare
best

state
of

my

that

the

knowledge,

belief

- NQgl^4js
the

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN t o b e f o r e me, a notaryv p u b l i c ,
S i r day o f M a r c h , 1 9 8 6 .
V
\
^
*
Notary \Public
Residing at;
«ires:

- 28

-

\A
CN/VM

on t h i s ,

